Supplements the textbook Microeconomics for Managers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976793 20160617

Supplements the textbook Microeconomics for Managers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976793 20160617

A thoroughly revised new edition of a leading textbook that equips MBA students with the powerful tools of economics This is a thoroughly revised and substantially streamlined new edition of a leading textbook that shows MBA students how understanding economics can help them make smarter and better-informed real-world management decisions. David Kreps, one of the world's most influential economists, has developed and refined Microeconomics for Managers over decades of teaching at Stanford's Graduate School of Business. Stressing game theory and strategic thinking and driven by in-depth, integrated case studies, the book shows future managers how economics can provide practical answers to critical business problems. Focuses on case studies and real companies, such as Amazon, Microsoft, General Motors, United Airlines, and Xerox Covers essential topics for future managers--including price discrimination, Porter's five forces, risk sharing and spreading, signaling and screening, credibility and reputation, and economics and organizational behavior Features an online supplement for students that provides solutions to the problems in the book, longer caselike exercises, review problems, a calculus review, and more.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691182698 20190114

• Acknowledgments
• Mastering employee motivation
• Pay for performance : the economic theory of incentives
• Is pay for performance always "the answer?"
• The economics of employment relationships
• The psychology of employment relationships
• Psychological theories of motivation
• Motivation and teams
• Motivation and your organization
• Appendix: The wisdom of crowds : what do managers believe?
• Notes
• Index.

Employee motivation is one of the cornerstones of any successful firm, yet it can be devilishly complex to nurture in a consistent and constructive manner. In The Motivation Toolkit David Kreps distills decades of experience and research to highlight the elements of employee motivation. Kreps begins by walking readers through leading economic and psychological theories of motivation, from the economic theory of incentives to the social psychological theory of self-determination. He then shows how to successfully navigate between these theories. Kreps challenges managers (and aspiring managers) to think rigorously about their specific organisation, and shares enduring insights into effective leadership and organisational prosperity.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393254099 20180508

