Mean field games and mean field type control theory
 Responsibility
 Alain Bensoussan, Jens Frehse, Phillip Yam.
 Language
 English.
 Publication
 New York : Springer, [2013].
 Physical description
 x, 128 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
 Series
 SpringerBriefs in mathematics.
Access
Creators/Contributors
 Author/Creator
 Bensoussan, Alain author.
 Contributor
 Frehse, J. (Jens), author.
 Yam, Phillip, author.
Contents/Summary
 Bibliography
 Includes bibliographical references (pages 125126) and index.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 Contents

 Introduction. General Presentation of Mean Field Control Problems. Discussion of the Mean Field game. Discussion of the Mean Field Type Control. Approximation of Nash Games with a large number of players. Linear Quadratic Models. Stationary Problems Different Populations. Nash differential games with Mean Field effect.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
 Publisher's Summary
 Mean field games and Mean field type control introduce new problems in Control Theory. The terminology "games" may be confusing. In fact they are control problems, in the sense that one is interested in a single decision maker, whom we can call the representative agent. However, these problems are not standard, since both the evolution of the state and the objective functional is influenced but terms which are not directly related to the state or the control of the decision maker. They are however, indirectly related to him, in the sense that they model a very large community of agents similar to the representative agent. All the agents behave similarly and impact the representative agent. However, because of the large number an aggregation effect takes place. The interesting consequence is that the impact of the community can be modeled by a mean field term, but when this is done, the problem is reduced to a control problem.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Subjects
Bibliographic information
 Publication date
 2013
 Series
 SpringerBriefs in Mathematics, 21918198
 ISBN
 9781461485070 (pbk.)
 146148507X (pbk.)
 9781461485087 (eBook)
 1461485088 (eBook)