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• 1. Sovereign credibility and public revenue
• Part I. The Glorious Revolution and the English State: 2. The market for taxes and platforms
• 3. More credible platforms, more taxes
• 4. Pricing sovereign debts
• 5. Establishing monopoly brokerage of sovereign debts
• 6. The consequences of monopoly brokerage of debt
• 7. Property rights
• 8. From constitutional commitment to Industrial Revolution
• 9. Summarizing the Revolution
• Part II. The English Constitutional Diaspora: 10. Exporting the Revolution - the early adopters
• 11. Exporting the Revolution - the late adopters
• 12. Good political institutions.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

How did England, once a minor regional power, become a global hegemon between 1689 and 1815? Why, over the same period, did she become the world's first industrial nation? Gary W. Cox addresses these questions in Marketing Sovereign Promises. The book examines two central issues: the origins of the great taxing power of the modern state and how that power is made compatible with economic growth. Part I considers England's rise after the revolution of 1689, highlighting the establishment of annual budgets with shutdown reversions. This core reform effected a great increase in per capita tax extraction. Part II investigates the regional and global spread of British budgeting ideas. Cox argues that states grew only if they addressed a central credibility problem afflicting the Ancien Regime - that rulers were legally entitled to spend public revenue however they deemed fit.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1 The Weakness of Parties 2
• 2 Committee Government 9
• 3 An Outline of the Book 13
• Part 1 The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees 15
• 1 Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis 17
• 1 Self Selection 19
• 2 Constituency Interests and Assignment Requests 21
• 3 Accommodation of Assignment Requests 25
• 4 Accommodation of Transfer Requests 32
• 5 The Routinization of the Assignment Process 37
• 6 What of Norms in the Assignment Process? 39
• 7 Whither Assignment Routines? The Republican Revolution 40
• 2 The Seniority System in Congress 43
• 1 Seniority in the Rayburn House: The Standard View 44
• 2 Reconsidering the Standard View 45
• 3 The Empirical Evidence 47
• 4 Interpreting the Evidence: Postwar Democratic Rule 52
• 5 Interpreting the Evidence: The Republican Revolution 55
• 3 Subgovernments and the Representativeness of Committees 58
• 1 The Previous Literature 59
• 2 Data and Methodology 65
• 3 Results 68
• 4 The Representativeness Thesis 72
• Part 2 A Theory of Organization 77
• 4 Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas 79
• 1 Collective Dilemmas 80
• 2 Central Authority: The Basics 84
• 3 Why Central Authority Is Sometimes Necessary 87
• 4 Multiperiod Considerations 92
• 5 Problems with Central Authority 94
• 5 A Theory of Legislative Parties 99
• 1 The Reelection Goal 100
• 2 Reelection Maximizers and Electoral Inefficiencies 112
• 3 Party Leadership 115
• 4 Some Criticisms of Our Theory and Our Rejoinder 123
• Part 3 Parties as Floor-Voting Coalitions 127
• 6 On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress 129
• 1 Party Voting: Trends Since 1980 130
• 2 Party Voting: Trends from 1910 to the 1970s 131
• 3 Party Agendas and Party Leadership Votes 135
• Part 4 Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments 149
• 7 Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments 153
• 1 Assignments to Control Committees 154
• 2 Party Loyalty and Transfers to House Committees 155
• 3 Loyalty, the Republican Revolution, and the Great Purge of 1995 170
• 4 Assignment Success of Freshmen 171
• 8 Contingents and Parties 176
• 1 A Model of Partisan Selection 177
• 2 Which Committees' Contingents Will Be Representative? 178
• 3 Results 188
• Part 5 Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power 211
• 9 The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda 213
• 1 The Speaker's Collective Scheduling Problem 215
• 2 Limits on the Scheduling Power 217
• 3 Committee Agendas and the Speaker 221
• 4 Intercommittee Logrolls 227
• 5 Coalitional Stability 230
• 6 Critiques and Rejoinders 232
• 10 Controlling the Legislative Agenda 235
• 1 The Majority Party and the Committee System 236
• 2 The Consequences of Structural Power: The Legislative Agenda 241
• 3 The Consequences of Structural Power: Public Policy 250
• 4 Comments on the Postwar House 251
• Appendix 1 Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses 259
• Appendix 2 A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences 263
• Appendix 3 Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes 267
• Appendix 4 The Scheduling Power 269.

