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Book
100 p.
Green Library
Book
249 p. ; 21 cm.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
xix, 193 p.
  • Editors' Preface-- Morigiwa Yasutomo, Michael Stolleis, Jean-Louis Halperin.- Foreword from the Herstec Project-- Sato Shoichi.- About the Contributors.- I. Introduction.- Judicial Interpretation in Transition from the Ancien Regime to Constitutionalism-- Michael Stolleis.- II. The case of France.- Legal Interpretation in France under the Reign of Louis XVI through the Gazette des Tribunaux-- Jean-Louis Halperin.- Legal Interpretation through the Case Law Book of the Parlement de Flandre-- Serge Dauchy.- II. The case of Germany.- The Object of Interpretation: Legislation and Competing Normative Sources of Law in Europe during the 16th to 18th Centuries-- Heinz Mohnhaupt.- The Concept and Means of Legal Interpretation in the 18th Century-- Jan Schroder.- Necessity: Pandectists between Norm and Reality (1780-1870)-- Hans-Peter Haferkamp.- IV. The Nature of Legal Interpretation.- Interpretation by Another Name-- Morigiwa Yasutomo.- What is Interpretation of the Law for the French Judge? Michel Troper.- The Craft of Interpretation-- Bradley Wendel.- Concluding Remarks.- Legal Interpretation in 18th Century Europe: Doctrinal Debates versus Political Change-- Jean-Louis Halperin.- Index.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9789400715059 20160606
This is a collaboration of leading historians of European law and philosophers of law and politics identifying and explaining the practice of interpretation of law in the 18th century. The goal: establishing the actual practice in the Age of Enlightenment, and explaining why this was the case. The ideology of the Age was that law, i.e., the will of the sovereign, can be explicitly and appropriately stated, thus making interpretation redundant. However, the reality was that in the 18th century, there was no one leading source of national law that would be the object of interpretation. Instead, there was a plurality of sources of law: the Roman Law, local customary law, and the royal ordinance. However, in deciding a case in a court of law, the law must speak with one voice. Hence, interpretation to unify the norms was inevitable. What was the process? What role did justification in terms of reason, the hallmark of the Enlightenment, play? These are some of the questions addressed.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9789400715059 20160606
dx.doi.org SpringerLink
Book
40 p. : port ; 20 cm.
  • Einführung
  • Rechtsbegriff und Interpretationstheorie im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert
  • Rechtsbegriff und Interpretationstheorie im frühen 20. Jahrhundert : Der Wandel des Rechtsbegriffs und das Lückenproblem
  • Rechtsbegriff und Interpretationstheorie im frühen 20. Jahrhundert : Die Varianten des voluntaristischen Rechtsbegriffs und die Spaltung der Interpretationslehre
  • Schluss : Weitere Beispiele und der Nutzen einer Historisierung der Interpretationstheorie.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
x, 288 p.
  • Laws and judges
  • Why we need to interpret statutes
  • Definitions, ordinary meaning, and respect for the legislature
  • The intent of the legislature
  • Stability, dynamism, and other values
  • Who should interpret statutes?
  • Jurors as statutory interpreters
  • Legislatures, judges, and statutory interpretation.
Book
x, 288 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
  • Laws and judges
  • Why we need to interpret statutes
  • Definitions, ordinary meaning, and respect for the legislature
  • The intent of the legislature
  • Stability, dynamism, and other values
  • Who should interpret statutes?
  • Jurors as statutory interpreters
  • Legislatures, judges, and statutory interpretation.
Pulling the rug out from under debates about interpretation, "The Language of Statutes" joins together learning from law, linguistics, and cognitive science to illuminate the fundamental issues and problems in this highly contested area. Here, Lawrence M. Solan argues that statutory interpretation is alive, well, and not in need of the major overhaul that many have suggested. Rather, he suggests, the majority of people understand their rights and obligations most of the time, with difficult cases occurring in circumstances that we can predict from understanding when our minds do not work in a lawlike way. Solan explains that these cases arise because of the gap between our inability to write crisp yet flexible laws on the one hand and the ways in which our cognitive and linguistic faculties are structured on the other. To make our lives easier and more efficient, we're predisposed to absorb new situations into categories we have previously formed - but in the legislative and judicial realms this can present major difficulties. Solan provides an excellent introduction to statutory interpretation, rejecting the extreme arguments that judges have either too much or too little leeway, and explaining how and why a certain number of interpretive problems are simply inevitable.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780226767963 20160605
Law Library (Crown)
Book
xiii, 200 p. ; 25 cm.
  • I: Legal Norms and Legal System. Appendix A: A Formal Theory of Sense for Prescription. Appendix B: Relevance, Argumentation and Normative Systems. II. A Logical Analysis of Legal Propositions. Appendix: Truth-Conditions and the Logical Analysis of Legal Statements. III. Legal Dynamics. IV. The Primacy of the Constitution. V. Constitutional Interpretation.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780792351566 20160528
The main purpose of this book is to offer a logical analysis of legal propositions, especially of constitutional propositions. This analysis shows the relationship between truth-conditions of legal propositions and the problem of indeterminacy. Where the law is indeterminate, legal propositions lack truth-values. The background of this approach is the philosophical debate between realism and antirealism. The book deals with the notions of legal norms and legal systems and provides an analysis of the notion of legal indeterminacy and its relation to gaps, contradictions and the vagueness of legal concepts. It shows also that the simple model of a legal system is not sufficient to account for the complexity of legal propositions referring to legal systems of some degree of maturity.Several notions from legal dynamics are presented in order to bring to light the importance of concepts like applicability or hierarchy for the determination of the truth-value of a legal proposition. Thus the primacy of constitution becomes a central idea in the theoretical reconstruction of most contemporary legal systems; a conceptual explanation of this idea is presented and some conclusions from that explanation are drawn. Finally, a particular conception of constitutional interpretation is proposed. Special attention is paid to the relationship between interpretation and legal indeterminacy and, more specifically, to the problem of the discretion enjoyed by the organs entrusted with applying the constitution and also to the several theses that have been discussed controversially in the context of constitutional interpretation, such as the relevance of the intentions for the interpretation of the constitution and for the justification of judicial review.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780792351566 20160528
Law Library (Crown)
Book
ix, 479 p.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
xix, 325 p. ; 24 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
126 p. ; 23 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
180 p. 24 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)
Book
xi, 320 p. ; 22 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
100 p. ; 24 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)
Book
493 p. ; 25 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
104 p. ; 24 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
xiii, 199 p. 24 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
30 p. ; 24 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
145 p. 22 cm.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
47 p. 23 cm.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
618 p. 21 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)

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