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Book
ix, 272 p. ; 24 cm.
  • Preface Ch. 2Lattices, Supermodular Functions, and Related Topics Ch. 3Optimal Decision Models Ch. 4Noncooperative Games Ch. 5Cooperative Games Bibliography Index.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780691032443 20160528
The economics literature is replete with examples of monotone comparative statics; that is, scenarios where optimal decisions or equilibria in a parameterized collection of models vary monotonically with the parameter. Most of these examples are manifestations of complementarity, with a common explicit or implicit theoretical basis in properties of a super-modular function on a lattice. Supermodular functions yield a characterization for complementarity and extend the notion of complementarity to a general setting that is a natural mathematical context for studying complementarity and monotone comparative statics. Concepts and results related to supermodularity and monotone comparative statics constitute a new and important formal step in the long line of economics literature on complementarity. This monograph links complementarity to powerful concepts and results involving supermodular functions on lattices and focuses on analyses and issues related to monotone comparative statics. Don Topkis, who is known for his seminal contributions to this area, here presents a self-contained and up-to-date view of this field, including many new results, to scholars interested in economic theory and its applications as well as to those in related disciplines. The emphasis is on methodology. The book systematically develops a comprehensive, integrated theory pertaining to supermodularity, complementarity, and monotone comparative statics. It then applies that theory in the analysis of many diverse economic models formulated as decision problems, noncooperative games, and cooperative games.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780691032443 20160528
Green Library
ECON-286-01
Book
xiv, 276 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
  • Fictitious play-- replicator dynamics and related deterministic models of evolution-- stochastic fictitious and mixed-strategy equilibria-- adjustment models with persistent randomness-- extensive-form games and self-confirming equilibrium-- Nash equilibrium, large population models, and mutations in extensive-form games-- sophisticated learning.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262061940 20160618
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is that it results from analysis and introspection by the players in a situation where the rules of the game, the rationality of the players, and the players' payoff functions are all common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory has many problems. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262061940 20160618
Green Library, Science Library (Li and Ma)
ECON-286-01
Book
xv, 352 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
  • Part 1 Introduction: game theory-- games and solutions-- game theory and the theory of competitive equilibrium-- rational behaviour-- the steady state and deductive interpretations-- bounded rationality-- terminology and notation. Part 2 Strategic games: Nash equilibrium-- mixed, correlated, and evolutionary equilibrium-- rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions-- knowledge and equilibrium. Part 3 Extensive games with perfect information: extensive games with perfect information-- bargaining games-- repeated games-- complexity considerations in repeated games-- implementation theory. Part 4 Extensive games with imperfect information: extensive games with imperfect information-- sequential equilibrium. Part 5 Coalitional games: the core-- stable sets, the bargaining set, and the Shapley value-- the Nash solution.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262650403 20160528
This text presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262650403 20160528
Green Library, Science Library (Li and Ma)
ECON-286-01

4. Game theory [1991]

Book
xxiii, 579 p. : ill. ; 26 cm.
  • Part 1 Static games of complete information: games in strategic form and Nash equilibrium-- iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, and correlated equilibrium. Part 2 Dynamic games of complete information: extensive-form games-- applications of multi-stage games with observed actions-- repeated games. Part 3 Static games of incomplete information: Bayesian games and Bayesian equilibrium-- Bayesian games and mechanism design. Part 4 Dynamic games of incomplete information: equilibrium refinements - perfect Bayesian equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, and trembling-hand perfection-- reputation effects-- sequential bargaining under incomplete information. Part 5 Advanced topics: more equilibrium refinements - stability, forward induction, and iterated weak dominance-- advanced topics in strategic-form games-- payoff-relevant strategies and Markov equilibrium-- common knowledge and games.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262061414 20160605
This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780262061414 20160605
Green Library
ECON-286-01