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees: 1. Self-selection and the subgovernment thesis
• 2. The seniority system in Congress
• 3. Subgovernments and the representativeness of committees
• Part II. A Theory of Party Organization: 4. Institutions as solutions to collective dilemmas
• 5. A theory of legislative parties
• Part III. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions: 6. On the decline of party voting in Congress
• Part IV. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments: 7. Party loyalty and committee assignments
• 8. Contingents and parties
• Part V. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power: 9. The majority party and the legislative agenda
• 10. Controlling the legislative agenda.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The second edition of Legislative Leviathan provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Re-evaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel'. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Most of the cartel's efforts are focused on securing control of the legislative agenda for its members. The first edition of this book had significant influence on the study of American politics and is essential reading for students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction
• Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory
• Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model
• 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization
• 5. Final passage votes
• 6. The costs of agenda control
• 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules
• 8. The bills reported from committee
• 9. Which way does policy move?
• Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power
• 11. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction
• Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory
• Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model
• 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization
• 5. Final passage votes
• 6. The costs of agenda control
• 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules
• 8. The bills reported from committee
• 9. Which way does policy move?
• Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power
• 11. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction
• Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory
• Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model
• 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization
• 5. Final passage votes
• 6. The costs of agenda control
• 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules
• 8. The bills reported from committee
• 9. Which way does policy move?
• Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power
• 11. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction
• 2. The reapportionment revolution
• Part II. Democrats and Republicans: 3. A model of Congressional redistricting in the US
• 4. The case of the disappearing bias
• 5. The role of the courts in the 1960s redistricting process
• 6. Bias, responsiveness and the courts
• 7. Redistricting's differing impact on Democratic and Republican incumbents
• Part III. Incumbents and Challengers: 8. The growth of the incumbency advantage
• 9. Redistricting and electoral coordination
• 10. Redistricting, the probability of securing a majority and entry
• 11. Reassessing the incumbency advantage
• Part IV. Conclusion: 12. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in America's history. Moreover, they changed what would happen at law should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides a detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction
• 2. The reapportionment revolution
• Part II. Democrats and Republicans: 3. A model of Congressional redistricting in the US
• 4. The case of the disappearing bias
• 5. The role of the courts in the 1960s redistricting process
• 6. Bias, responsiveness and the courts
• 7. Redistricting's differing impact on Democratic and Republican incumbents
• Part III. Incumbents and Challengers: 8. The growth of the incumbency advantage
• 9. Redistricting and electoral coordination
• 10. Redistricting, the probability of securing a majority and entry
• 11. Reassessing the incumbency advantage
• Part IV. Conclusion: 12. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in America's history. Moreover, they changed what would happen at law should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides a detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction
• 2. The reapportionment revolution
• Part II. Democrats and Republicans: 3. A model of Congressional redistricting in the US
• 4. The case of the disappearing bias
• 5. The role of the courts in the 1960s redistricting process
• 6. Bias, responsiveness and the courts
• 7. Redistricting's differing impact on Democratic and Republican incumbents
• Part III. Incumbents and Challengers: 8. The growth of the incumbency advantage
• 9. Redistricting and electoral coordination
• 10. Redistricting, the probability of securing a majority and entry
• 11. Reassessing the incumbency advantage
• Part IV. Conclusion: 12. Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, had far more than jurisprudential consequences. They sparked a massive wave of extraordinary redistricting in the mid-1960s. Both state legislative and congressional districts were redrawn more comprehensively - by far - than at any previous time in America's history. Moreover, they changed what would happen at law should a state government fail to enact a new districting plan when one was legally required. This book provides a detailed analysis of how judicial partisanship affected redistricting outcomes in the 1960s, arguing that the reapportionment revolution led indirectly to three fundamental changes in the nature of congressional elections: the abrupt eradication of a 6% pro-Republican bias in the translation of congressional votes into seats outside the south; the abrupt increase in the apparent advantage of incumbents; and the abrupt alteration of the two parties' success in congressional recruitment and elections.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of tables and figures
• Series editor's preface
• Preface
• PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction
• 2. Duverger's propositions
• PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems
• 4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems
• 5. Strategic voting in multimember districts
• 6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems
• 7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY: 8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry
• 9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan
• PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL: 10. Putting the constituencies together
• 11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties
• PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: 12. Coordination failures and representation
• 13. Coordination failures and dominant parties
• 14. Coordination failures and realignments
• PART VI. CONCLUSION
• 15. Conclusion
• Appendices
• References
• Subject index
• Author index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of tables and figures
• Series editor's preface
• Preface
• PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction
• 2. Duverger's propositions
• PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems
• 4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems
• 5. Strategic voting in multimember districts
• 6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems
• 7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY: 8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry
• 9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan
• PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL: 10. Putting the constituencies together
• 11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties
• PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: 12. Coordination failures and representation
• 13. Coordination failures and dominant parties
• 14. Coordination failures and realignments
• PART VI. CONCLUSION
• 15. Conclusion
• Appendices
• References
• Subject index
• Author index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Popular elections are at the heart of representative democracy. Thus, understanding the laws and practices that govern such elections is essential to understanding modern democracy. In this book, Cox views electoral laws as posing a variety of coordination problems that political forces must solve. Coordination problems - and with them the necessity of negotiating withdrawals, strategic voting, and other species of strategic coordination - arise in all electoral systems. This book employs a unified game-theoretic model to study strategic coordination worldwide and that relies primarily on constituency-level rather than national aggregate data in testing theoretical propositions about the effects of electoral laws. This book also considers not just what happens when political forces succeed in solving the coordination problems inherent in the electoral system they face but also what happens when they fail.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of 'legislative cartel.' These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership. Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work. This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction. The Weakness of Parties ; Committee Government ; Outline of the Book
• Part One. The Autonomy and Distinctiveness of Committees. Self-Selection and the Subgovernment Thesis ; The Seniority System in Congress ; Subgovernments and the Representativeness of committees
• Part Two. A Theory of Party Organization. Institutions as Solutions to Collective Dilemmas ; A Theory of Legislative Parties
• Part Three. Parties as Floor Voting Coalitions. On the Decline of Party Voting in Congress
• Part Four. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: Committee Appointments. Party Loyalty and Committee Assignments ; Contingents and Parties
• Part Five. Parties as Procedural Coalitions: The Scheduling Power. The Majority Party and the Legislative Agenda ; Controlling the Legislative Agenda
• Appendix 1. Uncompensated Seniority Violations, Eightieth through Hundredth Congresses
• Appendix 2. A Model of the Speaker's Scheduling Preferences
• Appendix 3. Unchallengeable and Challengeable Vetoes
• Appendix 4. The Scheduling Power.

