Crime Aggregation, Deterrence, and Witness Credibility
- Type of resource
- Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2020
- Digital origin
- born digital
- 1 online resource
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Since 1989, Stanford University's Department of Economics has hosted a series of workshop sessions in economic theory and mathematical economics. This program is known as the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE). Its purpose is to advance economic science for the benefit of society and to support cutting-edge work of economic theorists within specialized areas of research. The SITE Archives documents the workshop proceedings over time. Access to the presented papers is available in cases where the original material was provided by the author(s). This portion of the archive includes records describing papers where a copy of the original material is preserved and accessible.
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We present a model for the equilibrium frequency of offenses and the informativeness of witness reports when potential offenders can commit multiple offenses and witnesses are subject to retaliation risk and idiosyncratic reporting preferences. We compare two ways of handling multiple accusations discussed in legal scholarship: (i) When convictions are based on the probability that the defendant committed at least one, unspecified offense and entail a severe punishment, potential offenders induce negative correlation in witnesses’ private information, which leads to uninformative reports, information aggregation failures, and frequent offenses in equilibrium. Moreover, lowering the punishment in case of conviction can improve deterrence and the informativeness of witnesses’ reports. (ii) When accusations are treated separately to adjudicate guilt and conviction entails a severe punishment, witness reports are highly informative and offenses are infrequent in equilibrium.
- Presented at SITE on July 31, 2020
- Session series
- Political Economic Theory
- Organizer of meeting:
- Acharya, Avi, Bagwell, Kyle, Callander, Steve, Eraslan, Hulya, Foarta, Dana, Palfrey, Tom
- This session will bring together researchers from political science and economics who apply economic theory to the study of politics. This includes work in the areas of voting theory, political bargaining, policy-making and implementation, lobbying and regulation, and the media and information environment in which politics takes place. The session will encourage productive dialogue between researchers in economic theory that have developed ideas and tools relevant to the study of politics, and those in political science study questions and topics that can be addressed by economic theory.
- Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics
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