• More may be better / Kenneth N. Waltz
• More will be worse / Scott D. Sagan
• Waltz responds to Sagan / Kenneth N. Waltz
• Sagan responds to Waltz / Scott D. Sagan
• Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons: for better or worse? / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz
• Iraq, North Korea, and Iran / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz with Mira Rapp-Hooper
• Is nuclear zero the best option? / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz.

Over the past fifteen years, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons has been a staple in International Relations courses because of its brevity and crystal-clear explanations. The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear-armed world. With new chapters on the questions surrounding a nuclear North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons, this Third Edition will continue to generate a lively classroom experience.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this text, two leading scholars of international politics debate the pros and cons of nuclear weaponry. This text serves as a concise introduction to an issue that encapsulates some of the most basic themes in international relations: are states rational? Are states sovereign? Does international organization work? New to this second edition is a case study of the precarious relations between India and Pakistan, exploring specific problems and consequences of nuclear competition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this text, two leading scholars of international politics debate the pros and cons of nuclear weaponry. This text serves as a concise introduction to an issue that encapsulates some of the most basic themes in international relations: are states rational? Are states sovereign? Does international organization work? New to this second edition is a case study of the precarious relations between India and Pakistan, exploring specific problems and consequences of nuclear competition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

If the build-up of nuclear weapons was a significant factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union, will the spread of nuclear weapons beyond these two superpowers stabilize or disrupt international relations. In this book, two scholars of international politics debate the issue. Kenneth Waltz argues that fear of the spread of nuclear weapons is unfounded - "more may be better". Nuclear proliferation may be a stabilizing force, as it decreases the likelihood of war by increasing its costs. Scott Sagan, however, argues that nuclear proliferation will make the world less stable - "more will be worse". Nuclear-armed states may not possess the internal structures that would ensure safe and rational control of nuclear weapons. Written for a general audience, this book is intended to help the public understand more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in the new world order.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of Figures and Tables Ch. 1The Origins of Accidents Ch. 2Nuclear Weapons Safety during the Cuban Missile Crisis Ch. 3Intelligence and Warning during the Cuban Missile Crisis Ch. 4Redundancy and Reliability: The 1968 Thule Bomber Accident Ch. 5Learning by Trial and Terror Ch. 6The Limits of Safety Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This study argues that, unless the governments of developed countries radically change their posture on nuclear weapons, a serious accident will eventually occur. The author challenges the safety record of post-Cold War nuclear arsenals and reveals a history of dangerous incidents.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparent excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
• The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
• Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
• Contra-proliferation : interpreting the meanings of India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 / Itty Abraham
• Pride and prejudice and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
• Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
• The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrine / Scott D. Sagan.

• Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
• The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
• Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
• Contra-proliferation : the Indian bomb and nuclear developmentalism / Itty Abraham
• Pride, prejudice, and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
• Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
• The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrines / Scott D. Sagan.

Nuclear-armed adversaries India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their creation as sovereign states in 1947. They went to the brink of a fourth in 2001 following an attack on the Indian parliament, which the Indian government blamed on the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist organizations. Despite some attempts at rapprochement in the intervening years, a new standoff between the two countries was precipitated when India accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being behind the Mumbai attacks late last year. The relentlessness of the confrontations between these two nations makes Inside Nuclear South Asia a must read for anyone wishing to gain a thorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. The book begins with an analysis of the factors that led to India's decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998, with Pakistan close behind: factors such as the broad political support for a nuclear weapons program within India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the intense rivalry between the two countries, the normative and prestige factors that influenced their behaviors, and ultimately the perceived threat to their respective national security. The second half of the book analyzes the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. These chapters show that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has increased the frequency and propensity of low-level violence, further destabilizing the region. Additionally, nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have led to serious political changes that also challenge the ability of the two states to produce stable nuclear detente. Thus, this book provides both new insights into the domestic politics behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia, a critique of narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
• The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
• Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
• Contra-proliferation : the Indian bomb and nuclear developmentalism / Itty Abraham
• Pride, prejudice, and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
• Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
• The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrines / Scott D. Sagan.