This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House - especially majority parties - as a species of "legislative cartel". These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences.First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership. Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work. This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Introduction: 1. Introduction and outline
• 2. The historical setting
• Part II. The Development of Disciplined Parliamentary Parties: 3. The measurement and theory of party cohesion
• 4. The Peelites and the disruption of the party system
• 5. The caucus
• 6. The origin of the efficient secret
• 7. The electoral connection and ministerial ambition
• 8. The Cabinet's strength: threats of resignation and dissolution
• Part III. The Electorate: 9. The development of a party-oriented electorate
• 10. The causes of a party-oriented electorate
• 11. The legislative consequences of a party-oriented electorate
• 12. The influence of constituents in Victorian England
• Part IV. Conclusion: 13. The history of party voting
• Appendix
• References
• Author index
• Subject index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The Efficient Secret is an analysis of the institutional changes in parliamentary government in nineteenth-century England, concentrating on the years between the first and third Reform Acts. Professor Gary W. Cox employs a rational choice model to analyze the problems of voter choice and to examine the emergence of party loyalty in the electorate, the development of cabinet government, and their legislative consequences. The introductory chapters provide the historical setting for this study and briefly survey nineteenth-century political and economic events. Professor Cox then focuses on the increases in party voting in Parliament and in the electorate. To support his argument concerning these parallel developments, he uses statistical evidence drawn from poll books and newspapers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part 1 Introduction: an era of divided government, Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell. Part 2 Federal causes: divided government - is it all in the campaigns?, John R. Petrocik
• the republican presidential advantage in the age of party disunity, Martin P. Wattenberg
• the persistence of democratic house majorities - structure or politics?, Gary C. Jacobson. Part 4 Federal consequences: cooperation of conflict - the strategic circumstance of a President facing an opposition congress, Samuel Kernell
• government on lay-away - federal spending and deficits under divided government, Mathew D. McCubbins
• fiscal policy and divided government, G.W.Cox and M.D. McCubbins. Part 5 Comparative perspectives: divided government in the states, Morris P. Fiorina
• divided government in the third party system - causes and consequences, Charles H. Stewart III
• conclusion, Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this survey of the most current and controversial issues affecting US governance today, leading scholars examine various aspects of divided government - from institutional concerns to issues such as the budget deficit - to provide an analysis of contemporary American politics. The editors have drawn together leading scholars to write eight original essays dedicated to making research on various aspects of divided government accessible to students at all levels.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive office and the greater the degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and find that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

