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Book
x, 250 pages : ill. ; 24 cm
  • 1. Introduction-- 2. Buyer behavior-- 3. Estimating price response-- 4. Uniform posted price-- 5. Auctions-- 6. Price discrimination-- 7. Pricing and competition-- 8. Bringing it all together-- 9. Appendix on game theory.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107010659 20160616
Pricing drives three of the most important elements of firm success: revenue and profits, customer behavior and firm image. This book provides an introduction to the basic principles for thinking clearly about pricing. Unlike other marketing books on pricing, the authors use a more analytic approach and relate ideas to the basic principles of microeconomics. Rakesh Vohra and Lakshman Krishnamurthi also cover three areas in greater depth and provide more insight than may be gleaned from existing books: 1) the use of auctions, 2) price discrimination and 3) pricing in a competitive environment.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107010659 20160616
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01

2. Auction theory [2010]

Book
xi, 323 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
  • I. Single Object Auctions: Private Value Auctions, The Revenue Equivalence Principle, Qualifications and Extensions, Mechanism Design, Auctions with Interdependent Values, The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle, Asymmetries and Other Complications, Efficiency and the English Auction, Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, Bidding Rings II. Multiple Object Auctions: An Introduction to Multiple Object Auctions, Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values, Some Revenue Considerations, Sequential Sales, Nonidentical Objects, Packages and Positions, Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values III. Appendices: Continuous Distributions, Stochastic Orders, Order Statistics, Affiliated Random Variables, Some Linear Algebra.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780123745071 20170403
Vijay Krishna's 2e of Auction Theory improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna's ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780123745071 20170403
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01

3. Auction theory [2010]

Book
1 online resource.
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Private ValueAuctions:A First Look
  • 3. Revenue Equivalence Principle
  • 4. Qualifications and Extensions
  • 5. Mechanism Design
  • 6. Auctions with Interdependent Values
  • 7. Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
  • 8. Asymmetries and Other Complications
  • 9. Efficiency and the English Auction
  • 10. Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values
  • 11. Bidding Rings
  • 12. Introduction to Multiple-Object Auctions
  • 13. Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values
  • 14. Some Revenue Considerations
  • 15. Sequential Sales
  • 16. Nonidentical Objects
  • 17. Packages and Positions
  • 18. Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values
  • A. Continuous Distributions
  • B. Stochastic Orders
  • C. Order Statistics
  • D. Affiliated Random Variables
  • E. Some Linear Algebra
  • F. Games of Incomplete Information
  • G. Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions.
ProQuest Ebook Central Access limited to three simultaneous users.
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01
Book
ix, 336 p. ; 24 cm.
  • 1. The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee
  • 2. Price Cluelessness
  • 3. The Myth of the Boomerang
  • 4. Body and Soul
  • 5. Black Is White
  • 6. Helson's Cigarette
  • 7. The Price Scale
  • 8. Input to Output
  • 9. Lunch with Maurice
  • 10. Money Pump
  • 11. The Best Odds in Vegas
  • 12. Cult of Rationality
  • 13. Kahneman and Tversky
  • 14. Heuristics and Biases
  • 15. The Devil's Greatest Trick
  • 16. Prospect Theory
  • 17. Rules of Fairness
  • 18. Ultimatum Game
  • 19. The Vanishing Altruist
  • 20. Pittsburgh Is Not a Culture
  • 21. Attacking Heuristics
  • 22. Deal or No Deal
  • 23. Prices on the Planet Algon
  • 24. The Free 72-Ounce Steak
  • 25. Price Check
  • 26. Shilling for Prada
  • 27. Menu Psych
  • 28. The Price of a Super Bowl Ticket
  • 29. Don't Wrap All the Christmas Presents in One Box
  • 30. Who's Afraid of the Phone Bill?