Nuclear-armed adversaries India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their creation as sovereign states in 1947. They went to the brink of a fourth in 2001 following an attack on the Indian parliament, which the Indian government blamed on the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist organizations. Despite some attempts at rapprochement in the intervening years, a new standoff between the two countries was precipitated when India accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being behind the Mumbai attacks late last year. The relentlessness of the confrontations between these two nations makes Inside Nuclear South Asia a must read for anyone wishing to gain a thorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent.The book begins with an analysis of the factors that led to India's decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998, with Pakistan close behind: factors such as the broad political support for a nuclear weapons program within India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the intense rivalry between the two countries, the normative and prestige factors that influenced their behaviors, and ultimately the perceived threat to their respective national security.The second half of the book analyzes the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. These chapters show that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has increased the frequency and propensity of low-level violence, further destabilizing the region. Additionally, nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have led to serious political changes that also challenge the ability of the two states to produce stable nuclear detente. Thus, this book provides both new insights into the domestic politics behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia, a critique of narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction: Inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
• Insiders and outsiders : a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
• The Fort Hood terrorist attack : an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy Zegart
• Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
• Green-on-blue violence : a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
• Preventing insider theft : lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
• A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.

High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders-trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.Contributors Matthew Bunn, Harvard University Andreas Hoelstad Daehli, Oslo Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo Austin Long, Columbia University Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School Jessica Stern, Harvard University Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction: inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
• Insiders and outsiders: a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
• The Fort Hood terrorist attack: an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy Zegart
• Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
• Green-on-blue violence: a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
• Preventing insider theft: lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
• A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.

High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders-trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.Contributors Matthew Bunn, Harvard University Andreas Hoelstad Daehli, Oslo Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo Austin Long, Columbia University Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School Jessica Stern, Harvard University Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction: inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
• Insiders and outsiders: a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
• The Fort Hood terrorist attack: an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy B. Zegart
• Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
• Green-on-blue violence: a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
• Preventing insider theft: lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
• A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.