After the seventeenth century, rulers across Europe attempted reforms to replace amateur administrators with professional bureaucrats. The success of administrative reforms hinged on whether rulers could compensate entrenched patrimonial office-holders and recruit talented employees for a wage. I show that the degree to which these two administrative conditions were met at the time of state reforms depended on whether states experienced a Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. I argue that the Reformation, which involved the expropriation of the Catholic Church's assets, set in motion two processes. First, to finance their wars, Protestant rulers used confiscated assets instead of selling offices, leading to smaller stocks of venal office-holders who resisted administrative reforms. Second, expropriations made churches poorer and reduced the number of plum jobs in the clergy, and this incentivized a reallocation of educational investments from religious to "secular" skills that were more useful for state administration. This distinctive Protestant developmental path hastened the demise of the patrimonial state, and by 1789 the only major territorial states that were bureaucratic were Protestant, while all Catholic states remained patrimonial

Circa 1787, Americans elected very few state and local officials. Yet, by 1950 they elected far more such officials than any other country. This dissertation presents original data on the nineteenth century reforms that proliferated public offices at the state and county levels. To explain this historical sea change, I present a model of a bargaining problem, faced by all governments, in which leaders must simultaneously fill public offices and fully fund the government's budget. Applying the model to the early American states, I argue that the growth of elective offices at the state and county levels stemmed from elite fears that unitary executive power would fall into the hands of the newly-enfranchised poor. Thus, the main driver of office proliferation was neither Jacksonian Democrats' desire to expand spoils, nor western states' desire to attract labor. I support my thesis mainly using difference-in-difference analyses that compare the timing of "electoralization" to the timing of suffrage expansion from 1776 to 1900

Over the past decade, a small minority of Kenyan legislators have invested heavily in their lawmaking duties, contributing to the transformation of the Kenya National Assembly from a rubber-stamp Parliament into a consequential actor in crafting the nation's laws. The rising assertiveness of the Kenya National Assembly is a welcome development, since strong independent legislatures are a fundamental building block of liberal democracy. However, Kenyan legislators -- as in many other emerging democracies across Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe -- face strong electoral incentives from voters to eschew their lawmaking responsibilities in favor of implementing local development projects, mediating local conflicts, and providing other forms of constituency service. Kenyan political parties magnify these electoral incentives by recruiting and rewarding candidates based on factors other than legislative ambition or past legislative accomplishments, such as a candidate's political connections, party loyalty, and ability to pay for the party nomination. So then why has a small minority of Kenyan legislators invested heavily in their lawmaking duties, while most of their parliamentary colleagues have not? In this dissertation, I address three sub-questions nested within this overarching question using a new dataset of 371,995 parliamentary speeches made by 959 legislators in the Kenya National Assembly between 1998 and 2019. First, in Chapter 2, I show that the electoral selection of "lawmaker" candidate types is predominantly responsible for variation in the lawmaking effort of Kenyan legislators, rather than electoral sanctioning pressures on legislators to invest in their lawmaking duties out of fear of electoral reprisal from voters or political parties. Second, in Chapter 3, I examine why these "lawmaker" candidate types are elected in some constituencies but not others, failing to find evidence that political violence and ethnic divisions -- two core features of Kenyan elections -- undermine the entry or selection of "lawmaker" candidates. Third, in Chapter 4, I show that the investments of Kenyan legislators in their lawmaking responsibilities do not come at the expense of constituency service, despite intense pressures from voters to prioritize constituency service above all else. Collectively, these findings imply that competitive multi-party elections in emerging democracies -- which tend to be plagued by political violence, ethnic divisions, and intense demands from voters for clientelism and constituency service -- are not incompatible with the emergence of strong independent legislatures

In this dissertation, I study how elections -- and electoral rules, in particular -- shape the selection of candidates with distinct attributes into office. I examine how electoral rules applied to local politics -- the very first rung of the tall ladder of political careers -- shape the nature of electoral competition by affecting female candidates' career trajectories and allowing independent candidates without a partisan affiliation to thrive. I do so using modern causal inference techniques and introduce new methods to study heterogeneous effects in close elections