• Preface xiii Chapter One. Choice, Preference, and Utility
• 1 1.1. Consumer Choice: The Basics
• 1 1.2. Proving Most of Proposition 1.2, and More
• 5 1.3. The No-Better-Than Sets and Utility Representations
• 7 1.4. Strict Preference and Indifference
• 9 1.5. Infinite Sets and Utility Representations
• 10 1.6. Choice from Infinite Sets
• 15 1.7. Equivalent Utility Representations
• 17 1.8. Commentary
• 18 Bibliographic Notes
• 23 Problems
• 23 Chapter Two. Structural Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions
• 30 2.1. Monotonicity
• 31 2.2. Convexity
• 32 2.3. Continuity
• 35 2.4. Indifference Curve Diagrams
• 38 2.5. Weak and Additive Separability
• 39 2.6. Quasi-linearity
• 43 2.7. Homotheticity
• 44 Bibliographic Notes
• 45 Problems
• 45 Chapter Three. Basics of Consumer Demand
• 50 3.1. The Consumer's Problem
• 50 3.2. Basic Facts about the CP
• 52 3.3. The Marshallian Demand Correspondence and Indirect Utility Function
• 54 3.4. Solving the CP with Calculus
• 56 Bibliographic Notes
• 63 Problems
• 64 Chapter Four. Revealed Preference and Afriat's Theorem
• 67 4.1. An Example and Basic Ideas
• 67 4.2. GARP and Afriat's Theorem
• 70 4.3. Comparative Statics and the Own-Price Effect
• 74 Bibliographic Notes
• 77 Problems
• 78 Chapter Five. Choice under Uncertainty
• 79 5.1. Two Models and Three Representations
• 79 5.2. The Mixture-Space Theorem
• 89 5.3. States of Nature and Subjective Expected Utility
• 101 5.4. Subjective and Objective Probability and the Harsanyi Doctrine
• 108 5.5. Empirical and Theoretical Critiques
• 110 Bibliographic Notes
• 116 Problems
• 116 Chapter Six. Utility for Money
• 123 6.1. Properties of Utility Functions for Money
• 123 6.2. Induced Preferences for Income
• 134 6.3. Demand for Insurance and Risky Assets
• 138 Bibliographic Notes
• 140 Problems
• 140 Chapter Seven. Dynamic Choice
• 148 7.1. The Standard Strategic Approach
• 149 7.2. Dynamic Programming
• 152 7.3. Testable Restrictions of the Standard Model
• 153 7.4. Three Alternatives to the Standard Model
• 156 Bibliographic Notes
• 161 Problems
• 161 Chapter Eight. Social Choice and Efficiency
• 166 8.1. Arrow's Theorem
• 166 8.2. What Do We Give Up?
• 172 8.3. Efficiency
• 175 8.4. Identifying the Pareto Frontier: Utility Imputations and Bergsonian Social Utility Functionals
• 176 8.5. Syndicate Theory and Efficient Risk Sharing: Applying Proposition 8.10
• 184 8.6. Efficiency?
• 192 Bibliographic Notes
• 194 Problems
• 194 Chapter Nine. Competitive and Profit-Maximizing Firms
• 197 9.1. The Production-Possibility Set
• 198 9.2. Profit Maximization
• 199 9.3. Basics of the Firm's Profit-Maximization Problem
• 201 9.4. Afriat's Theorem for Firms
• 207 9.5. From Profit Functions to Production-Possibility Sets
• 211 9.6. How Many Production-Possibility Sets Give the Same Profit Function?
• 213 9.7. What Is Going On Here, Mathematically?
• 216 9.8. Differentiability of the Profit Function
• 219 9.9. Cost Minimization and Input-Requirement Sets
• 222 9.10. Why DoWe Care?
• 228 Bibilographic Notes
• 229 Problems
• 229 Chapter Ten. The Expenditure-Minimization Problem
• 233 10.1. Defining the EMP
• 233 10.2. Basic Analysis of the EMP
• 235 10.3. Hicksian Demand and the Expenditure Function
• 236 10.4. Properties of the Expenditure Function
• 238 10.5. How Many Continuous Utility Functions Give the Same Expenditure Function?
• 240 10.6. Recovering Continuous Utility Functions from Expenditure Functions
• 247 10.7. Is an Alleged Expenditure Function Really an Expenditure Function?
• 248 10.8. Connecting the CP and the EMP
• 254 Bibliographic Notes
• 255 Problems
• 255 Chapter Eleven. Classic Demand Theory
• 258 11.1. Roy's Identity and the Slutsky Equation
• 258 11.2. Differentiability of Indirect Utility
• 262 11.3. Duality of Utility and Indirect Utility
• 269 11.4. Differentiability of Marshallian Demand
• 274 11.5. Integrability
• 279 11.6. Complements and Substitutes