  • 31. Breakage and Slippage
  • 32. Paying for Air
  • 33. Cheap and Cheaper
  • 34. Mysteries of the 99-Cent Store
  • 35. Meaningless Zeros
  • 36. Reality Constraint
  • 37. Selling Warhol's Beach House
  • 38. Groundhog Day
  • 39. Anchoring for Dummies
  • 40. Attention Deficit
  • 41. Drinking and Deal Making
  • 42. An Octillion Doesn't Buy What It Used To
  • 43. Selling the Money Illusion
  • 44. Neutron Jane
  • 45. The Beauty Premium
  • 46. Search for Suckers
  • 47. Pricing Gender
  • 48. It's All About Testosterone
  • 49. Liquid Trust
  • 50. The Million-Dollar Club
  • 51. The Mischievous Mr. Market
  • 52. For the Love of God
  • 53. Antidote for Anchoring
  • 54. Buddy System
  • 55. The Outrage Theory
  • 56. Honesty Box
  • 57. Money, Chocolate, Happiness.
"People used to download music for free; then Steve Jobs convinced them to pay for it. How? By charging 99 cents. Prada and other luxury stores stock a few obscenely expensive items - just to make the rest of their inventory seem like a bargain. Why do text messages cost money, while e-mails are free? Why do jars of peanut butter keep getting smaller in order to keep the price the "same"? The answer is simple: prices are a collective hallucination." "In Priceless, William Poundstone reveals the hidden psychology of value. In psychological experiments, people are unable to estimate "fair" prices accurately and are strongly influenced by the unconscious, the irrational, and the politically incorrect. It hasn't taken long for marketers to apply these findings. "Price consultants" advise retailers on how to convince consumers to pay more for less, and negotiation coaches offer similar advice for businesspeople cutting deals. The new psychology of price dictates the design of price tags, menus, rebates, "sale" ads, cell phone plans, supermarket aisles, real estate offers, wage packages, tort demands, and corporate buyouts. Prices are the most pervasive hidden persuaders of all." "Rooted in the little-heralded story of behavioral decision theory, a field advanced most notably by the legendary team of Israeli American psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Priceless is indispensable to anyone who buys, sells, or negotiates."--BOOK JACKET.
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01
Book
xii, 355 p. : ill. ; 27 cm.
  • Background and introduction
  • Introduction to pricing and revenue optimization
  • Basic price optimization
  • Price differentiation
  • Pricing with constrained supply
  • Revenue management
  • Capacity allocation
  • Network management
  • Overbooking
  • Markdown management
  • Customized pricing
  • Pricing and revenue optimization and customer acceptance.
This is the first comprehensive introduction to the concepts, theories, and applications of pricing and revenue optimization. From the initial success of "yield management" in the commercial airline industry down to more recent successes of markdown management and dynamic pricing, the application of mathematical analysis to optimize pricing has become increasingly important across many different industries. But, since pricing and revenue optimization has involved the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques, the topic has remained largely inaccessible to students and the typical manager. With methods proven in the MBA courses taught by the author at Columbia and Stanford Business Schools, this book presents the basic concepts of pricing and revenue optimization in a form accessible to MBA students, MS students, and advanced undergraduates. In addition, managers will find the practical approach to the issue of pricing and revenue optimization invaluable. Solutions to the end-of-chapter exercises are available to instructors who are using this book in their courses. For access to the solutions manual, please contact marketing@www.sup.org.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780804746984 20160615
Green Library, Stanford Libraries
MGTECON-349-01
Book
xii, 355 p. : ill ; 26 cm.
  • Background and introduction
  • Introduction to pricing and revenue optimization
  • Basic price optimization
  • Price differentiation
  • Pricing with constrained supply
  • Revenue management
  • Capacity allocation
  • Network management
  • Overbooking
  • Markdown management
  • Customized pricing
  • Pro and customer acceptance.
