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Book
xii, 267 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. High-publicity investigations
  • 3. Lawmaking : selecting the laws
  • 4. Lawmaking : the analysis
  • 5. Explaining the patterns, I
  • 6. Explaining the patterns, II
  • 7. Conclusion
  • Epilogue : the record during 1991-2002
  • App. A. Sources for sweep one
  • App. B. Sources for sweep two
  • App. C. Sources for sweep one, 1991-2002
  • App. D. A defense of sweep two.
In this prize-winning book, a renowned political scientist debunks the commonly held myth that the American national government functions effectively only when one political party controls the presidency and Congress. For this new edition, David R. Mayhew has provided a new Preface, a new appendix, and a new concluding chapter that brings the historical narrative up to date.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780300102888 20180326
Business Library
POLECON-682-01
Book
xii, 336 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
  • 1. Introduction-- Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory-- Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model-- 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization-- 5. Final passage votes-- 6. The costs of agenda control-- 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules-- 8. The bills reported from committee-- 9. Which way does policy move?-- Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power-- 11. Conclusion.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521853798 20160528
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521853798 20160528
Green Library, Stanford Libraries
POLECON-682-01
Book
xii, 336 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
  • 1. Introduction-- Part I. Why Party Government?: 2. Procedural Cartel theory-- Part II. Negative Agenda Power: 3. Cartel agenda model vs. floor agenda model-- 4. The primacy of Reed's rules in house organization-- 5. Final passage votes-- 6. The costs of agenda control-- 7. The textbook congress and the committee on rules-- 8. The bills reported from committee-- 9. Which way does policy move?-- Part III. The Consequences of Positive Agenda Power and Conditional Party Government: 10. Positive agenda power-- 11. Conclusion.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521853798 20180326
Scholars of the U.S. House disagree over the importance of political parties in organizing the legislative process. On the one hand, non-partisan theories stress how congressional organization serves members' non-partisan goals. On the other hand, partisan theories argue that the House is organized to serve the collective interests of the majority party. This book advances our partisan theory and presents a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions (pitted against others). It considers why procedural cartels form, arguing that agenda power is naturally subject to cartelization in busy legislatures. It argues that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890. The evidence demonstrates that the majority party seizes agenda control at nearly every stage of the legislative process in order to prevent bills that the party dislikes from reaching the floor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521853798 20180326
Business Library
POLECON-682-01
Book
xxi, 194 pages : illustrations ; 21 cm.
  • Introduction
  • 1. The electoral incentive
  • 2. Processes and policies.
In this second edition to a book that has now achieved canonical status, David R. Mayhew argues that the principal motivation of legislators is reelection and that the pursuit of this goal affects the way they behave and the way that they make public policy. In a new foreword for this edition, R. Douglas Arnold discusses why the book revolutionized the study of Congress and how it has stood the test of time. The book also contains a new preface by the author.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780300105872 20161213
Business Library
POLECON-682-01
Book
xvi, 258 p. : ill ; 23 cm.
  • Tables Figures Preface I: Theoretical Foundations 1: Basics 2: A Theory II: Empirical Tests 3: Gridlock 4: Coalition Sizes 5: Filibuster Pivots 6: Veto Pivots III: Applications 7: Presidential Power? 8: Party Government? 9: Partisanship or Pivots? IV: Conclusion 10: Beyond Basics Bibliography Index.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780226452715 20160528
Politicians and pundits alike have complained that the divided governments of the last decades have led to a legislative gridlock. The author argues against this, advancing the theory that divided government actually has little effect on legislative productivity. Gridlock is in fact the order of the day, occurring even when the same party controls the legislative and executive branches. Anchored to real politics, the author argues that the pivotal vote on a piece of legislation is not the one that gives a bill simple majority, but the vote that allows its supporters to override a possible presidential veto. This theory of pivots also explains why, when bills are passed, winning coalitions usually are bipartisan and supermajority sized. Offering an account of when gridlock is overcome and showing that political parties are less important in legislative-executive politics than previously thought, this text offers a perspective on American lawmaking.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780226452715 20160528
Business Library
POLECON-682-01
Book
ix, 314 p. : ill ; 24 cm.
Presents an alternative informational theory of legislative politics to challenge the conventional view.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780472094608 20160605
Business Library
POLECON-682-01
Book
ix, 314 p. : ill. ; @$ cm.
Presents an alternative informational theory of legislative politics to challenge the conventional view.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780472094608 20160605
Green Library
POLECON-682-01