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- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- 3rd ed. - New York : W.W. Norton & Co., c2013.
- Description
- Book — xi, 270 p. : ill. ; 21 cm.
- Summary
-
- More may be better / Kenneth N. Waltz
- More will be worse / Scott D. Sagan
- Waltz responds to Sagan / Kenneth N. Waltz
- Sagan responds to Waltz / Scott D. Sagan
- Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons: for better or worse? / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz
- Iraq, North Korea, and Iran / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz with Mira Rapp-Hooper
- Is nuclear zero the best option? / Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library
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U264 .S233 2013 | Unavailable Missing |
U264 .S233 2013 | Unknown |
U264 .S233 2013 | Unknown |
- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- [2nd ed.]. - New York : Norton, c2003.
- Description
- Book — xii, 220 p. : map ; 21 cm.
- Summary
-
In this text, two leading scholars of international politics debate the pros and cons of nuclear weaponry. This text serves as a concise introduction to an issue that encapsulates some of the most basic themes in international relations: are states rational? Are states sovereign? Does international organization work? New to this second edition is a case study of the precarious relations between India and Pakistan, exploring specific problems and consequences of nuclear competition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library
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---|---|
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U264 .S233 2003 | Unknown |
- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- [2nd ed.]. - New York : W.W. Norton & Co., c2003.
- Description
- Book — xii, 220 p. ; 21 cm.
- Summary
-
In this text, two leading scholars of international politics debate the pros and cons of nuclear weaponry. This text serves as a concise introduction to an issue that encapsulates some of the most basic themes in international relations: are states rational? Are states sovereign? Does international organization work? New to this second edition is a case study of the precarious relations between India and Pakistan, exploring specific problems and consequences of nuclear competition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Law Library (Crown)
Law Library (Crown) | Status |
---|---|
Find it Basement | Request (opens in new tab) |
U264 .S233 2003 | Unknown |
4. The spread of nuclear weapons : a debate [1995]
- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- 1st ed. - New York : W.W. Norton, 1995.
- Description
- Book — 160 p.
- Summary
-
If the build-up of nuclear weapons was a significant factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union, will the spread of nuclear weapons beyond these two superpowers stabilize or disrupt international relations. In this book, two scholars of international politics debate the issue. Kenneth Waltz argues that fear of the spread of nuclear weapons is unfounded - "more may be better". Nuclear proliferation may be a stabilizing force, as it decreases the likelihood of war by increasing its costs. Scott Sagan, however, argues that nuclear proliferation will make the world less stable - "more will be worse". Nuclear-armed states may not possess the internal structures that would ensure safe and rational control of nuclear weapons. Written for a general audience, this book is intended to help the public understand more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in the new world order.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library, SAL3 (off-campus storage)
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U264 .S233 1995 | In-library use |
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U264 .S233 1995 | Unknown |
U264 .S233 1995 | Unknown |
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Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
U264 .S233 1995 | Available |
U264 .S233 1995 | Available |
- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Description
- Book — 286 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
- Summary
-
- List of Figures and Tables Ch. 1The Origins of Accidents Ch. 2Nuclear Weapons Safety during the Cuban Missile Crisis Ch. 3Intelligence and Warning during the Cuban Missile Crisis Ch. 4Redundancy and Reliability: The 1968 Thule Bomber Accident Ch. 5Learning by Trial and Terror Ch. 6The Limits of Safety Index.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Environmental tragedies such as Chernobyl and the Exxon Valdez remind us that catastrophic accidents are always possible in a world full of hazardous technologies. Yet, the apparent excellent safety record with nuclear weapons has led scholars, policy-makers, and the public alike to believe that nuclear arsenals can serve as a secure deterrent for the foreseeable future. In this provocative book, Scott Sagan challenges such optimism. Sagan's research into formerly classified archives penetrates the veil of safety that has surrounded U.S. nuclear weapons and reveals a hidden history of frightening "close calls" to disaster.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Green Library
Green Library | Status |
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U264.3 .S24 1993 | Unknown |
POLISCI-211N-01, POLISCI-311N-01
- Course
- POLISCI-211N-01 -- Nuclear Politics
- Instructor(s)
- Sagan, Scott D
- Course
- POLISCI-311N-01 -- Nuclear Politics
- Instructor(s)
- Sagan, Scott D
- Sagan, Scott Douglas.
- Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1989.
- Description
- Book — xiii, 237 p. ; 24 cm.
