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• Volume
• 1. Invasion, insurgency, civil war, 2003-2006
• Volume
• 2. Surge and withdrawal, 2007-2011.

Iraq War, 2003-2011; Iraq; history.

• Foreword
• Preface
• Planning and preparation
• Force planning and planning refinements
• Adjustments to the plan and combat rehearsals
• The opening gambit
• Bridgehead over the Tigris
• Attack to secure Eastern Baghdad
• Task force Tripoli
• Security and stabilization operations
• Epilogue
• Appendix A: Command and staff list
• Appendix B: Glossary
• Appendix C: 1st Marine Division honor roll.

• List of entries
• List of primary documents
• Overview of the Iraq War (2003-2011)
• Causes of the Iraq War
• Consequences of the Iraq War
• A-Z entries
• Primary source documents
• Chronology of the Iraq War
• Recommended Bibliography
• List of Contributions
• Index
• About the editor.

This invaluable resource offers a comprehensive overview of the Iraq War, with more than 100 in-depth articles by leading scholars on an array of topics and themes and more than a dozen key primary source documents. * Explores how the Bush Doctrine was employed to justify the US decision to invade Iraq * Illuminates the key leaders and the military strategy they implemented in conducting the Iraq War * Explains how a series of flawed military and political decisions created a dysfunctional government in Baghdad * Informs readers of the disruptive influence the Iraq War has had on the entire Middle East.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

A single-volume reference containing analysis and commentary on the 2003 war with Iraq that cuts through media hype and government spin with the aim of providing a balanced picture of the conflict. Despite the torrent of coverage, woefully little attention has been paid to the history of the region; the policies that led to confrontation; the complex problems affecting decision-making in the Middle East; and the daunting challenges that will confront America and the Middle East following the crisis. In this collection, the co-editors of the acclaimed "Gulf War Reader" have assembled essays and documents that present an eminently readable guide from every perspective. Contributors include Noam Chomsky, Christopher Hitchens, Arundhati Roy, Terry Jones, Thomas Friedman, Susan Sontag and many more. They offer an engrossing saga of how oil economics, power politics, dreams of empire, nationalist yearnings and religious fanaticism - not to mention naked aggression, betrayal and tragic miscalculation - have conspired to bring about the fateful collison of the West and Arab world over Iraq.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction
• Genesis of the War / Jefferson P. Marquis, Walter L. Perry, Andrea Mejia, Jerry M. Sollinger, Vipin Narang
• Planning the War and the Transition to Peace / Walter L. Perry
• Land Operations / Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Forrest E. Morgan, Alexander C. Hou, Chad Yost, Andrea Mejia, David E. Mosher
• Air Operations / Bruce R. Pirnie, John Gordon IV, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Forrest E. Morgan, Alexander C. Hou, Chad Yost
• Why the Iraqi Resistance Was So Weak / Stephen T. Hosmer
• Managing the War / Walter L. Perry, Edward O'Connell, Miranda Priebe, Alexander C. Hou, Lowell H. Schwartz
• The Aftermath: Civilian Planning Efforts and the Occupation of Iraq / Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Heather S. Gregg, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Andrew Rathmell
• Mobilization, Deployment, and Sustainment in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM / Eric Peltz, Dave Kassing, Chad Yost, Marc Robbins, Kenneth Girardini, Brian Nichiporuk, Peter Schirmer, John M. Halliday, John R. Bondanella
• Conclusions and Recommendations.