• 283 11.7. Integrability and Revealed Preference
• 284 Bibliographic Notes
• 286 Problems
• 287 Chapter Twelve. Producer and Consumer Surplus
• 289 12.1. Producer Surplus
• 289 12.2. Consumer Surplus
• 296 Bibliographic Notes
• 304 Problems
• 304 Chapter Thirteen. Aggregating Firms and Consumers
• 306 13.1. Aggregating Firms
• 307 13.2. Aggregating Consumers
• 310 13.3. Convexification through Aggregation
• 318 Bibliographic Notes
• 326 Problems
• 326 Chapter Fourteen. General Equilibrium
• 329 14.1. Definitions
• 329 14.2. Basic Properties ofWalrasian Equilibrium
• 333 14.3. The Edgeworth Box
• 335 14.4. Existence ofWalrasian Equilibria
• 338 14.5. The Set of Equilibria for a Fixed Economy
• 351 14.6. The Equilibrium Correspondence
• 354 Bibliographic Notes
• 354 Problems
• 355 Chapter Fifteen. General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the Core
• 358 15.1. The First Theorem ofWelfare Economics
• 359 15.2. The Second Theorem ofWelfare Economics
• 362 15.3. Walrasian Equilibria Are in the Core
• 366 15.4. In a Large Enough Economy, Every Core Allocation Is a Walrasian-Equilibrium Allocation
• 370 15.5. Externalities and Lindahl Equilibrium
• 380 Bibliographic Notes
• 383 Problems
• 383 Chapter Sixteen. General Equilibrium, Time, and Uncertainty
• 386 16.1. A Framework for Time and Uncertainty
• 386 16.2. General Equilibrium with Time and Uncertainty
• 389 16.3. Equilibria of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations: I. Pure Exchange with Contingent Claims
• 392 16.4. EPPPE: II. Complex Financial Securities and Complete Markets
• 402 16.5. EPPPE: III. Complex Securities with Real Dividends and Complete Markets
• 418 16.6. Incomplete Markets
• 419 16.7. Firms
• 424 Bibliographic Notes
• 431 Problems
• 432 About the Appendices
• 437 Appendix One: Mathematical Induction
• 439 Appendix Two: Some Simple Real Analysis
• 441 A2.1. The Setting
• 441 A2.2. Distance, Neighborhoods, and Open and Closed Sets
• 441 A2.3. Sequences and Limits
• 445 A2.4. Boundedness, (Completeness), and Compactness
• 446 A2.5. Continuous Functions
• 447 A2.6. Simply Connected Sets and the Intermediate-Value Theorem
• 448 A2.7. Suprema and Infima-- Maxes and Mins
• 448 A2.8. The Maximum of a Continuous Function on a Compact Set
• 449 A2.9. Lims Sup and Inf
• 450 A2.10. Upper and Lower Semi-continuous Functions
• 451 Appendix Three: Convexity
• 452 A3.1. Convex Sets
• 452 A3.2. The Separating- and Supporting-Hyperplane Theorems
• 457 A3.3. The Support-Function Theorem
• 459 A3.4. Concave and Convex Functions
• 461 A3.5. Quasi-concavity and Quasi-convexity
• 463 A3.6. Supergradients and Subgradients
• 466 A3.7. Concave and Convex Functions and Calculus
• 468 Appendix Four: Correspondences
• 469 A4.1. Functions and Correspondences
• 470 A4.2. Continuity of Correspondences
• 471 A4.3. Singleton-Valued Correspondences and Continuity
• 474 A4.4. Parametric Constrained Optimization Problems and Berge's Theorem
• 475 A4.5. Why this Terminology?
• 477 Appendix Five: Constrained Optimization
• 479 Appendix Six: Dynamic Programming
• 485 A6.1. Several Examples
• 485 A6.2. A General Formulation
• 489 A6.3. Bellman's Equation
• 494 A6.4. Conserving and Unimprovable Strategies
• 496 A6.5. Additive Rewards
• 501 A6.6. States of the System
• 504 A6.7. Solving Finite-Horizon Problems
• 506 A6.8. Infinite-Horizon Problems and Stationarity
• 509 A6.9. Solving Infinite-Horizon (Stationary) Problems with Unimprovability
• 512 A6.10. Policy Iteration (and Transience)
• 516 A6.11. Value Iteration
• 518 A6.12. Examples
• 521 A6.13. Things Not Covered Here: Other Optimality Criteria-- Continuous Time and Control Theory
• 527 A6.14. Multi-armed Bandits and Complexity
• 528 A6.15. Four More Problems You Can Solve
• 530 Appendix Seven: The Implicit Function Theorem
• 534 Appendix Eight: Fixed-Point Theory
• 535 References
• 543 Index 551.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

