Cooptation: Meritocracy vs. Homophily in Organizations
- Type of resource
- Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2020
- Digital origin
- born digital
- 1 online resource
- online resource
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Since 1989, Stanford University's Department of Economics has hosted a series of workshop sessions in economic theory and mathematical economics. This program is known as the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE). Its purpose is to advance economic science for the benefit of society and to support cutting-edge work of economic theorists within specialized areas of research. The SITE Archives documents the workshop proceedings over time. Access to the presented papers is available in cases where the original material was provided by the author(s). This portion of the archive includes records describing papers where a copy of the original material is preserved and accessible.
- Digital collection
- 3144 digital items
The paper investigates factors that undermine meritocracy and policies that may restore it. To this purpose, it analyzes the Markovian dynamics, the entrenchment and the welfare properties of an organization whose members’ cooptation decisions are driven by two motives: quality and homophily. It investigates policy interventions (affirmative action, quality assessment exercises, overruling of majority decisions) and analyzes when these have unintended consequences. The paper also generates a rich set of testable implications.
- Presented at SITE on August 4, 2020
- Session series
- Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets
- Organizer of meeting:
- Board, Simon, Doval, Laura, Liang, Annie, Skrzypacz, Andrzej, Sugaya, Takuo, Thomas, Caroline
- This session brings together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in dynamic games and contracts. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines, in particular, helping raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields. We’re aiming for a roughly even split between micro theory papers and papers from other areas. This is a continuation of successful SITE sessions in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019. Last year, we attracted people from economics, finance, operations research, political economy, and other related fields, ranging from PhD students to senior professors. We hope to have a similar number of attendees this year as in the past. Specific topics likely to be covered include repeated and stochastic games, dynamic optimal contracts, dynamic market pricing, reputation, search, and learning and experimentation.
- Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics
- Use and reproduction
- This publication is open for research use. Copyright is retained by the author(s) or their heir(s).