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 Kreps, David M.
 New York : Norton, 2004.
 Description
 Book — 364 p. : ill. ; 28 cm
 Summary

Supplements the textbook Microeconomics for Managers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976793 20160617
 Online
 Kreps, David M.
 New York : Norton, c2004.
 Description
 Book — xi, 364 p. : ill ; 28 cm.
 Summary

Supplements the textbook Microeconomics for Managers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976793 20160617
 Online
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3. Microeconomics for managers [2019]
 Kreps, David M.
 Second edition.  Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, [2019]
 Description
 Book — xvi, 498 pages : illustrations (some color) ; 27 cm
 Summary

A thoroughly revised new edition of a leading textbook that equips MBA students with the powerful tools of economics This is a thoroughly revised and substantially streamlined new edition of a leading textbook that shows MBA students how understanding economics can help them make smarter and betterinformed realworld management decisions. David Kreps, one of the world's most influential economists, has developed and refined Microeconomics for Managers over decades of teaching at Stanford's Graduate School of Business. Stressing game theory and strategic thinking and driven by indepth, integrated case studies, the book shows future managers how economics can provide practical answers to critical business problems. Focuses on case studies and real companies, such as Amazon, Microsoft, General Motors, United Airlines, and Xerox Covers essential topics for future managersincluding price discrimination, Porter's five forces, risk sharing and spreading, signaling and screening, credibility and reputation, and economics and organizational behavior Features an online supplement for students that provides solutions to the problems in the book, longer caselike exercises, review problems, a calculus review, and more.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691182698 20190114
 Online
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MGTECON2030102
 Course
 MGTECON2030102  Managerial Economics  Accelerated
 Instructor(s)
 Lambert, Nicolas Sebastien
 Kreps, David M., author.
 First Edition.  New York : W. W. Norton & Company, [2018]
 Description
 Book — viii, 277 pages : illustrations ; 22 cm
 Summary

 Acknowledgments
 Mastering employee motivation
 Pay for performance : the economic theory of incentives
 Is pay for performance always "the answer?"
 The economics of employment relationships
 The psychology of employment relationships
 Psychological theories of motivation
 Motivation and teams
 Motivation and your organization
 Appendix: The wisdom of crowds : what do managers believe?
 Notes
 Index.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393254099 20180508
 Online
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5. Microeconomic foundations [2013  ]
 Kreps, David M.
 Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013
 Description
 Book — v. : ill. ; 27 cm.
 Summary

