A Dynamic Model of Censorship
- Type of resource
- Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2020
- Digital origin
- born digital
- 1 online resource
- online resource
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Since 1989, Stanford University's Department of Economics has hosted a series of workshop sessions in economic theory and mathematical economics. This program is known as the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE). Its purpose is to advance economic science for the benefit of society and to support cutting-edge work of economic theorists within specialized areas of research. The SITE Archives documents the workshop proceedings over time. Access to the presented papers is available in cases where the original material was provided by the author(s). This portion of the archive includes records describing papers where a copy of the original material is preserved and accessible.
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We model censorship as a dynamic game between an agent and an evaluator. Two types of public news, good and bad news, are informative about the agent’s ability. However, the agent can hide bad news from the evaluator, at some cost, and will do so if and only if this secures her a significant increase in tenure. Thus, the evaluator faces a bandit problem with endogenous news processes. When bad news is conclusive, the agent always censors when the public belief is sufficiently high, but below a threshold, she entirely or partially stops censoring. The possibility of censorship hurts the evaluator and the good agent, and it may also hurt the bad agent. However, when bad news is inconclusive, we show that the good agent censors bad news more aggressively than the bad agent does. This improves the quality of public information and may benefit all players.
- Presented at SITE on August 3, 2020
- Session series
- Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets
- Organizer of meeting:
- Board, Simon, Doval, Laura, Liang, Annie, Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Sugaya, Takuo, Thomas, Caroline
- This session brings together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in dynamic games and contracts. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines, in particular, helping raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields. We’re aiming for a roughly even split between micro theory papers and papers from other areas. This is a continuation of successful SITE sessions in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Last year, we attracted people from economics, finance, operations research, political economy, and other related fields, ranging from PhD students to senior professors. We hope to have a similar number of attendees this year as in the past. Specific topics likely to be covered include repeated and stochastic games, dynamic optimal contracts, dynamic market pricing, reputation, search, and learning and experimentation.
- Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics
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- This publication is open for research use. Copyright is retained by the author(s) or their heir(s).