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1. Ontology and objectivity [1999]
- Hofweber, Thomas.
- 1999.
- Description
- Book — xii, 256 leaves, bound.
- Online
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Philosophy Library (Tanner), SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving), Special Collections
Philosophy Library (Tanner) | Status |
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Stacks | |
3781 1999 H | Unknown |
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving) | Status |
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Stacks | Request |
3781 1999 H | Unknown |
Special Collections | Status |
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University Archives | Request on-site access |
3781 1999 H | In-library use |
- Hofweber, Thomas, 1969- author.
- First edition. - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Description
- Book — xiv, 365 pages ; 25 cm
- Summary
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Many significant problems in metaphysics are tied to ontological questions, but ontology and its relation to larger questions in metaphysics give rise to a series of puzzles that suggest that we don't fully understand what ontology is supposed to do, nor what ambitions metaphysics can have for finding out about what reality is like. Thomas Hofweber aims to solve these puzzles about ontology and consequently to make progress on four central metaphysical problems: the philosophy of arithmetic, the metaphysics of ordinary objects, the problem of universals, and the question of whether the reality is independent of us. Crucial parts of the proposed solution involve considerations about quantification and its relationship to ontology, the place of reference in natural languages, the possibility of ineffable facts, the extent of empirical evidence in metaphysics, and whether metaphysics can be properly esoteric. Overall, Hofweber defends a rationalist account of arithmetic, an empiricist picture in the philosophy of ordinary objects, a restricted form of nominalism, and realism about reality, understood as all there is, but idealism about reality, understood as all that is the case. He defends metaphysics as having some questions of fact that are distinctly its own, with a limited form of autonomy from other parts of inquiry, but rejects several metaphysical projects and approaches as being based on a mistake.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Stanford, Calif. : CSLI Publications, c2000.
- Description
- Book — xxi, 325 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
- Summary
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- Much ado about nothing / Anthony Everett, Thomas Hofweber
- Pleonastic Fregianism and empty names / Stephen Schiffer
- Emptiness without compromise / Kenneth A. Taylor
- Referentialism and empty names / Anthony Everett
- On myth / Avrom Faderman
- Existence as metaphor? / Kendall Walton
- Negative Existentials / Fred Kroon
- Pretense theory and abstract object theory / Edward N. Zalta
- Making up stories / Harry Deutsch
- Real people in unreal contexts / Stacie Friend
- Semantic pretense / Mark Richard
- Quantification and fictional discourse / Peter van Inwagen
- Quantification and non-existent objects / Thomas Hofweber
- A paradox of existence / Stephen Yablo.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Online
Green Library, Philosophy Library (Tanner), Science Library (Li and Ma)
Green Library | Status |
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Find it Jonsson Social Sciences Reading Room: CSLI publications | |
P51 .C18 NO.108 | Unknown |
Philosophy Library (Tanner) | Status |
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Stacks | |
BD311 .E47 2000 | Unknown |
Science Library (Li and Ma) | Status |
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Stacks | |
P51 .C18 NO.108 | Unknown |
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