Essays in market and mechanism design
- Giorgio Martini.
- [Stanford, California] : [Stanford University], 2018.
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- 1 online resource.
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|3781 2018 M||In-library use|
- My dissertation consists of four chapters. In chapter 1, I study verifiable disclosure with multidimensional information. Chapter 2 (joint work with Piotr Dworczak) studies Bayesian persuasion when the Sender's preferences depend only on the mean of posterior beliefs. The first chapters present two contrasting ``persuasion'' models: in chapter 1, voluntary, verifiable disclosure (Sender has no commitment); in chapter 2, Bayesian persuasion or information design (Sender has full commitment). Chapter 3 (joint work with Nicolas Lambert and Michael Ostrovsky) studies a general model of quadratic games and characterizes their unique equilibrium. Finally, in chapter 4 I prove a novel impossibility theorem in the assignment problem.
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- Submitted to the Graduate School of Business.
- Thesis Ph.D. Stanford University 2018.
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