• Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks
• The invention of "morality" and the possibility of consequentialism
• The misguided project of vindicating morality
• The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension
• What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality?
• Assessing "modern moral philosophy"
• Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of "I" as a device of self-reference
• Is the fundamental reference rule for "I" the key to explaining first-person self-reference?
• Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem
• Can we make sense of a nonreferential account of "I"?
• Strategies for saving "I" as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference
• Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.

Elizabeth Anscombe's Modern Moral Philosophy and The First Person have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe's theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.
(source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780674976504 20180604