 Preface xiii Chapter One. Choice, Preference, and Utility
 1 1.1. Consumer Choice: The Basics
 1 1.2. Proving Most of Proposition 1.2, and More
 5 1.3. The NoBetterThan Sets and Utility Representations
 7 1.4. Strict Preference and Indifference
 9 1.5. Infinite Sets and Utility Representations
 10 1.6. Choice from Infinite Sets
 15 1.7. Equivalent Utility Representations
 17 1.8. Commentary
 18 Bibliographic Notes
 23 Problems
 23 Chapter Two. Structural Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions
 30 2.1. Monotonicity
 31 2.2. Convexity
 32 2.3. Continuity
 35 2.4. Indifference Curve Diagrams
 38 2.5. Weak and Additive Separability
 39 2.6. Quasilinearity
 43 2.7. Homotheticity
 44 Bibliographic Notes
 45 Problems
 45 Chapter Three. Basics of Consumer Demand
 50 3.1. The Consumer's Problem
 50 3.2. Basic Facts about the CP
 52 3.3. The Marshallian Demand Correspondence and Indirect Utility Function
 54 3.4. Solving the CP with Calculus
 56 Bibliographic Notes
 63 Problems
 64 Chapter Four. Revealed Preference and Afriat's Theorem
 67 4.1. An Example and Basic Ideas
 67 4.2. GARP and Afriat's Theorem
 70 4.3. Comparative Statics and the OwnPrice Effect
 74 Bibliographic Notes
 77 Problems
 78 Chapter Five. Choice under Uncertainty
 79 5.1. Two Models and Three Representations
 79 5.2. The MixtureSpace Theorem
 89 5.3. States of Nature and Subjective Expected Utility
 101 5.4. Subjective and Objective Probability and the Harsanyi Doctrine
 108 5.5. Empirical and Theoretical Critiques
 110 Bibliographic Notes
 116 Problems
 116 Chapter Six. Utility for Money
 123 6.1. Properties of Utility Functions for Money
 123 6.2. Induced Preferences for Income
 134 6.3. Demand for Insurance and Risky Assets
 138 Bibliographic Notes
 140 Problems
 140 Chapter Seven. Dynamic Choice
 148 7.1. The Standard Strategic Approach
 149 7.2. Dynamic Programming
 152 7.3. Testable Restrictions of the Standard Model
 153 7.4. Three Alternatives to the Standard Model
 156 Bibliographic Notes
 161 Problems
 161 Chapter Eight. Social Choice and Efficiency
 166 8.1. Arrow's Theorem
 166 8.2. What Do We Give Up?
 172 8.3. Efficiency
 175 8.4. Identifying the Pareto Frontier: Utility Imputations and Bergsonian Social Utility Functionals
 176 8.5. Syndicate Theory and Efficient Risk Sharing: Applying Proposition 8.10
 184 8.6. Efficiency?
 192 Bibliographic Notes
 194 Problems
 194 Chapter Nine. Competitive and ProfitMaximizing Firms
 197 9.1. The ProductionPossibility Set
 198 9.2. Profit Maximization
 199 9.3. Basics of the Firm's ProfitMaximization Problem
 201 9.4. Afriat's Theorem for Firms
 207 9.5. From Profit Functions to ProductionPossibility Sets
 211 9.6. How Many ProductionPossibility Sets Give the Same Profit Function?
 213 9.7. What Is Going On Here, Mathematically?
 216 9.8. Differentiability of the Profit Function
 219 9.9. Cost Minimization and InputRequirement Sets
 222 9.10. Why DoWe Care?
 228 Bibilographic Notes
 229 Problems
 229 Chapter Ten. The ExpenditureMinimization Problem
 233 10.1. Defining the EMP
 233 10.2. Basic Analysis of the EMP
 235 10.3. Hicksian Demand and the Expenditure Function
 236 10.4. Properties of the Expenditure Function
 238 10.5. How Many Continuous Utility Functions Give the Same Expenditure Function?
 240 10.6. Recovering Continuous Utility Functions from Expenditure Functions
 247 10.7. Is an Alleged Expenditure Function Really an Expenditure Function?
 248 10.8. Connecting the CP and the EMP
 254 Bibliographic Notes
 255 Problems
 255 Chapter Eleven. Classic Demand Theory
 258 11.1. Roy's Identity and the Slutsky Equation
 258 11.2. Differentiability of Indirect Utility
 262 11.3. Duality of Utility and Indirect Utility
 269 11.4. Differentiability of Marshallian Demand
 274 11.5. Integrability
 279 11.6. Complements and Substitutes
 283 11.7. Integrability and Revealed Preference
 284 Bibliographic Notes
 286 Problems
