Essays on political economy [electronic resource]
- Xiaochen Fan.
- Physical description
- 1 online resource.
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|3781 2011 F||In-library use|
- This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter, Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining, is a joint paper with Nageeb Ali and B. Douglas Bernheim. This paper examines the effect of the predictability of recognition processes on the concentration of political power in legislative bargaining. For a broad class of legislative bargaining games, we identify a mild predictability condition on the recognition rule, requiring an ability to rule out some minimum number of legislators as the next proposer, under which Markovian equilibria deliver all economic surplus to the first proposer. When legislators can be nearly certain that the next proposer belongs to a class of the requisite size, the first proposer receives nearly all of the surplus. The second chapter, Designing Checks and Balances, is a joint paper with Tiberiu Dragu and James Kuklinski. We study the design of checks and balances institutions when two (or more) parties need to agree on changing an existing policy in environments with single-peaked preferences. We characterize a class of checks and balances rules that satisfy strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency and show that there is a unique rule that satisfy these properties. It consists of implementing the ideal policy of the more moderate player, that is, the player that prefers the less aggressive change from the policy status-quo. We study the implications of our analysis for constitutional review. The third chapter is Regulation and Liabilities. I develop a game theoretic model of the interaction among a firm, a regulatory agency and a consumer group. I use this framework to analyze the effect of allowing product liability compensation on the incentives and utility of the firm. I show that the firm's incentive to produce a quality product increases in the level of the damage compensation awarded through tort claims; however, the firm's utility may increase or decrease in the level of tort claim compensation.
- Publication date
- Submitted to the Department of Economics.
- Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2011.
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