High-security organizations around the world face devastating threats from insiders-trusted employees with access to sensitive information, facilities, and materials. From Edward Snowden to the Fort Hood shooter to the theft of nuclear materials, the threat from insiders is on the front page and at the top of the policy agenda. Insider Threats offers detailed case studies of insider disasters across a range of different types of institutions, from biological research laboratories, to nuclear power plants, to the U.S. Army. Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan outline cognitive and organizational biases that lead organizations to downplay the insider threat, and they synthesize "worst practices" from these past mistakes, offering lessons that will be valuable for any organization with high security and a lot to lose.Insider threats pose dangers to anyone who handles information that is secret or proprietary, material that is highly valuable or hazardous, people who must be protected, or facilities that might be sabotaged. This is the first book to offer in-depth case studies across a range of industries and contexts, allowing entities such as nuclear facilities and casinos to learn from each other. It also offers an unprecedented analysis of terrorist thinking about using insiders to get fissile material or sabotage nuclear facilities.Contributors Matthew Bunn, Harvard University Andreas Hoelstad Daehli, Oslo Kathryn M. Glynn, IBM Global Business Services Thomas Hegghammer, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo Austin Long, Columbia University Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University Ronald Schouten, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School Jessica Stern, Harvard University Amy B. Zegart, Stanford University.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: Learning from a Man-made Disaster Scott D. Sagan chapter abstractThe introduction discusses four ways in which this book in unusual and valuable: 1) it focuses not on the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident, but rather on what lessons should and did the Japanese government and other actors learn from the event-- 2) the Japanese and American authors present diverse perspectives from different disciplines, including physics, political science, nuclear engineering, and history-- 3) the book analyzes both nuclear safety and nuclear security lessons learned (and not learned)-- and 4) the authors range from being strong advocates of nuclear power to agnostics to skeptics about nuclear power.
• 1Japan's Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Overview Kenji E. Kushida chapter abstractThis chapter provides an overview of the Fukushima nuclear accident that began onMarch 11, 2011, triggered by the Great Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami. It provides a narrative of the main events at the plant as they unfolded during the first few days of the disaster, during which the reactor meltdowns and hydrogen explosions occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi power station.
• 2The Accident That Could Never Happen: Deluded by a Design Basis Gregory D. Wyss chapter abstractThis chapter describes two fallacies that occur frequently in the development and application of design bases for high-consequence facilities such as nuclear power plants. These fallacies led many of the designers, operators and regulators of the Fukushima Daiichi plant to believe that a tsunami of the magnitude experienced onMarch 12, 2011 would not be credible. These fallacies and the events surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident point to eight safety lessons and three security lessons that should be applied for the design, operation, and regulation of all high-consequence facilities in order minimize the potential for future catastrophic events. Thechapter also describes how design bases can either enable synergy or cause conflict in the interplay between safety and security in system design. Thus, proper formulation of and conflict resolution among competing design bases are key elements of the emerging discipline of Safety, Safeguards, and Security by Design.
• 3Security Implications of the Fukushima Accident Kaoru Naito chapter abstractThis chapter presents nuclear security lessons that can be abstracted from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, explaining first as background the concept of nuclear security and the potential risks involved, and describing efforts both internationally and in Japan to assure nuclear security. To glean nuclear security lessons from the accident, it presents the sequence and cause of the accident, as well as their nuclear security implications. It then enumerates the measures taken against additional nuclear security threats identified after the accident and explains how they are being implemented in Japan. Finally, it focuses on the need for attaining synergy or closer coordination between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
• 4Political Leadership in Nuclear Emergency: Institutional and Structural Constraints Nobumasa Akiyama chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes the sources of emergency response failures during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The emergency response was plagued by miscommunication between leaders and technical experts. In addition, institutional mechanisms to support the political leadership did not function as they were stipulated in crisis management manuals of the government and TEPCO. Finally, inappropriate risk assessment prevented political leadership from reacting to the unfolding crisis. The dysfunction of leadership during the Fukushima nuclear crisis was a product of the myth of absolute safety and regulatory capture.
• 5Radiation Protection by Numbers: Another Man-made Disaster" Toshihiro Higuchi chapter abstractThis chapter discusses radiation protection in Japan regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, with a focus on the use and abuse of numerical guidelines called reference levels. Informed by historical and sociological studies of administrative standards, the chapter traces the process in which the Japanese government consistently used the reference levels in such a way as to exclude backup plans and informed choices on the part of citizens in a wide range of practices from evacuation to decontamination. It also shows that the Japanese government became a victim of its own policy, lowering the reference levels to restore public trust and belatedly realizing that it could not deliver the promised results. It concludes that the fundamental cause of radiological mismanagement lay in the excessively top-down structure of administration in Japan, and argues for de-centralization and accountability to correct overreliance on numbers.
• 6Encouraging Transnational Organizational Learning Kazuto Suzuki chapter abstractThis chapter discusses why Japanese nuclear authorities have not learned from past experiences, both in Japan and other countries, and identifies how organizational learning failures led to inadequate safety and security measures in advance of the severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in
• 2011. It focuses on Japan's failure to learn from external cases, including the so-called B.5.b measures, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) peer review, and the role of industry in the nuclear safety community in other countries. It argues that Japanese nuclear safety system was isolated from international standards and did not reflect newer global safety protocols. The so-called "myth of safety, " lack of a sense of security, complexity of administrative structure, and confusion of responsibilities were named as the reasons why Japanese nuclear safety system could not learn from other countries.
• 7Were Japan's Nuclear Plants Uniquely Vulnerable? Phillip Lipscy, Kenji E. Kushida, and Trevor Incerti chapter abstractThis chapter examines the vulnerability of nuclear power plants worldwide to adisaster like the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. Examination ofJapanese nuclear plants affected by the earthquake and tsunami on March11, 2011, shows that three variables were crucial at the early stages of the crisis: plant elevation, sea wall elevation, and location and statusof backup generators. Higher elevations for these variables, orwaterproof protection of backup generators, could have prevented thedisaster. We collected information on these variables, along withhistorical data on run-up heights, for 89 coastal nuclear power plantsin the world. The data shows that: 1) Japan was relatively unpreparedfor tsunami in international comparison, but there was considerablevariation for power plants within and outside of Japan-- 2) Older powerplants and plants owned by the largest utility companies appear to havebeen particularly unprotected from inundation.