 287 Chapter Twelve. Producer and Consumer Surplus
 289 12.1. Producer Surplus
 289 12.2. Consumer Surplus
 296 Bibliographic Notes
 304 Problems
 304 Chapter Thirteen. Aggregating Firms and Consumers
 306 13.1. Aggregating Firms
 307 13.2. Aggregating Consumers
 310 13.3. Convexification through Aggregation
 318 Bibliographic Notes
 326 Problems
 326 Chapter Fourteen. General Equilibrium
 329 14.1. Definitions
 329 14.2. Basic Properties ofWalrasian Equilibrium
 333 14.3. The Edgeworth Box
 335 14.4. Existence ofWalrasian Equilibria
 338 14.5. The Set of Equilibria for a Fixed Economy
 351 14.6. The Equilibrium Correspondence
 354 Bibliographic Notes
 354 Problems
 355 Chapter Fifteen. General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the Core
 358 15.1. The First Theorem ofWelfare Economics
 359 15.2. The Second Theorem ofWelfare Economics
 362 15.3. Walrasian Equilibria Are in the Core
 366 15.4. In a Large Enough Economy, Every Core Allocation Is a WalrasianEquilibrium Allocation
 370 15.5. Externalities and Lindahl Equilibrium
 380 Bibliographic Notes
 383 Problems
 383 Chapter Sixteen. General Equilibrium, Time, and Uncertainty
 386 16.1. A Framework for Time and Uncertainty
 386 16.2. General Equilibrium with Time and Uncertainty
 389 16.3. Equilibria of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations: I. Pure Exchange with Contingent Claims
 392 16.4. EPPPE: II. Complex Financial Securities and Complete Markets
 402 16.5. EPPPE: III. Complex Securities with Real Dividends and Complete Markets
 418 16.6. Incomplete Markets
 419 16.7. Firms
 424 Bibliographic Notes
 431 Problems
 432 About the Appendices
 437 Appendix One: Mathematical Induction
 439 Appendix Two: Some Simple Real Analysis
 441 A2.1. The Setting
 441 A2.2. Distance, Neighborhoods, and Open and Closed Sets
 441 A2.3. Sequences and Limits
 445 A2.4. Boundedness, (Completeness), and Compactness
 446 A2.5. Continuous Functions
 447 A2.6. Simply Connected Sets and the IntermediateValue Theorem
 448 A2.7. Suprema and Infima Maxes and Mins
 448 A2.8. The Maximum of a Continuous Function on a Compact Set
 449 A2.9. Lims Sup and Inf
 450 A2.10. Upper and Lower Semicontinuous Functions
 451 Appendix Three: Convexity
 452 A3.1. Convex Sets
 452 A3.2. The Separating and SupportingHyperplane Theorems
 457 A3.3. The SupportFunction Theorem
 459 A3.4. Concave and Convex Functions
 461 A3.5. Quasiconcavity and Quasiconvexity
 463 A3.6. Supergradients and Subgradients
 466 A3.7. Concave and Convex Functions and Calculus
 468 Appendix Four: Correspondences
 469 A4.1. Functions and Correspondences
 470 A4.2. Continuity of Correspondences
 471 A4.3. SingletonValued Correspondences and Continuity
 474 A4.4. Parametric Constrained Optimization Problems and Berge's Theorem
 475 A4.5. Why this Terminology?
 477 Appendix Five: Constrained Optimization
 479 Appendix Six: Dynamic Programming
 485 A6.1. Several Examples
 485 A6.2. A General Formulation
 489 A6.3. Bellman's Equation
 494 A6.4. Conserving and Unimprovable Strategies
 496 A6.5. Additive Rewards
 501 A6.6. States of the System
 504 A6.7. Solving FiniteHorizon Problems
 506 A6.8. InfiniteHorizon Problems and Stationarity
 509 A6.9. Solving InfiniteHorizon (Stationary) Problems with Unimprovability
 512 A6.10. Policy Iteration (and Transience)
 516 A6.11. Value Iteration
 518 A6.12. Examples
 521 A6.13. Things Not Covered Here: Other Optimality Criteria Continuous Time and Control Theory
 527 A6.14. Multiarmed Bandits and Complexity
 528 A6.15. Four More Problems You Can Solve
 530 Appendix Seven: The Implicit Function Theorem
 534 Appendix Eight: FixedPoint Theory
 535 References
 543 Index 551.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691155838 20160609
 Online
6. Microeconomic foundations [2013  ]
 Kreps, David M.
 Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2013
 Description
 Book — xvii, 563 p. : : ill. ; 27 cm.
 Summary

