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France -- Foreign relations -- Russia, Russia-Ukraine relations, Hollande Administration, French presidential elections, and European Union countries -- Foreign relations

European Union member states have been notoriously divided in their attitudes towards Russia. These national positions have, however, too often been essentialized, thereby obfuscating nuances and foregoing the possibility to discern or explain change. Considering its strong political and economic links with Russia, its past positions and the fact that Ukraine had never registered prominently on its foreign policy radar, France's reaction to the Ukraine crisis has been firmer and more active than most could have forecast. This article examines the content, determinants and evolutions of France's policies towards Russia before, during and beyond the crisis. Contrary to traditional explanations, which tend to emphasize historic, cultural, economic or domestic political factors, I argue that these policies have been mainly—and continuously—driven by France's broader milieu goals in international and European politics. These considerations help to account for the policy shift revealed during the Ukraine crisis. Following the emergence of Russia as a central actor in Syria and the correlated politicization of the Russia question in the 2017 French presidential election, the Macron administration has adopted a new diplomatic approach towards Moscow. Yet a different policy direction has not emerged, as the administration has not fundamentally put into question the previously established assessment of how Russia's current foreign policy collides with France's milieu goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CULTURAL diplomacy, WORLD War II, WORLD War II -- Underground movements, PROPAGANDA, GOVERNMENTS in exile, FRANCE -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain, FRANCE, and GREAT Britain

The Second World War challenged the well-established circulation of cultural practices between France and Britain. But it also gave individuals, communities, states, and aspiring governments opportunities to invent new forms of international cultural promotion that straddled the national boundaries that the war had disrupted. Although London became the capital city of the main external Resistance movement Free France, the latter struggled to establish its cultural agenda in Britain, owing, on the one hand, to the British Council's control over French cultural policies and, on the other hand, to the activities of anti-Gaullist Resistance fighters based in London who ascribed different purposes to French arts. While the British Council and a few French individuals worked towards prolonging French cultural policies that had been in place since the interwar period, Free French promoted rather conservative and traditional images of France so as to reclaim French culture in the name of the Resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CRISIS management, INTERNATIONAL relations, FRANCE -- Foreign relations -- 1995-, ARAB Spring Uprisings, 2011-, TUNISIA -- Foreign relations -- 1987-, EGYPT -- Foreign relations -- 2011-, and LIBYA -- Foreign relations -- 2011-

Why did French leaders adopt vastly different positions during the Arab uprisings? Building on recent studies that emphasize the importance of rhetoric to understand states' behaviour, this article argues that France's inconsistent positioning results from decision-makers trying to remain within political boundaries that are acceptable both to their domestic audiences and to foreign partners. Through a chronological content analysis of France's top decision-makers' responses to the crises in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, the article provides evidence that acceptability-enhancing rhetorical strategies contribute to explaining foreign policy positioning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 2009-, Monetary unions, Negotiation, and France -- Foreign relations -- Germany

Abstract: The close co‐operation between French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel (‘Merkozy’) dominated a significant part of eurozone crisis management. Yet, after the election of a new French government in 2012, the Franco‐German co‐operation in the Economic and Monetary Union deteriorated. This article asks why the Franco‐German tandem got stuck. Drawing on bargaining theory, it argues that Germany used ‘Merkozy’ as a negotiation strategy to further its aims in eurozone crisis management. However, when the preferences of the two countries were no longer reconcilable due to changes in France as well as in the negotiation environment, the strategy failed. Thus, while much of the literature has focused on the persistence of the Franco‐German partnership, this approach accounts for variation in its functioning. The results provide an explanation for the rise and fall of Merkozy and bear implications for assessing the future Franco‐German relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]