"Microeconomic Foundations I" develops the choice, price, and general equilibrium theory topics typically found in first-year theory sequences, but in deeper and more complete mathematical form than most standard texts provide. The objective is to take the reader from acquaintance with these foundational topics to something closer to mastery of the models and results connected to them. This title provides a rigorous treatment of some of the basic tools of economic modeling and reasoning, along with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these tools. It complements standard texts. It covers choice, preference, and utility; structural properties of preferences and utility functions; basics of consumer demand; revealed preference and Afriat's Theorem; choice under uncertainty; dynamic choice; social choice and efficiency; competitive and profit-maximizing firms; expenditure minimization; demand theory (duality methods); producer and consumer surplus; aggregation; general equilibrium; efficiency and the core; GET, time, and uncertainty; and other topics. It features a free web-based student's guide, which gives solutions to approximately half the problems, and a limited-access instructor's manual, which provides solutions to the rest of the problems. It contains appendixes that review most of the specific mathematics employed in the book, including a from-first-principles treatment of dynamic programming.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691155838 20160609

• Preface xiii Chapter One. Choice, Preference, and Utility
• 1 1.1. Consumer Choice: The Basics
• 1 1.2. Proving Most of Proposition 1.2, and More
• 5 1.3. The No-Better-Than Sets and Utility Representations
• 7 1.4. Strict Preference and Indifference
• 9 1.5. Infinite Sets and Utility Representations
• 10 1.6. Choice from Infinite Sets
• 15 1.7. Equivalent Utility Representations
• 17 1.8. Commentary
• 18 Bibliographic Notes
• 23 Problems
• 23 Chapter Two. Structural Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions
• 30 2.1. Monotonicity
• 31 2.2. Convexity
• 32 2.3. Continuity
• 35 2.4. Indifference Curve Diagrams
• 38 2.5. Weak and Additive Separability
• 39 2.6. Quasi-linearity
• 43 2.7. Homotheticity
• 44 Bibliographic Notes
• 45 Problems
• 45 Chapter Three. Basics of Consumer Demand
• 50 3.1. The Consumer's Problem
• 50 3.2. Basic Facts about the CP
• 52 3.3. The Marshallian Demand Correspondence and Indirect Utility Function
• 54 3.4. Solving the CP with Calculus
• 56 Bibliographic Notes
• 63 Problems
• 64 Chapter Four. Revealed Preference and Afriat's Theorem
• 67 4.1. An Example and Basic Ideas
• 67 4.2. GARP and Afriat's Theorem
• 70 4.3. Comparative Statics and the Own-Price Effect
• 74 Bibliographic Notes
• 77 Problems
• 78 Chapter Five. Choice under Uncertainty
• 79 5.1. Two Models and Three Representations
• 79 5.2. The Mixture-Space Theorem
• 89 5.3. States of Nature and Subjective Expected Utility
• 101 5.4. Subjective and Objective Probability and the Harsanyi Doctrine
• 108 5.5. Empirical and Theoretical Critiques
• 110 Bibliographic Notes
• 116 Problems
• 116 Chapter Six. Utility for Money
• 123 6.1. Properties of Utility Functions for Money
• 123 6.2. Induced Preferences for Income
• 134 6.3. Demand for Insurance and Risky Assets
• 138 Bibliographic Notes
• 140 Problems
• 140 Chapter Seven. Dynamic Choice
• 148 7.1. The Standard Strategic Approach
• 149 7.2. Dynamic Programming
• 152 7.3. Testable Restrictions of the Standard Model
• 153 7.4. Three Alternatives to the Standard Model
• 156 Bibliographic Notes
• 161 Problems
• 161 Chapter Eight. Social Choice and Efficiency
• 166 8.1. Arrow's Theorem
• 166 8.2. What Do We Give Up?
• 172 8.3. Efficiency
• 175 8.4. Identifying the Pareto Frontier: Utility Imputations and Bergsonian Social Utility Functionals
• 176 8.5. Syndicate Theory and Efficient Risk Sharing: Applying Proposition 8.10
• 184 8.6. Efficiency?
• 192 Bibliographic Notes
• 194 Problems
• 194 Chapter Nine. Competitive and Profit-Maximizing Firms
• 197 9.1. The Production-Possibility Set
• 198 9.2. Profit Maximization
• 199 9.3. Basics of the Firm's Profit-Maximization Problem
• 201 9.4. Afriat's Theorem for Firms
• 207 9.5. From Profit Functions to Production-Possibility Sets
• 211 9.6. How Many Production-Possibility Sets Give the Same Profit Function?
• 213 9.7. What Is Going On Here, Mathematically?
• 216 9.8. Differentiability of the Profit Function
• 219 9.9. Cost Minimization and Input-Requirement Sets
• 222 9.10. Why DoWe Care?
• 228 Bibilographic Notes
• 229 Problems
• 229 Chapter Ten. The Expenditure-Minimization Problem
• 233 10.1. Defining the EMP
• 233 10.2. Basic Analysis of the EMP