This is the first comprehensive introduction to the concepts, theories, and applications of pricing and revenue optimization. From the initial success of "yield management" in the commercial airline industry down to more recent successes of markdown management and dynamic pricing, the application of mathematical analysis to optimize pricing has become increasingly important across many different industries. But, since pricing and revenue optimization has involved the use of sophisticated mathematical techniques, the topic has remained largely inaccessible to students and the typical manager. With methods proven in the MBA courses taught by the author at Columbia and Stanford Business Schools, this book presents the basic concepts of pricing and revenue optimization in a form accessible to MBA students, MS students, and advanced undergraduates. In addition, managers will find the practical approach to the issue of pricing and revenue optimization invaluable. Solutions to the end-of-chapter exercises are available to instructors who are using this book in their courses. For access to the solutions manual, please contact marketing@www.sup.org.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780804746984 20160615
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01
Book
xxii, 368 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
  • Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage-- 2. Designing for multiple goals-- 3. Comparing seller revenues-- 4. The academic critics-- 5. Plan for this book-- Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach-- Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation-- 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies-- 8. Balancing the budget-- 9. Uniqueness-- 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction-- 11. Conclusion-- Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma-- 13. The envelope theorem in integral form-- 14. Quasi-linear payoffs-- 15. Conclusion-- Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions-- 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies-- 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model-- 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions-- 20. Conclusion-- Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?-- 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions-- 23. Wilson's drainage tract model-- 24. Correlated types model interdependent values-- 25. Conclusion-- Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant-- 27. Symmetric models with costly entry-- 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition-- 29. After the bidding ends-- 30. Conclusion-- Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions-- Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions-- 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions-- 33. Conclusion-- Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems-- 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions-- 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions-- 37. Conclusion.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521536721 20160528
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521536721 20160528
Green Library, Stanford Libraries
MGTECON-349-01
Book
xxii, 368 p. : ill ; 24 cm.
  • Section 1. Getting to Work: 1. Politics sets the stage-- 2. Designing for multiple goals-- 3. Comparing seller revenues-- 4. The academic critics-- 5. Plan for this book-- Part I. The Mechanism Design Approach-- Section 2. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: 6. Formulation-- 7. Always optimal and weakly dominant strategies-- 8. Balancing the budget-- 9. Uniqueness-- 10. Disadvantages of the Vickrey auction-- 11. Conclusion-- Section 3. The Envelope Theorem and Payoff Equivalence: 12. Hottelling's lemma-- 13. The envelope theorem in integral form-- 14. Quasi-linear payoffs-- 15. Conclusion-- Section 4. Bidding Equilibrium and Revenue Differences: 16. The single crossing conditions-- 17. Deriving and verifying equilibrium strategies-- 18. Revenue comparisons in the benchmark model-- 19. Expected-revenue maximizing auctions-- 20. Conclusion-- Section 5. Interdependence of Types and Values: 21. Which models and assumptions are 'useful'?-- 22. Statistical dependence and revenue-maximizing auctions-- 23. Wilson's drainage tract model-- 24. Correlated types model interdependent values-- 25. Conclusion-- Section 6. Auctions in Context: 26. The profit and surplus contribution of an entrant-- 27. Symmetric models with costly entry-- 28. Asymmetric models: devices to promote competition-- 29. After the bidding ends-- 30. Conclusion-- Part II. Multi-Unit Auctions-- Section 7. Uniform Price Auctions: 31. Uniform price sealed bid auctions-- 32. Simultaneous ascending auctions-- 33. Conclusion-- Section 8. Package Auctions and Combinatorial Bidding: 34. Vickrey auctions and the monotonicity problems-- 35. Bernheim-Whinston first-price package auctions-- 36. Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auctions-- 37. Conclusion.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521536721 20160528
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521536721 20160528
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01
Book
xiii, 265 p. ; 23 cm.
  • Foreword Robert Auman-- Acknowledgment-- 1. Introduction-- Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model: 2. Stable matchings-- 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings-- 4. Strategic questions-- Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers: 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns-- 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences-- Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable: 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers-- 8. The assignment game-- 9. The generalization of the assignment model-- Part IV. Epilogue: 10. Open questions and research directions-- Bibliography-- Indexes.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521390156 20160528
Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ...The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780521390156 20160528
Business Library
MGTECON-349-01