Isolating the Enemy : Diplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953-1956
- Responsibility
- Tao Wang.
- Publication
- New York : Columbia University Press, [2021]
- Physical description
- 1 online resource.
- Series
- Studies of the East Asian Institute.
Online
Available online
More options
Description
Creators/Contributors
- Author/Creator
- Wang, Tao (Diplomatic historian), author.
Contents/Summary
- Bibliography
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Contents
-
- Acknowledgments Abbreviations Prologue Introduction Part I: Geneva Conference
- 1. Neutralizing Indochina
- 2. Between the Unattainable and the Unacceptable Part II: Taiwan Strait Crisis
- 3. Preventing the Mutual Defense Treaty
- 4. "A Horrible Dilemma" Part III: Bandung Conference
- 5. Formulating a Zone of Peace
- 6. A Blessing in Disguise? Conclusion Epilogue Appendix: Countries That Established Diplomatic Relations with the PRC by 1956 Notes Bibliography Index.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Publisher's summary
-
In the crucial moment after the Korean War, the United States and the People's Republic of China circled each other warily. They shifted between confrontation and conciliation, ratcheting up tension yet also embarking on peace initiatives. Tao Wang offers a new account of Sino-American relations in the mid-1950s that situates the two great powers in their international context. He reveals how both the United States and China adopted a policy of attempting to isolate their adversary and explores how Chinese and American leaders perceived and reacted to each other's strategies. Although the policy of the Eisenhower administration was to contain China, Washington often overestimated Chinese aggressiveness, worrying allies and neutral states. Sensitive to the differences within the Western camp, Chinese leaders sought to convince American allies to persuade the United States to back down. Wang analyzes diplomatic maneuvering over a peace settlement in Indochina, an American defense pact with Taiwan, and the anticolonial Bandung Conference, showing how political pressure pushed American leaders to make concessions. He challenges the portrayal of Communist states as driven by ideology, showing that Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic policy during these crucial years. Drawing on Chinese, Taiwanese, Russian, Vietnamese, British, and American archival material, including reclassified Chinese Foreign Ministry documents, Isolating the Enemy offers new insight into Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s and U.S. foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration through a nuanced portrayal of Sino-American interactions.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Subjects
- Subjects
- United States > Foreign relations > China.
- China > Foreign relations > United States.
- United States > Foreign relations > 1953-1961.
- China > Foreign relations > 1949-1976.
- États-Unis > Relations extérieures > Chine.
- Chine > Relations extérieures > États-Unis.
- États-Unis > Relations extérieures > 1953-1961.
- Chine > Relations extérieures > 1949-1976.
- POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy
- Diplomatic relations.
- China.
- United States.
Bibliographic information
- Publication date
- 2021
- Title variation
- Diplomatic Strategy in China and the United States, 1953-1956
- Series
- Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
- ISBN
- 0231552513 electronic book
- 9780231552516 electronic book
- 9780231198165 hardcover
- 9780231198172 trade paperback
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