No morality, no self : Anscombe's radical skepticism
- James Doyle.
- Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2018.
- Copyright notice
- Physical description
- xi, 238 pages ; 25 cm
- Doyle, James, 1963 November 18- author.
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 199-230) and index.
- Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks
- The invention of "morality" and the possibility of consequentialism
- The misguided project of vindicating morality
- The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension
- What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality?
- Assessing "modern moral philosophy"
- Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of "I" as a device of self-reference
- Is the fundamental reference rule for "I" the key to explaining first-person self-reference?
- Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem
- Can we make sense of a nonreferential account of "I"?
- Strategies for saving "I" as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference
- Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.
- Publisher's Summary
- Elizabeth Anscombe's Modern Moral Philosophy and The First Person have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe's theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780674976504 20180604
- Publication date
- Copyright date
- 9780674976504 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
- 0674976509 (hardcover ; alkaline paper)
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