- Online
Green Library
Green Library | Status |
---|---|
Find it Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
UA23 .S215 1989 | Unavailable Missing |
7. Inside nuclear South Asia [2009]
- Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Security Studies, ©2009.
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource (x, 281 pages) : illustrations
- Summary
-
- Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
- The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
- Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
- Contra-proliferation : the Indian bomb and nuclear developmentalism / Itty Abraham
- Pride, prejudice, and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
- Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
- The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrines / Scott D. Sagan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
8. Inside nuclear South Asia [2009]
- Stanford, Calif. : Stanford Security Studies, c2009.
- Description
- Book — x, 281 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
- Summary
-
- Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
- The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
- Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
- Contra-proliferation : interpreting the meanings of India's nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 / Itty Abraham
- Pride and prejudice and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
- Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
- The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrine / Scott D. Sagan.
- Introduction : inside nuclear South Asia / Scott D. Sagan
- The BJP and the bomb / Kanti Bajpai
- Testing theories of proliferation in South Asia / Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way
- Contra-proliferation : the Indian bomb and nuclear developmentalism / Itty Abraham
- Pride, prejudice, and Prithvis : strategic weapons behavior in South Asia / Vipin Narang
- Revisionist ambitions, conventional capabilities, and nuclear instability : why nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe / S. Paul Kapur
- The evolution of Pakistani and Indian nuclear doctrines / Scott D. Sagan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library
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---|---|
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UA832.7 .I518 2009 | Unknown |
- Leifer, Larry J.
- 2001.
- Description
- Sound recording — 1 sound cassette : analog.
- Online
Media & Microtext Center
Media & Microtext Center | Status |
---|---|
Find it Ask at Media Microtext desk | Request (opens in new tab) |
ZCS 815 | Unknown |
10. Insider threats [2016]
- Ithaca ; London : Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Description
- Book — x, 181 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
- Summary
-
- Introduction: inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
- Insiders and outsiders: a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
- The Fort Hood terrorist attack: an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy B. Zegart
- Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
- Green-on-blue violence: a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
- Preventing insider theft: lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
- A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library
Green Library | Status |
---|---|
Find it Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
HV6432 .I555 2016 | Unknown |
11. Insider threats [2016]
- Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2016.
- Description
- Book — x, 181 pages ; 23 cm.
- Summary
-
- Introduction: Inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
- Insiders and outsiders : a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
- The Fort Hood terrorist attack : an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy Zegart
- Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
- Green-on-blue violence : a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
- Preventing insider theft : lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
- A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Law Library (Crown)
Law Library (Crown) | Status |
---|---|
Find it Basement | Request (opens in new tab) |
HV6432 .I555 2016 | Unknown |
12. Insider threats [2016]
- Ithaca ; London : Cornell University Press, [2017]
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource Digital: text file; PDF.
- Summary
-
- Introduction: inside the insider threat / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
- Insiders and outsiders: a survey of terrorist threats to nuclear facilities / Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Hoelstad Dæhli
- The Fort Hood terrorist attack: an organizational postmortem of Army and FBI deficiencies / Amy Zegart
- Lessons from the anthrax letters / Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten
- Green-on-blue violence: a first look at lessons from the insider threat in Afghanistan / Austin Long
- Preventing insider theft: lessons from the casino and pharmaceutical industries / Matthew Bunn and Kathryn M. Glynn
- A worst practices guide to insider threats / Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2016.
- Description
- Book — xi, 219 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
- Summary
-
- Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: Learning from a Man-made Disaster Scott D. Sagan chapter abstractThe introduction discusses four ways in which this book in unusual and valuable: 1) it focuses not on the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident, but rather on what lessons should and did the Japanese government and other actors learn from the event-- 2) the Japanese and American authors present diverse perspectives from different disciplines, including physics, political science, nuclear engineering, and history-- 3) the book analyzes both nuclear safety and nuclear security lessons learned (and not learned)-- and 4) the authors range from being strong advocates of nuclear power to agnostics to skeptics about nuclear power.
- 1Japan's Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Overview Kenji E. Kushida chapter abstractThis chapter provides an overview of the Fukushima nuclear accident that began onMarch 11, 2011, triggered by the Great Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami. It provides a narrative of the main events at the plant as they unfolded during the first few days of the disaster, during which the reactor meltdowns and hydrogen explosions occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi power station.