 Preface xiii Chapter One. Choice, Preference, and Utility
 1 1.1. Consumer Choice: The Basics
 1 1.2. Proving Most of Proposition 1.2, and More
 5 1.3. The NoBetterThan Sets and Utility Representations
 7 1.4. Strict Preference and Indifference
 9 1.5. Infinite Sets and Utility Representations
 10 1.6. Choice from Infinite Sets
 15 1.7. Equivalent Utility Representations
 17 1.8. Commentary
 18 Bibliographic Notes
 23 Problems
 23 Chapter Two. Structural Properties of Preferences and Utility Functions
 30 2.1. Monotonicity
 31 2.2. Convexity
 32 2.3. Continuity
 35 2.4. Indifference Curve Diagrams
 38 2.5. Weak and Additive Separability
 39 2.6. Quasilinearity
 43 2.7. Homotheticity
 44 Bibliographic Notes
 45 Problems
 45 Chapter Three. Basics of Consumer Demand
 50 3.1. The Consumer's Problem
 50 3.2. Basic Facts about the CP
 52 3.3. The Marshallian Demand Correspondence and Indirect Utility Function
 54 3.4. Solving the CP with Calculus
 56 Bibliographic Notes
 63 Problems
 64 Chapter Four. Revealed Preference and Afriat's Theorem
 67 4.1. An Example and Basic Ideas
 67 4.2. GARP and Afriat's Theorem
 70 4.3. Comparative Statics and the OwnPrice Effect
 74 Bibliographic Notes
 77 Problems
 78 Chapter Five. Choice under Uncertainty
 79 5.1. Two Models and Three Representations
 79 5.2. The MixtureSpace Theorem
 89 5.3. States of Nature and Subjective Expected Utility
 101 5.4. Subjective and Objective Probability and the Harsanyi Doctrine
 108 5.5. Empirical and Theoretical Critiques
 110 Bibliographic Notes
 116 Problems
 116 Chapter Six. Utility for Money
 123 6.1. Properties of Utility Functions for Money
 123 6.2. Induced Preferences for Income
 134 6.3. Demand for Insurance and Risky Assets
 138 Bibliographic Notes
 140 Problems
 140 Chapter Seven. Dynamic Choice
 148 7.1. The Standard Strategic Approach
 149 7.2. Dynamic Programming
 152 7.3. Testable Restrictions of the Standard Model
 153 7.4. Three Alternatives to the Standard Model
 156 Bibliographic Notes
 161 Problems
 161 Chapter Eight. Social Choice and Efficiency
 166 8.1. Arrow's Theorem
 166 8.2. What Do We Give Up?
 172 8.3. Efficiency
 175 8.4. Identifying the Pareto Frontier: Utility Imputations and Bergsonian Social Utility Functionals
 176 8.5. Syndicate Theory and Efficient Risk Sharing: Applying Proposition 8.10
 184 8.6. Efficiency?
 192 Bibliographic Notes
 194 Problems
 194 Chapter Nine. Competitive and ProfitMaximizing Firms
 197 9.1. The ProductionPossibility Set
 198 9.2. Profit Maximization
 199 9.3. Basics of the Firm's ProfitMaximization Problem
 201 9.4. Afriat's Theorem for Firms
 207 9.5. From Profit Functions to ProductionPossibility Sets
 211 9.6. How Many ProductionPossibility Sets Give the Same Profit Function?
 213 9.7. What Is Going On Here, Mathematically?
 216 9.8. Differentiability of the Profit Function
 219 9.9. Cost Minimization and InputRequirement Sets
 222 9.10. Why DoWe Care?
 228 Bibilographic Notes
 229 Problems
 229 Chapter Ten. The ExpenditureMinimization Problem
 233 10.1. Defining the EMP
 233 10.2. Basic Analysis of the EMP
 235 10.3. Hicksian Demand and the Expenditure Function
 236 10.4. Properties of the Expenditure Function
 238 10.5. How Many Continuous Utility Functions Give the Same Expenditure Function?
 240 10.6. Recovering Continuous Utility Functions from Expenditure Functions
 247 10.7. Is an Alleged Expenditure Function Really an Expenditure Function?
 248 10.8. Connecting the CP and the EMP
 254 Bibliographic Notes
 255 Problems
 255 Chapter Eleven. Classic Demand Theory
 258 11.1. Roy's Identity and the Slutsky Equation
 258 11.2. Differentiability of Indirect Utility
 262 11.3. Duality of Utility and Indirect Utility
 269 11.4. Differentiability of Marshallian Demand
 274 11.5. Integrability
 279 11.6. Complements and Substitutes
 283 11.7. Integrability and Revealed Preference
 284 Bibliographic Notes
 286 Problems
 287 Chapter Twelve. Producer and Consumer Surplus
 289 12.1. Producer Surplus
 289 12.2. Consumer Surplus
