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In 2005, a small group of American and Indian diplomats engineered a landmark agreement that released India from decades of restrictions imposed on its nuclear weapons program after its 1974 and 1998 tests. Before and after the Deal passed Congress, there was an active debate among critics and supporters who predicted its effects. This thesis provides the first comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the outcome. It incorporates the available scholarly evidence as well as interviews from prominent policymakers and scholars in both the Obama and Bush Administrations. This survey of the aftermath of the US-India Deal reveals a mixed outcome. While it appeared to make India’s nuclear policies more responsible on the international stage, India has engaged in hedging in order to maintain relations with the United States while ensuring a steady supply of oil from Iran. Many developing countries believed that the US had undermined its own commitments to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but in the end, they did not actively oppose the Agreement. More significantly, despite the opaque nature of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals, it is clear that Pakistan in particular has chosen to produce even more weapons in the aftermath of the US-India deal, leaving South Asia less stable. Regarding precedent-setting, the US-India Deal allowed the US to break longstanding international rules given its position as the global power. China would have more difficulty taking the same route. However, the Deal did not set a precedent because China did not follow the same path to break and then remake the rules. Thus, while American actions were legitimate in a system fashioned by the United States, China used the conclusion of the India Deal as an opportunity to pursue an alternative policy and to circumvent the export controls entirely.