- 2The Accident That Could Never Happen: Deluded by a Design Basis Gregory D. Wyss chapter abstractThis chapter describes two fallacies that occur frequently in the development and application of design bases for high-consequence facilities such as nuclear power plants. These fallacies led many of the designers, operators and regulators of the Fukushima Daiichi plant to believe that a tsunami of the magnitude experienced onMarch 12, 2011 would not be credible. These fallacies and the events surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident point to eight safety lessons and three security lessons that should be applied for the design, operation, and regulation of all high-consequence facilities in order minimize the potential for future catastrophic events. Thechapter also describes how design bases can either enable synergy or cause conflict in the interplay between safety and security in system design. Thus, proper formulation of and conflict resolution among competing design bases are key elements of the emerging discipline of Safety, Safeguards, and Security by Design.
- 3Security Implications of the Fukushima Accident Kaoru Naito chapter abstractThis chapter presents nuclear security lessons that can be abstracted from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, explaining first as background the concept of nuclear security and the potential risks involved, and describing efforts both internationally and in Japan to assure nuclear security. To glean nuclear security lessons from the accident, it presents the sequence and cause of the accident, as well as their nuclear security implications. It then enumerates the measures taken against additional nuclear security threats identified after the accident and explains how they are being implemented in Japan. Finally, it focuses on the need for attaining synergy or closer coordination between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
- 4Political Leadership in Nuclear Emergency: Institutional and Structural Constraints Nobumasa Akiyama chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes the sources of emergency response failures during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The emergency response was plagued by miscommunication between leaders and technical experts. In addition, institutional mechanisms to support the political leadership did not function as they were stipulated in crisis management manuals of the government and TEPCO. Finally, inappropriate risk assessment prevented political leadership from reacting to the unfolding crisis. The dysfunction of leadership during the Fukushima nuclear crisis was a product of the myth of absolute safety and regulatory capture.
- 5Radiation Protection by Numbers: Another Man-made Disaster" Toshihiro Higuchi chapter abstractThis chapter discusses radiation protection in Japan regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, with a focus on the use and abuse of numerical guidelines called reference levels. Informed by historical and sociological studies of administrative standards, the chapter traces the process in which the Japanese government consistently used the reference levels in such a way as to exclude backup plans and informed choices on the part of citizens in a wide range of practices from evacuation to decontamination. It also shows that the Japanese government became a victim of its own policy, lowering the reference levels to restore public trust and belatedly realizing that it could not deliver the promised results. It concludes that the fundamental cause of radiological mismanagement lay in the excessively top-down structure of administration in Japan, and argues for de-centralization and accountability to correct overreliance on numbers.
- 6Encouraging Transnational Organizational Learning Kazuto Suzuki chapter abstractThis chapter discusses why Japanese nuclear authorities have not learned from past experiences, both in Japan and other countries, and identifies how organizational learning failures led to inadequate safety and security measures in advance of the severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in
- 2011. It focuses on Japan's failure to learn from external cases, including the so-called B.5.b measures, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) peer review, and the role of industry in the nuclear safety community in other countries. It argues that Japanese nuclear safety system was isolated from international standards and did not reflect newer global safety protocols. The so-called "myth of safety, " lack of a sense of security, complexity of administrative structure, and confusion of responsibilities were named as the reasons why Japanese nuclear safety system could not learn from other countries.
- 7Were Japan's Nuclear Plants Uniquely Vulnerable? Phillip Lipscy, Kenji E. Kushida, and Trevor Incerti chapter abstractThis chapter examines the vulnerability of nuclear power plants worldwide to adisaster like the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. Examination ofJapanese nuclear plants affected by the earthquake and tsunami on March11, 2011, shows that three variables were crucial at the early stages of the crisis: plant elevation, sea wall elevation, and location and statusof backup generators. Higher elevations for these variables, orwaterproof protection of backup generators, could have prevented thedisaster. We collected information on these variables, along withhistorical data on run-up heights, for 89 coastal nuclear power plantsin the world. The data shows that: 1) Japan was relatively unpreparedfor tsunami in international comparison, but there was considerablevariation for power plants within and outside of Japan-- 2) Older powerplants and plants owned by the largest utility companies appear to havebeen particularly unprotected from inundation.
