Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2018.
Book — xi, 238 pages ; 25 cm
Part One. No morality: "Modern moral philosophy" (1958): Virtue ethics, eudaimonism, and the Greeks
The invention of "morality" and the possibility of consequentialism
The misguided project of vindicating morality
The futility of seeking the extension of a word with no intension
What's really wrong with the vocabulary of morality?
Assessing "modern moral philosophy"
Part Two: No self: "the first person" (1975): The circularity problem for accounts of "I" as a device of self-reference
Is the fundamental reference rule for "I" the key to explaining first-person self-reference?
Rumfitt's solution to the circularity problem
Can we make sense of a nonreferential account of "I"?
Strategies for saving "I" as a singular term: domesticating FP and deflating reference
Epilogue: The anti-cartesian basis of Anscombe's scepticism.
Elizabeth Anscombe's Modern Moral Philosophy and The First Person have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe's theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view. (source: Nielsen Book Data) 9780674976504 20180604