• Conclusion: Beyond Fukushima: Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security in the 21st Century Michael May and Edward Blandford chapter abstractThe conclusion reviews the main themes relating to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima nuclear accident that appear throughout the edited volume. These themes include Japan's overreliance on rigid standards in emergency preparedness and the myth of absolute safety as a source of that rigidity. The conclusion also discusses ways to deal with risk and uncertainty in both routine and emergency situations as well as the need to adapt standards to differing local situations. Also analyzed are the synergies between safety and security, the difficulties of transnational learning from previous incidents, and the comparative vulnerability to flooding of nuclear reactors worldwide.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book-the culmination of a truly collaborative international and highly interdisciplinary effort-brings together Japanese and American political scientists, nuclear engineers, historians, and physicists to examine the Fukushima accident from a new and broad perspective. It explains the complex interactions between nuclear safety risks (the causes and consequences of accidents) and nuclear security risks (the causes and consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks), exposing the possible vulnerabilities all countries may have if they fail to learn from this accident.The book further analyzes the lessons of Fukushima in comparative perspective, focusing on the politics of safety and emergency preparedness. It first compares the different policies and procedures adopted by various nuclear facilities in Japan and then discusses the lessons learned-and not learned-after major nuclear accidents and incidents in other countries in the past. The book's editors conclude that learning lessons across nations has proven to be very difficult, and they propose new policies to improve global learning after nuclear accidents or attacks.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: Learning from a Man-made Disaster Scott D. Sagan chapter abstractThe introduction discusses four ways in which this book in unusual and valuable: 1) it focuses not on the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident, but rather on what lessons should and did the Japanese government and other actors learn from the event-- 2) the Japanese and American authors present diverse perspectives from different disciplines, including physics, political science, nuclear engineering, and history-- 3) the book analyzes both nuclear safety and nuclear security lessons learned (and not learned)-- and 4) the authors range from being strong advocates of nuclear power to agnostics to skeptics about nuclear power.
• 1Japan's Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Overview Kenji E. Kushida chapter abstractThis chapter provides an overview of the Fukushima nuclear accident that began onMarch 11, 2011, triggered by the Great Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami. It provides a narrative of the main events at the plant as they unfolded during the first few days of the disaster, during which the reactor meltdowns and hydrogen explosions occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi power station.
• 2The Accident That Could Never Happen: Deluded by a Design Basis Gregory D. Wyss chapter abstractThis chapter describes two fallacies that occur frequently in the development and application of design bases for high-consequence facilities such as nuclear power plants. These fallacies led many of the designers, operators and regulators of the Fukushima Daiichi plant to believe that a tsunami of the magnitude experienced onMarch 12, 2011 would not be credible. These fallacies and the events surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident point to eight safety lessons and three security lessons that should be applied for the design, operation, and regulation of all high-consequence facilities in order minimize the potential for future catastrophic events. Thechapter also describes how design bases can either enable synergy or cause conflict in the interplay between safety and security in system design. Thus, proper formulation of and conflict resolution among competing design bases are key elements of the emerging discipline of Safety, Safeguards, and Security by Design.
• 3Security Implications of the Fukushima Accident Kaoru Naito chapter abstractThis chapter presents nuclear security lessons that can be abstracted from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, explaining first as background the concept of nuclear security and the potential risks involved, and describing efforts both internationally and in Japan to assure nuclear security. To glean nuclear security lessons from the accident, it presents the sequence and cause of the accident, as well as their nuclear security implications. It then enumerates the measures taken against additional nuclear security threats identified after the accident and explains how they are being implemented in Japan. Finally, it focuses on the need for attaining synergy or closer coordination between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
• 4Political Leadership in Nuclear Emergency: Institutional and Structural Constraints Nobumasa Akiyama chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes the sources of emergency response failures during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The emergency response was plagued by miscommunication between leaders and technical experts. In addition, institutional mechanisms to support the political leadership did not function as they were stipulated in crisis management manuals of the government and TEPCO. Finally, inappropriate risk assessment prevented political leadership from reacting to the unfolding crisis. The dysfunction of leadership during the Fukushima nuclear crisis was a product of the myth of absolute safety and regulatory capture.
• 5Radiation Protection by Numbers: Another Man-made Disaster" Toshihiro Higuchi chapter abstractThis chapter discusses radiation protection in Japan regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, with a focus on the use and abuse of numerical guidelines called reference levels. Informed by historical and sociological studies of administrative standards, the chapter traces the process in which the Japanese government consistently used the reference levels in such a way as to exclude backup plans and informed choices on the part of citizens in a wide range of practices from evacuation to decontamination. It also shows that the Japanese government became a victim of its own policy, lowering the reference levels to restore public trust and belatedly realizing that it could not deliver the promised results. It concludes that the fundamental cause of radiological mismanagement lay in the excessively top-down structure of administration in Japan, and argues for de-centralization and accountability to correct overreliance on numbers.
• 6Encouraging Transnational Organizational Learning Kazuto Suzuki chapter abstractThis chapter discusses why Japanese nuclear authorities have not learned from past experiences, both in Japan and other countries, and identifies how organizational learning failures led to inadequate safety and security measures in advance of the severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in
• 2011. It focuses on Japan's failure to learn from external cases, including the so-called B.5.b measures, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) peer review, and the role of industry in the nuclear safety community in other countries. It argues that Japanese nuclear safety system was isolated from international standards and did not reflect newer global safety protocols. The so-called "myth of safety, " lack of a sense of security, complexity of administrative structure, and confusion of responsibilities were named as the reasons why Japanese nuclear safety system could not learn from other countries.
• 7Were Japan's Nuclear Plants Uniquely Vulnerable? Phillip Lipscy, Kenji E. Kushida, and Trevor Incerti chapter abstractThis chapter examines the vulnerability of nuclear power plants worldwide to adisaster like the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. Examination ofJapanese nuclear plants affected by the earthquake and tsunami on March11, 2011, shows that three variables were crucial at the early stages of the crisis: plant elevation, sea wall elevation, and location and statusof backup generators. Higher elevations for these variables, orwaterproof protection of backup generators, could have prevented thedisaster. We collected information on these variables, along withhistorical data on run-up heights, for 89 coastal nuclear power plantsin the world. The data shows that: 1) Japan was relatively unpreparedfor tsunami in international comparison, but there was considerablevariation for power plants within and outside of Japan-- 2) Older powerplants and plants owned by the largest utility companies appear to havebeen particularly unprotected from inundation.
• Conclusion: Beyond Fukushima: Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security in the 21st Century Michael May and Edward Blandford chapter abstractThe conclusion reviews the main themes relating to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima nuclear accident that appear throughout the edited volume. These themes include Japan's overreliance on rigid standards in emergency preparedness and the myth of absolute safety as a source of that rigidity. The conclusion also discusses ways to deal with risk and uncertainty in both routine and emergency situations as well as the need to adapt standards to differing local situations. Also analyzed are the synergies between safety and security, the difficulties of transnational learning from previous incidents, and the comparative vulnerability to flooding of nuclear reactors worldwide.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book-the culmination of a truly collaborative international and highly interdisciplinary effort-brings together Japanese and American political scientists, nuclear engineers, historians, and physicists to examine the Fukushima accident from a new and broad perspective. It explains the complex interactions between nuclear safety risks (the causes and consequences of accidents) and nuclear security risks (the causes and consequences of sabotage or terrorist attacks), exposing the possible vulnerabilities all countries may have if they fail to learn from this accident. The book further analyzes the lessons of Fukushima in comparative perspective, focusing on the politics of safety and emergency preparedness. It first compares the different policies and procedures adopted by various nuclear facilities in Japan and then discusses the lessons learned-and not learned-after major nuclear accidents and incidents in other countries in the past. The book's editors conclude that learning lessons across nations has proven to be very difficult, and they propose new policies to improve global learning after nuclear accidents or attacks.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