 296 Bibliographic Notes
 304 Problems
 304 Chapter Thirteen. Aggregating Firms and Consumers
 306 13.1. Aggregating Firms
 307 13.2. Aggregating Consumers
 310 13.3. Convexification through Aggregation
 318 Bibliographic Notes
 326 Problems
 326 Chapter Fourteen. General Equilibrium
 329 14.1. Definitions
 329 14.2. Basic Properties ofWalrasian Equilibrium
 333 14.3. The Edgeworth Box
 335 14.4. Existence ofWalrasian Equilibria
 338 14.5. The Set of Equilibria for a Fixed Economy
 351 14.6. The Equilibrium Correspondence
 354 Bibliographic Notes
 354 Problems
 355 Chapter Fifteen. General Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the Core
 358 15.1. The First Theorem ofWelfare Economics
 359 15.2. The Second Theorem ofWelfare Economics
 362 15.3. Walrasian Equilibria Are in the Core
 366 15.4. In a Large Enough Economy, Every Core Allocation Is a WalrasianEquilibrium Allocation
 370 15.5. Externalities and Lindahl Equilibrium
 380 Bibliographic Notes
 383 Problems
 383 Chapter Sixteen. General Equilibrium, Time, and Uncertainty
 386 16.1. A Framework for Time and Uncertainty
 386 16.2. General Equilibrium with Time and Uncertainty
 389 16.3. Equilibria of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations: I. Pure Exchange with Contingent Claims
 392 16.4. EPPPE: II. Complex Financial Securities and Complete Markets
 402 16.5. EPPPE: III. Complex Securities with Real Dividends and Complete Markets
 418 16.6. Incomplete Markets
 419 16.7. Firms
 424 Bibliographic Notes
 431 Problems
 432 About the Appendices
 437 Appendix One: Mathematical Induction
 439 Appendix Two: Some Simple Real Analysis
 441 A2.1. The Setting
 441 A2.2. Distance, Neighborhoods, and Open and Closed Sets
 441 A2.3. Sequences and Limits
 445 A2.4. Boundedness, (Completeness), and Compactness
 446 A2.5. Continuous Functions
 447 A2.6. Simply Connected Sets and the IntermediateValue Theorem
 448 A2.7. Suprema and Infima Maxes and Mins
 448 A2.8. The Maximum of a Continuous Function on a Compact Set
 449 A2.9. Lims Sup and Inf
 450 A2.10. Upper and Lower Semicontinuous Functions
 451 Appendix Three: Convexity
 452 A3.1. Convex Sets
 452 A3.2. The Separating and SupportingHyperplane Theorems
 457 A3.3. The SupportFunction Theorem
 459 A3.4. Concave and Convex Functions
 461 A3.5. Quasiconcavity and Quasiconvexity
 463 A3.6. Supergradients and Subgradients
 466 A3.7. Concave and Convex Functions and Calculus
 468 Appendix Four: Correspondences
 469 A4.1. Functions and Correspondences
 470 A4.2. Continuity of Correspondences
 471 A4.3. SingletonValued Correspondences and Continuity
 474 A4.4. Parametric Constrained Optimization Problems and Berge's Theorem
 475 A4.5. Why this Terminology?
 477 Appendix Five: Constrained Optimization
 479 Appendix Six: Dynamic Programming
 485 A6.1. Several Examples
 485 A6.2. A General Formulation
 489 A6.3. Bellman's Equation
 494 A6.4. Conserving and Unimprovable Strategies
 496 A6.5. Additive Rewards
 501 A6.6. States of the System
 504 A6.7. Solving FiniteHorizon Problems
 506 A6.8. InfiniteHorizon Problems and Stationarity
 509 A6.9. Solving InfiniteHorizon (Stationary) Problems with Unimprovability
 512 A6.10. Policy Iteration (and Transience)
 516 A6.11. Value Iteration
 518 A6.12. Examples
 521 A6.13. Things Not Covered Here: Other Optimality Criteria Continuous Time and Control Theory
 527 A6.14. Multiarmed Bandits and Complexity
 528 A6.15. Four More Problems You Can Solve
 530 Appendix Seven: The Implicit Function Theorem
 534 Appendix Eight: FixedPoint Theory
 535 References
 543 Index 551.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691155838 20160609
 Online
Business Library
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Stacks  
HB172 .K744 2013  Unknown 
HB172 .K744 2013  Unknown 
 Kreps, David M. speaker.
 [Stanford, California] : [Stanford University, Graduate School of Business], [2010]
 Description
 Video — 1 videocassette (ca. 55 min.) : DVCAM video, sound, color ; 1/4 in.
 Summary