- Conclusion: Beyond Fukushima: Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security in the 21st Century Michael May and Edward Blandford chapter abstractThe conclusion reviews the main themes relating to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima nuclear accident that appear throughout the edited volume. These themes include Japan's overreliance on rigid standards in emergency preparedness and the myth of absolute safety as a source of that rigidity. The conclusion also discusses ways to deal with risk and uncertainty in both routine and emergency situations as well as the need to adapt standards to differing local situations. Also analyzed are the synergies between safety and security, the difficulties of transnational learning from previous incidents, and the comparative vulnerability to flooding of nuclear reactors worldwide.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Green Library
Green Library | Status |
---|---|
Find it Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
TK1365 .J3 L43 2016 | Unknown |
- Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, [2016]
- Description
- Book — 1 online resource Digital: data file.
- Summary
-
- Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: Learning from a Man-made Disaster Scott D. Sagan chapter abstractThe introduction discusses four ways in which this book in unusual and valuable: 1) it focuses not on the causes of the Fukushima nuclear accident, but rather on what lessons should and did the Japanese government and other actors learn from the event-- 2) the Japanese and American authors present diverse perspectives from different disciplines, including physics, political science, nuclear engineering, and history-- 3) the book analyzes both nuclear safety and nuclear security lessons learned (and not learned)-- and 4) the authors range from being strong advocates of nuclear power to agnostics to skeptics about nuclear power.
- 1Japan's Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Overview Kenji E. Kushida chapter abstractThis chapter provides an overview of the Fukushima nuclear accident that began onMarch 11, 2011, triggered by the Great Tohoku Earthquake and tsunami. It provides a narrative of the main events at the plant as they unfolded during the first few days of the disaster, during which the reactor meltdowns and hydrogen explosions occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi power station.
- 2The Accident That Could Never Happen: Deluded by a Design Basis Gregory D. Wyss chapter abstractThis chapter describes two fallacies that occur frequently in the development and application of design bases for high-consequence facilities such as nuclear power plants. These fallacies led many of the designers, operators and regulators of the Fukushima Daiichi plant to believe that a tsunami of the magnitude experienced onMarch 12, 2011 would not be credible. These fallacies and the events surrounding the Fukushima Daiichi accident point to eight safety lessons and three security lessons that should be applied for the design, operation, and regulation of all high-consequence facilities in order minimize the potential for future catastrophic events. Thechapter also describes how design bases can either enable synergy or cause conflict in the interplay between safety and security in system design. Thus, proper formulation of and conflict resolution among competing design bases are key elements of the emerging discipline of Safety, Safeguards, and Security by Design.
- 3Security Implications of the Fukushima Accident Kaoru Naito chapter abstractThis chapter presents nuclear security lessons that can be abstracted from the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, explaining first as background the concept of nuclear security and the potential risks involved, and describing efforts both internationally and in Japan to assure nuclear security. To glean nuclear security lessons from the accident, it presents the sequence and cause of the accident, as well as their nuclear security implications. It then enumerates the measures taken against additional nuclear security threats identified after the accident and explains how they are being implemented in Japan. Finally, it focuses on the need for attaining synergy or closer coordination between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
- 4Political Leadership in Nuclear Emergency: Institutional and Structural Constraints Nobumasa Akiyama chapter abstractThis chapter analyzes the sources of emergency response failures during the Fukushima nuclear crisis. The emergency response was plagued by miscommunication between leaders and technical experts. In addition, institutional mechanisms to support the political leadership did not function as they were stipulated in crisis management manuals of the government and TEPCO. Finally, inappropriate risk assessment prevented political leadership from reacting to the unfolding crisis. The dysfunction of leadership during the Fukushima nuclear crisis was a product of the myth of absolute safety and regulatory capture.
- 5Radiation Protection by Numbers: Another Man-made Disaster" Toshihiro Higuchi chapter abstractThis chapter discusses radiation protection in Japan regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, with a focus on the use and abuse of numerical guidelines called reference levels. Informed by historical and sociological studies of administrative standards, the chapter traces the process in which the Japanese government consistently used the reference levels in such a way as to exclude backup plans and informed choices on the part of citizens in a wide range of practices from evacuation to decontamination. It also shows that the Japanese government became a victim of its own policy, lowering the reference levels to restore public trust and belatedly realizing that it could not deliver the promised results. It concludes that the fundamental cause of radiological mismanagement lay in the excessively top-down structure of administration in Japan, and argues for de-centralization and accountability to correct overreliance on numbers.