This dissertation examines the extent to which the military as a professional, trusted, and credible institution can influence public opinion on politically contentious issues facing the nation, including climate change, the national debt, and gender identity. I use original survey-experimentation to establish (1) the conditions under which the military can influence public attitudes on political issues, (2) the role public credibility in the military plays in this process, and (3) the potential consequences of military engagement on these issues. Partisan cues often cause a back-fire effect whereby cross-partisans respond to cues by adopting the opposite policy positions. Although the military is often associated with conservative ideology, I theorize that the high levels of credibility and trust in the military from both Republican and Democratic Americans allow the military to effectively engage in co- and cross-partisan messaging without a back-fire effect. Moreover, I theorize that the military's effectiveness at messaging will allow it to influence not only general attitudes but also preferences on specific, concrete policy options. Using an experiment embedded in surveys of the American public, I present evidence that the military can influence public attitudes on climate change and the national debt. On the issue of climate change, the US military can be more effective than the scientific community at shaping public beliefs that climate change is occurring, that it is a threat to US national security, and that steps must be taken to prevent further temperature rising. This effect is particularly pronounced among Republicans when the issue is framed as a security threat, but when the scientific community delivers the same security cue, treatment effects are not present. Traditional civil-military norms prescribe that political engagement by the military may erode the public's high confidence in the military, but little attention has been given in this literature to whether the military's positions on political issues may also affect public perceptions of the military. I present evidence of a partisan public that does not value the traditional apolitical norm but instead evaluates the military's position and updates its views of the military. Democrats report higher levels of trust in and credibility of the military when exposed to the military's pro-climate position but report lower levels of trust in and credibility of the military when exposed to the military's restrictions on transgender people joining the military. By contrast, Republicans who disagree with the military's position generally resist changing their views of the military. Importantly, I illustrate the downstream effects of the military's position on its effectiveness to influence opinions on another unrelated issue. Democrats who gain trust and credibility in the military from its position on climate change are more likely to oppose transgender people serving in the military and support other organizations being allowed to incorporate someone's gender identity into employment decisions. Overall, these results show that the military can have important effects on public opinion on non-military issues, but there is a long-term risk to its institutional image the more it gets involved in these politically contentious topics.