• 235 10.3. Hicksian Demand and the Expenditure Function
• 236 10.4. Properties of the Expenditure Function
• 238 10.5. How Many Continuous Utility Functions Give the Same Expenditure Function?
• 240 10.6. Recovering Continuous Utility Functions from Expenditure Functions
• 247 10.7. Is an Alleged Expenditure Function Really an Expenditure Function?
• 248 10.8. Connecting the CP and the EMP
• 254 Bibliographic Notes
• 255 Problems
• 255 Chapter Eleven. Classic Demand Theory
• 258 11.1. Roy's Identity and the Slutsky Equation
• 258 11.2. Differentiability of Indirect Utility
• 262 11.3. Duality of Utility and Indirect Utility
• 269 11.4. Differentiability of Marshallian Demand
• 274 11.5. Integrability
• 279 11.6. Complements and Substitutes
• 283 11.7. Integrability and Revealed Preference
• 284 Bibliographic Notes
• 286 Problems
• 287 Chapter Twelve. Producer and Consumer Surplus
• 289 12.1. Producer Surplus
• 289 12.2. Consumer Surplus
• 296 Bibliographic Notes
• 304 Problems
• 304 Chapter Thirteen. Aggregating Firms and Consumers
• 306 13.1. Aggregating Firms
• 307 13.2. Aggregating Consumers
• 310 13.3. Convexification through Aggregation
• 318 Bibliographic Notes
• 326 Problems
• 326 Chapter Fourteen. General Equilibrium
• 329 14.1. Definitions
• 329 14.2. Basic Properties ofWalrasian Equilibrium
• 333 14.3. The Edgeworth Box
• 335 14.4. Existence ofWalrasian Equilibria
• 338 14.5. The Set of Equilibria for a Fixed Economy
• 351 14.6. The Equilibrium Correspondence
• 354 Bibliographic Notes
• 354 Problems
• 355 Chapter Fifteen. General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the Core
• 358 15.1. The First Theorem ofWelfare Economics
• 359 15.2. The Second Theorem ofWelfare Economics
• 362 15.3. Walrasian Equilibria Are in the Core
• 366 15.4. In a Large Enough Economy, Every Core Allocation Is a Walrasian-Equilibrium Allocation
• 370 15.5. Externalities and Lindahl Equilibrium
• 380 Bibliographic Notes
• 383 Problems
• 383 Chapter Sixteen. General Equilibrium, Time, and Uncertainty
• 386 16.1. A Framework for Time and Uncertainty
• 386 16.2. General Equilibrium with Time and Uncertainty
• 389 16.3. Equilibria of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations: I. Pure Exchange with Contingent Claims
• 392 16.4. EPPPE: II. Complex Financial Securities and Complete Markets
• 402 16.5. EPPPE: III. Complex Securities with Real Dividends and Complete Markets
• 418 16.6. Incomplete Markets
• 419 16.7. Firms
• 424 Bibliographic Notes
• 431 Problems
• 432 About the Appendices
• 437 Appendix One: Mathematical Induction
• 439 Appendix Two: Some Simple Real Analysis
• 441 A2.1. The Setting
• 441 A2.2. Distance, Neighborhoods, and Open and Closed Sets
• 441 A2.3. Sequences and Limits
• 445 A2.4. Boundedness, (Completeness), and Compactness
• 446 A2.5. Continuous Functions
• 447 A2.6. Simply Connected Sets and the Intermediate-Value Theorem
• 448 A2.7. Suprema and Infima-- Maxes and Mins
• 448 A2.8. The Maximum of a Continuous Function on a Compact Set
• 449 A2.9. Lims Sup and Inf
• 450 A2.10. Upper and Lower Semi-continuous Functions
• 451 Appendix Three: Convexity
• 452 A3.1. Convex Sets
• 452 A3.2. The Separating- and Supporting-Hyperplane Theorems
• 457 A3.3. The Support-Function Theorem
• 459 A3.4. Concave and Convex Functions
• 461 A3.5. Quasi-concavity and Quasi-convexity
• 463 A3.6. Supergradients and Subgradients
• 466 A3.7. Concave and Convex Functions and Calculus
• 468 Appendix Four: Correspondences
• 469 A4.1. Functions and Correspondences
• 470 A4.2. Continuity of Correspondences
• 471 A4.3. Singleton-Valued Correspondences and Continuity
• 474 A4.4. Parametric Constrained Optimization Problems and Berge's Theorem
• 475 A4.5. Why this Terminology?
• 477 Appendix Five: Constrained Optimization
• 479 Appendix Six: Dynamic Programming
• 485 A6.1. Several Examples
• 485 A6.2. A General Formulation
• 489 A6.3. Bellman's Equation
• 494 A6.4. Conserving and Unimprovable Strategies
• 496 A6.5. Additive Rewards
• 501 A6.6. States of the System
• 504 A6.7. Solving Finite-Horizon Problems
• 506 A6.8. Infinite-Horizon Problems and Stationarity
• 509 A6.9. Solving Infinite-Horizon (Stationary) Problems with Unimprovability
• 512 A6.10. Policy Iteration (and Transience)
• 516 A6.11. Value Iteration
• 518 A6.12. Examples
• 521 A6.13. Things Not Covered Here: Other Optimality Criteria-- Continuous Time and Control Theory
• 527 A6.14. Multi-armed Bandits and Complexity
• 528 A6.15. Four More Problems You Can Solve
• 530 Appendix Seven: The Implicit Function Theorem
• 534 Appendix Eight: Fixed-Point Theory
• 535 References
• 543 Index 551.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