- 6Encouraging Transnational Organizational Learning Kazuto Suzuki chapter abstractThis chapter discusses why Japanese nuclear authorities have not learned from past experiences, both in Japan and other countries, and identifies how organizational learning failures led to inadequate safety and security measures in advance of the severe accident at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in
- 2011. It focuses on Japan's failure to learn from external cases, including the so-called B.5.b measures, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) peer review, and the role of industry in the nuclear safety community in other countries. It argues that Japanese nuclear safety system was isolated from international standards and did not reflect newer global safety protocols. The so-called "myth of safety, " lack of a sense of security, complexity of administrative structure, and confusion of responsibilities were named as the reasons why Japanese nuclear safety system could not learn from other countries.
- 7Were Japan's Nuclear Plants Uniquely Vulnerable? Phillip Lipscy, Kenji E. Kushida, and Trevor Incerti chapter abstractThis chapter examines the vulnerability of nuclear power plants worldwide to adisaster like the one that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi. Examination ofJapanese nuclear plants affected by the earthquake and tsunami on March11, 2011, shows that three variables were crucial at the early stages of the crisis: plant elevation, sea wall elevation, and location and statusof backup generators. Higher elevations for these variables, orwaterproof protection of backup generators, could have prevented thedisaster. We collected information on these variables, along withhistorical data on run-up heights, for 89 coastal nuclear power plantsin the world. The data shows that: 1) Japan was relatively unpreparedfor tsunami in international comparison, but there was considerablevariation for power plants within and outside of Japan-- 2) Older powerplants and plants owned by the largest utility companies appear to havebeen particularly unprotected from inundation.
- Conclusion: Beyond Fukushima: Enhancing Nuclear Safety and Security in the 21st Century Michael May and Edward Blandford chapter abstractThe conclusion reviews the main themes relating to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima nuclear accident that appear throughout the edited volume. These themes include Japan's overreliance on rigid standards in emergency preparedness and the myth of absolute safety as a source of that rigidity. The conclusion also discusses ways to deal with risk and uncertainty in both routine and emergency situations as well as the need to adapt standards to differing local situations. Also analyzed are the synergies between safety and security, the difficulties of transnational learning from previous incidents, and the comparative vulnerability to flooding of nuclear reactors worldwide.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Price, Bryan C.
- 2009.
- Description
- Book — xiii, 326 leaves, bound.
- Online
-
- Search ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Not all titles available.
- Google Books (Full view)
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
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---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
3781 2009 P | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
---|---|
University Archives | Request on-site access (opens in new tab) |
3781 2009 P | In-library use |
- Shapiro, Jacob N.
- 2007, c2008.
- Description
- Book — xv, 284 p.
- Online
-
- Search ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Not all titles available.
- Google Books (Full view)
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
3781 2008 S | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
---|---|
University Archives | Request on-site access (opens in new tab) |
3781 2008 S | In-library use |
17. Winning without a fight : power, reputation, and compellent threats in international crises [2007]
- Sechser, Todd S.
- 2007.
- Description
- Book — ix, 212 leaves bound.
- Online
-
- Search ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Not all titles available.
- Google Books (Full view)
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
3781 2007 S | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
---|---|
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3781 2007 S | In-library use |
- Montgomery, Alexander H.
- 2005, c2006.
- Description
- Book — xii, 300 p.
- Online
-
- Search ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Not all titles available.
- Google Books (Full view)
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
3781 2006 M | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
---|---|
University Archives | Request on-site access (opens in new tab) |
3781 2006 M | In-library use |
- Fravel, M. Taylor.
- 2003.
- Description
- Book — xi, 460 p.
- Online
-
- Search ProQuest Dissertations & Theses. Not all titles available.
- Google Books (Full view)
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving) | Status |
---|---|
Stacks | Request (opens in new tab) |
3781 2004 F | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
---|---|
University Archives | Request on-site access (opens in new tab) |
3781 2004 F | In-library use |
Online 20. Madeline Albright, Cutaways [2008]
- Stanford University. News and Publications Service (Producer)
- Stanford (Calif.), May 27, 2008
- Description
- Video — 1 MiniDV tape
- Summary
-
In a conversation with Scott Sagan, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright discussed a wide range of international conflicts facing the next president, as well as her experience as a high-powered woman in politics. The Stanford in Government and ASSU Speakers Bureau's choice this year for "Big Speaker," Albright addressed a packed audience during the event in Kresge Auditorium.
- Collection
- Stanford University, News and Publication Service, audiovisual recordings, 1936-2011 (inclusive)
Articles+
Journal articles, e-books, & other e-resources
Guides
Course- and topic-based guides to collections, tools, and services.