"Soon after Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) began in March 2003, RAND Arroyo Center began compiling an authoritative account of the planning and execution of combat and stability operations in Iraq through 2004 in order to identify key issues that could affect Army plans, operational concepts, doctrine, and other Title 10 functions.
"The resulting analysis, completed in January 2006, will interest those involved in organizing, training, and equipping military forces to plan for, deploy to, participate in, and support joint and multinational operations. Although focused primarily on Army forces and activities, the analysis also describes aspects of joint and multinational operations. RAND analysts collected the information in this report from many sources, including unit after-action reports, compilations of lessons learned, official databases, media reports, other contemporary records, and interviews with key participants in OIF.
"This report presents a broad overview of the study findings based on unclassified source material. It traces the operation from its root causes in the first Gulf War through operations up to approximately the end of June 2004. It addresses strategy, planning, and organization for OIF; air and ground force operations; personnel, deployment, and logistics issues; coalition operations; the occupation that followed combat operations; and civil-military operations. Also, because the research conducted for this report covers events only through June 2004, events that occurred after that date would alter some of the conclusions and recommendations. In other cases, some recommendations might already have been implemented in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the report's recommendations are provided as they were originally formulated."--Back cover.

• Acknowledgements-- Introduction--
• 1. Black Gold and Red Herrings--
• 2. Origins and Interests--
• 3. Ideology and Institutions--
• 4. Setting the Agenda--
• 5. Selling the War-- Conclusions-- Appendix: Mearsheimer and Walt, Redux.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

What were the causes of the Iraq War? Who were the main players? How was the war sold to the decision makers? Despite all that has been written on the Iraq war the myriad scholarly, journalistic and polemical works the answers to these questions remain shrouded in an ideological mist. The Road to Iraq is an empirical investigation that dispels this fog. Discover how a small but ideologically coherent and socially cohesive group of determined political agents used the contingency of 9/11 to overwhelm a sceptical foreign policy establishment, military brass and intelligence apparatus.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Reader's Guide to Related Documents
• The Case for War
• Shock and Awe
• Reconstruction
• From Conventional to Unconventional War
• The Rough Road to Democracy.

The Iraq War: A Documentary and Reference Guide gives readers the opportunity to investigate this costly and controversial conflict as professional researchers do-by looking closely at key samples of historical evidence. As readers will see, that evidence proves to be extraordinarily revealing about the drive to war, the course of the initial invasion, the counterinsurgency, the "surge, " and the continuing difficulties in unifying and stabilizing the country. From relevant exchanges in the 2000 Bush/Gore debates to interviews with Saddam Hussein to the latest reorganization of the Coalition Provisional Authority, The Iraq War gives readers an insider's view of the conflict's key decisions and events. Each chapter brings together primary and secondary sources on an important phase of the war, with the author providing context, analysis, and insight from a historian's perspective. The book also provides a solid framework for working with the documentary record-a particularly difficult task in this case, as so many vital sources will remain classified and inaccessible for years to come.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

2003: As Croatia lurches from socialism into globalized capitalism, Toni, a cocky journalist in Zagreb, struggles to balance his fragile career, pushy family, and hotheaded girlfriend. But in a moment of vulnerability he makes a mistake: volunteering his unhinged Arabic-speaking cousin Boris to report on the Iraq War. Boris begins filing Gonzo missives from the conflict zone and Toni decides it is better to secretly rewrite his cousin's increasingly incoherent ramblings than face up to the truth. But when Boris goes missing, Toni's own sense of reality - and reliability - begins to unravel. Our Man In Iraq, the first of Robert Perisic's novels to be translated into English, serves as an unforgettable introduction to a vibrant voice from Croatia. With his characteristic humor and insight, Perisic gets to the heart of life made and remade by war.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• PART I: The U.S. Prepares for Conflict, 2001 / By Joyce Battle
• PART II: Was There Even a Decision? / By John Prados and Christopher Ames
• PART III: Shaping the Debate / By John Prados and Christopher Ames

Hugh Martin's second full-length poetry collection moves within and among history to broaden and complicate our understanding of war. These poems push beyond tidy generalizations and easy moralizing as they explore the complex, often tense relationships between U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians. The speaker journeys through training to deployment and back again, returning home to reflect on the soldiers and civilians-both memories and ghosts-left behind. Filled with recollected dialogue and true-to-life encounters, these poems question, deconstruct, examine, and reintegrate the myths and realities of service.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defence ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)