Administrative law : the sources and limits of governmental agency power
- Daniel L. Feldman, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York.
- Los Angeles : SAGE, 
- Copyright notice
- Physical description
- xx, 244 pages ; 23 cm
- Feldman, Daniel L. author.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Non-delegation doctrine : "agencies cannot make laws" (ostensibly)
- The legitimacy of U.S. government agency power
- Separation of powers : legislative and executive control over administrative agencies
- Keeping track of regulations; discretionary and informal agency action
- Preemption and judicial review of agency rulemaking
- Adjudication : how much process is due?
- Adjudication : substantial evidence rule
- Choice of rulemaking or adjudication
- Availability of judicial review
- Suing government agencies and employees
- Government employment rights and due process
- "Transparency" : public access to government information.
Feldman's overview examines the quotidian challenges of administrative responsibilities; his comprehensive approach provides students with a way to understand and manage this complicated aspect of the governance mission. Offering chapter-specific "what do I do now?" discussions and boxed excerpts from the APA, the book will be a valuable resource.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
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- Title Variation
- Sources and limits of governmental agency power
- 9781506308548 (pbk. : alk. paper)
- 1506308546 (pbk. : alk. paper)
- 9781506308531 (ebook)
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