Award dinner with award winner giving speech to colleagues.
 Online
Business Library
Business Library  Status 

Archives: Ask at iDesk  
ARCHIVES VIDEO 999  Inlibrary use 
 Kreps, David M. interviewee.
 [Stanford, California] : [Stanford University, Graduate School of Business], [2008]
 Description
 Video — 1 videodisc (67 min.) : DVD video, sound, color ; 4 3/4 in.
 Summary

Kathy Long, Director of J. Hugh Jackson Library, interviews David Kreps, Senior Associate Dean of Stanford Graduate School of Business, about new curriculum implementation at the Business School.
 Online
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ARCHIVES VIDEO 1178  Inlibrary use 
9. Microeconomics for managers [2004]
 Kreps, David M.
 [1st ed.]  New York : Norton, c2004.
 Description
 Book — xviii, 652 p. : ill. ; 27 cm.
 Summary

Developed over the course of ten years at the Stanford Business School, Microeconomics for Managers leads the field with a strong game theoretic approach and fullchapter coverage of many modern topics, including Porter's five forces, signaling, transaction costs, and incentives.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976786 20160610
 Online
10. Microeconomics for managers [2004]
 Kreps, David M.
 1st ed.  New York : Norton, c2004.
 Description
 Book — xviii, 652 p. : ill ; 27 cm.
 Summary

Developed over the course of ten years at the Stanford Business School, Microeconomics for Managers leads the field with a strong game theoretic approach and fullchapter coverage of many modern topics, including Porter's five forces, signaling, transaction costs, and incentives.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780393976786 20160610
 Online
Business Library
Business Library  Status 

Archives: Ask at iDesk  
HB172 .K75 2003  Inlibrary use 
On reserve at Business Library  
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 2hour loan 
Stacks  
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 
HB172 .K75 2003  Unknown 
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BUS PERM RES, MGTECON2030102
 Course
 BUS PERM RES  Business Library Permanent Reserve
 Instructor(s)
 Bus Lib  Reserves
 Course
 MGTECON2030102  Managerial Economics  Accelerated
 Instructor(s)
 Lambert, Nicolas Sebastien
11. A course in microeconomic theory [1990]
 Kreps, David M.
 Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1990.
 Description
 Book — xviii, 839 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.
 Summary

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and ??i??userfriendly??i??i??'. The work is designed for the firstyear graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory  one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. This book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. This work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transactioncost economics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691042640 20160528
 Online
12. A course in microeconomic theory [1990]
 Kreps, David M.
 Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University, c1990.
 Description
 Book — xviii, 839 p. : ill ; 27 cm.
 Summary

David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and ??i??userfriendly??i??i??'. The work is designed for the firstyear graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory  one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. This book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. This work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transactioncost economics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780691042640 20160528
 Online
Business Library
Business Library  Status 

On reserve at Business Library  
HB172 .K74 1990  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K74 1990  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K74 1990  Unknown 2hour loan 
HB172 .K74 1990  Unknown 2hour loan 
MGTECON60101
 Course
 MGTECON60101  Microeconomic Analysis II
 Instructor(s)
 Wilson, Robert
13. Game theory and economic modelling [1990]
 Kreps, David M.
 Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1990.
 Description
 Book — viii, 195 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
 Summary

 Introduction
 1. The standard
 2. Basic notions of noncooperative game theory
 3. The successes of game theory
 4. The problems of game theory
 5. Bounded rationality and retrospection Bibliography Index.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
 The standard Basic notions of noncooperative game theory: Strategic form games Extensive form games Extensive and strategic form games Dominance Nash equilibrium The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form Dynamics and extensive form games Incredble threats and incredible promises Credible threats and promises: cooperation and reputation The importance of what players know about others The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols Too many equilibria and no way to choose choosing among equilibria with refinements The rules of the game Bounded rationality and retrospection.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it  and equilibrium analysis in particular  can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a nontechnical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283812 20160528
14. Game theory and economic modelling [1990]
 Kreps, David M.
 Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990.
 Description
 Book — viii, 195 p. : ill. ; 23 cm.
 Summary