"Microeconomic Foundations I" develops the choice, price, and general equilibrium theory topics typically found in first-year theory sequences, but in deeper and more complete mathematical form than most standard texts provide. The objective is to take the reader from acquaintance with these foundational topics to something closer to mastery of the models and results connected to them. This title provides a rigorous treatment of some of the basic tools of economic modeling and reasoning, along with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these tools. It complements standard texts. It covers choice, preference, and utility; structural properties of preferences and utility functions; basics of consumer demand; revealed preference and Afriat's Theorem; choice under uncertainty; dynamic choice; social choice and efficiency; competitive and profit-maximizing firms; expenditure minimization; demand theory (duality methods); producer and consumer surplus; aggregation; general equilibrium; efficiency and the core; GET, time, and uncertainty; and other topics. It features a free web-based student's guide, which gives solutions to approximately half the problems, and a limited-access instructor's manual, which provides solutions to the rest of the problems. It contains appendixes that review most of the specific mathematics employed in the book, including a from-first-principles treatment of dynamic programming.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691155838 20160609

Developed over the course of ten years at the Stanford Business School, Microeconomics for Managers leads the field with a strong game theoretic approach and full-chapter coverage of many modern topics, including Porter's five forces, signaling, transaction costs, and incentives.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976786 20160610

Developed over the course of ten years at the Stanford Business School, Microeconomics for Managers leads the field with a strong game theoretic approach and full-chapter coverage of many modern topics, including Porter's five forces, signaling, transaction costs, and incentives.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976786 20160610

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and ??i??user-friendly??i??i??'. The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory - one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. This book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. This work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691042640 20160528

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and ??i??user-friendly??i??i??'. The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory - one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. This book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. This work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691042640 20160528

• Introduction--
• 1. The standard--
• 2. Basic notions of noncooperative game theory--
• 3. The successes of game theory--
• 4. The problems of game theory--
• 5. Bounded rationality and retrospection-- Bibliography-- Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

• The standard-- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games-- Extensive form games-- Extensive and strategic form games-- Dominance-- Nash equilibrium-- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form-- Dynamics and extensive form games-- Incredble threats and incredible promises-- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation-- The importance of what players know about others-- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols-- Too many equilibria and no way to choose-- choosing among equilibria with refinements-- The rules of the game-- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283812 20160528

• Introduction--
• 1. The standard--
• 2. Basic notions of noncooperative game theory--
• 3. The successes of game theory--
• 4. The problems of game theory--
• 5. Bounded rationality and retrospection-- Bibliography-- Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

• The standard-- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games-- Extensive form games-- Extensive and strategic form games-- Dominance-- Nash equilibrium-- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form-- Dynamics and extensive form games-- Incredble threats and incredible promises-- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation-- The importance of what players know about others-- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols-- Too many equilibria and no way to choose-- choosing among equilibria with refinements-- The rules of the game-- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283812 20160528

• The standard-- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games-- Extensive form games-- Extensive and strategic form games-- Dominance-- Nash equilibrium-- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form-- Dynamics and extensive form games-- Incredble threats and incredible promises-- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation-- The importance of what players know about others-- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols-- Too many equilibria and no way to choose-- choosing among equilibria with refinements-- The rules of the game-- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528