 Introduction
 1. The standard
 2. Basic notions of noncooperative game theory
 3. The successes of game theory
 4. The problems of game theory
 5. Bounded rationality and retrospection Bibliography Index.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
 The standard Basic notions of noncooperative game theory: Strategic form games Extensive form games Extensive and strategic form games Dominance Nash equilibrium The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form Dynamics and extensive form games Incredble threats and incredible promises Credible threats and promises: cooperation and reputation The importance of what players know about others The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols Too many equilibria and no way to choose choosing among equilibria with refinements The rules of the game Bounded rationality and retrospection.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528
Over the past two decades, academic economics has undergone a mild revolution in methodology. The language, concepts and techniques of noncooperative game theory have become central to the discipline. This book provides the reader with some basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and then goes on to explore the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool of economic modelling and analysis. The central theses are that noncooperative game theory has been a remarkably popular tool in economics over the past decade because it allows analysts to capture essential features of dynamic competition and competition where some parties have proprietary information. The theory is weakest in providing a sense of when it  and equilibrium analysis in particular  can be applied and what to do when equilibrium analysis is inappropriate. Many of these weaknesses can be addressed by the consideration of individuals who are boundedly rational and learn imperfectly from the past. Written in a nontechnical style and working by analogy, the book, first given as part of the Clarendon Lectures in Economics, is readily accessible to a broad audience and will be of interest to economists and students alike. Knowledge of game theory is not required as the concepts are developed as the book progresses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283812 20160528
15. Game theory and economic modelling [1990]
 Kreps, David M.
 Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990.
 Description
 Book — viii, 195 p. : ill ; 23 cm.
 Summary

 The standard Basic notions of noncooperative game theory: Strategic form games Extensive form games Extensive and strategic form games Dominance Nash equilibrium The successes of game theory: Taxonomy based on the strategic form Dynamics and extensive form games Incredble threats and incredible promises Credible threats and promises: cooperation and reputation The importance of what players know about others The problems of game theory: Bilateral bargaining and precise protocols Too many equilibria and no way to choose choosing among equilibria with refinements The rules of the game Bounded rationality and retrospection.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780198283577 20160528
Business Library, SAL3 (offcampus storage)
Business Library  Status 

Stacks  
HB144 .K73 1990  Unknown 
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HB144 .K73 1990  Available 
 Kreps, David M.
 Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1990.
 Description
 Book — viii, 195 p. : ill.
17. Notes on the theory of choice [1988]
 Kreps, David M.
 Boulder : Westview Press, 1988.
 Description
 Book — xv, 207 p. : ill ; 23 cm.
 Summary

 * Introduction * Preference Relations and Revealed Preference * Ordinal Utility * Choice Under Uncertainty: Formulations and Representations * Von NewmannMorgenstern Expected Utility * Utility Functions for Money * Horse Race Lotteries and Roulette Wheels * Subjective Probability * Savages Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty * Conditional Preference, Conditional Probability, and Contingent Choice * Independence, Exchangeability, and de Finettis Theorem * Normative Uses of These Models on SubprobleMs. Dynamic Choice Theory and the Choice of Opportunity Sets * The Experimental Evidence.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780813375533 20160605
 Online
Business Library
Business Library  Status 

Stacks  
HB801 .K73 1988  Unknown 
18. Notes on the theory of choice [1988]
 Kreps, David M.
 Boulder : Westview Press, 1988.
 Description
 Book — xv, 207 p. : ill. ; 22 cm.
 Summary

 * Introduction * Preference Relations and Revealed Preference * Ordinal Utility * Choice Under Uncertainty: Formulations and Representations * Von NewmannMorgenstern Expected Utility * Utility Functions for Money * Horse Race Lotteries and Roulette Wheels * Subjective Probability * Savages Theory of Choice Under Uncertainty * Conditional Preference, Conditional Probability, and Contingent Choice * Independence, Exchangeability, and de Finettis Theorem * Normative Uses of These Models on SubprobleMs. Dynamic Choice Theory and the Choice of Opportunity Sets * The Experimental Evidence.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780813375533 20160605
 Online
19. Notes on the theory of choice [1988]
 Kreps, David M.
 Boulder : Westview Press, 1988.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource (xv, 207 pages) : illustrations.
20. Contributions to The New Palgrave [1986]
 Kreps, David M.
 [Stanford] : Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, [1986]
 Description
 Book — 68 p. ; 28 cm.
 Online
Business Library
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