• The standard-- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games-- Extensive form games-- Extensive and strategic form games-- Dominance-- Nash equilibrium-- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form-- Dynamics and extensive form games-- Incredble threats and incredible promises-- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation-- The importance of what players know about others-- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols-- Too many equilibria and no way to choose-- choosing among equilibria with refinements-- The rules of the game-- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction
• 1. The standard
• 2. Basic notions of noncooperative game theory
• 3. The successes of game theory
• 4. The problems of game theory
• 5. Bounded rationality and retrospection
• Bibliography
• Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20190204
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it - and equilibrium analysis in particular - can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a non-technical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283812 20190204

• The standard-- Basic notions of non-cooperative game theory: Strategic form games-- Extensive form games-- Extensive and strategic form games-- Dominance-- Nash equilibrium-- The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form-- Dynamics and extensive form games-- Incredble threats and incredible promises-- Credible threats and promises: co-operation and reputation-- The importance of what players know about others-- The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols-- Too many equilibria and no way to choose-- choosing among equilibria with refinements-- The rules of the game-- Bounded rationality and retrospection.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of non-cooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book looks at why game theory has become such a popular tool of analysis. It examines the deficiencies in this methodology and goes on to consider whether its popularity will fade or whether it will remain an important tool for economists.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20190204

• * Introduction * Preference Relations and Revealed Preference * Ordinal Utility * Choice Under Uncertainty: Formulations and Representations * Von NewmannMorgenstern Expected Utility * Utility Functions for Money * Horse Race Lotteries and Roulette Wheels * Subjective Probability * Savages Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty * Conditional Preference, Conditional Probability, and Contingent Choice * Independence, Exchangeability, and de Finettis Theorem * Normative Uses of These Models on SubprobleMs. Dynamic Choice Theory and the Choice of Opportunity Sets * The Experimental Evidence.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this book, Professor Kreps presents a first course on the basic models of choice theory that underlie much of economic theory. This course, taught for several years at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, gives the student an introduction to the axiomatic method of economic analysis, without placing too heavy a demand on mathematical sophistication.The course begins with the basics of choice and revealed preference theory and then discusses numerical representations of ordinal preference. Models with uncertainty come next: First is von Neumann--Morgenstern utility, and then choice under uncertainty with subjective uncertainty, using the formulation of Anscombe and Aumann, and then sketching the development of Savage's classic theory. Finally, the course delves into a number of special topics, including de Finetti's theorem, modeling choice on a part of a larger problem, dynamic choice, and the empirical evidence against the classic models.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780813375533 20160605

In this book, Professor Kreps presents a first course on the basic models of choice theory that underlie much of economic theory. This course, taught for several years at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, gives the student an introduction to the axiomatic method of economic analysis, without placing too heavy a demand on mathematical sophistication.The course begins with the basics of choice and revealed preference theory and then discusses numerical representations of ordinal preference. Models with uncertainty come next: First is von Neumann Morgenstern utility, and then choice under uncertainty with subjective uncertainty, using the formulation of Anscombe and Aumann, and then sketching the development of Savage's classic theory. Finally, the course delves into a number of special topics, including de Finetti's theorem, modeling choice on a part of a larger problem, dynamic choice, and the empirical evidence against the classic models.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780813346465 20190128

• * Introduction * Preference Relations and Revealed Preference * Ordinal Utility * Choice Under Uncertainty: Formulations and Representations * Von NewmannMorgenstern Expected Utility * Utility Functions for Money * Horse Race Lotteries and Roulette Wheels * Subjective Probability * Savages Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty * Conditional Preference, Conditional Probability, and Contingent Choice * Independence, Exchangeability, and de Finettis Theorem * Normative Uses of These Models on SubprobleMs. Dynamic Choice Theory and the Choice of Opportunity Sets * The Experimental Evidence.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this book, Professor Kreps presents a first course on the basic models of choice theory that underlie much of economic theory. This course, taught for several years at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, gives the student an introduction to the axiomatic method of economic analysis, without placing too heavy a demand on mathematical sophistication.The course begins with the basics of choice and revealed preference theory and then discusses numerical representations of ordinal preference. Models with uncertainty come next: First is von Neumann--Morgenstern utility, and then choice under uncertainty with subjective uncertainty, using the formulation of Anscombe and Aumann, and then sketching the development of Savage's classic theory. Finally, the course delves into a number of special topics, including de Finetti's theorem, modeling choice on a part of a larger problem, dynamic choice, and the empirical evidence against the classic models.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780813375533 20160605