banking and financial regulation, political economy, financial crisis, political parties, and political money.
Abstract
The extent to which governments can resist pressures from organized interest groups, and especially from finance, is a perennial source of controversy. This paper tackles this classic question by analyzing votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on measures to weaken the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill in the years following its passage. To control as many factors as possible that could influence floor voting by individual legislators, the analysis focuses on representatives who originally cast votes in favor of the bill but then subsequently voted to dismantle key provisions of it. This design rules out from the start most factors normally advanced by skeptics to explain vote shifts, since these are the same representatives, belonging to the same political party, representing substantially the same districts. Our panel analysis, which also controls for spatial influences, highlights the importance of time-varying factors, especially political money, in moving representatives to shift their positions on amendments such as the “swaps push out†provision. Our results suggest that the links between campaign contributions from the financial sector and switches to a pro-bank vote were direct and substantial: For every $100,000 that Democratic representatives received from finance, the odds they would break with their party’s majority support for the Dodd-Frank legislation increased by 13.9 percent. Democratic representatives who voted in favor of finance often received $200,000–$300,000 from that sector, which raised the odds of switching by 25–40 percent.
Giovanni Facchini, Paola Conconi, and Maurizio Zanardi
ULB Institutional Repository, 2020.
Abstract
Over the last decades, the United States has become increasingly integrated in the world economy. Very low trade barriers and comparatively liberal migration policies have made these developments possible. What drove US congressmen to support the recent wave of globalization? While much of the literature has emphasized the differences that exist between the political economy of trade and migration, in this paper we find that important similarities should not be overlooked. In particular, our analysis of congressional voting between 1970 and 2006 suggests that economic drivers that work through the labor market play an important role in shaping representatives’ behavior on both types of policies. Representatives from more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade liberalization and a more open stance vis-à-vis unskilled immigration. Still, important systematic differences exist: welfare state considerations and network effects have an impact on the support for immigration liberalization, but not for trade; Democratic lawmakers are systematically more likely to support a more open migration stance than their Republican counterparts, and the opposite is true for trade liberalization.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
With the rate of scientific and technological discoveries increasing exponentially there is a growing need for scientific literacy. However elected officials are most often lawyers which rely on experts in the field, or even lobbyists to inform their decision making. A list of the educational background of the United States Congress was created and the changes from the 2018 election highlighted. An analysis of the congressional record was also done showing a recent decline in selected scientific terms. Possible solutions to increase scientific discussion to help instruct legislation is discussed.
David Colander has been writing about economic methodology for over 30 years, but he goes out of his way to emphasize that he does not see himself as a methodologist. His pragmatic methodology is applicable to what economists are doing and attempts to answer questions that all economists face as they go about their work. The articles collected in this volume are divided, with the first part providing a framework underlying Colander’s methodology and introducing Colander’s methodology for economic policy within that framework. Part two presents Colander’s view on the methodology for microeconomics, while part three looks at Colander’s methodology for macroeconomics. The book closes with discussions of broader issues.
Matter, Ulrich, Roberti, Paolo, and Slotwinski, Michaela
Economics Working Paper Series, 2019.
Subjects
Legislative voting, campaign finance, special interest groups, lobbying, and forensic economics
Abstract
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U.S. House, we identify the link between narrowly passed bills and well-timed campaign contributions. Several pieces of evidence substantiate our main finding, suggesting that moneyed interests exert remarkably effective control over the passage of contested bills.
U.S. Congress, cooperativeness, bipartisanship, and gender
Abstract
This paper uses data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate gender differences in cooperative behavior. We employ a number of econometric methodologies to address the potential selection of female representatives into electoral districts with distinct preferences for cooperativeness, including regression discontinuity and matching. After accounting for selection, we find that among Democrats there is no significant gender gap in the number of cosponsors recruited, but women-sponsored bills tend to have fewer cosponsors from the opposite party. On the other hand, we find robust evidence that Republican women recruit more cosponsors and attract more bipartisan support on the bills that they sponsor. This is particularly true on bills that address issues more relevant for women, over which female Republicans have possibly preferences that are closer to those of Democrats. We interpret these results as evidence that cooperation is mostly driven by a commonality of interest, rather than gender per se.
Franklin G. Mixon, Chandini Sankaran, and Kamal P. Upadhyaya
Economies, 2019, 7, 2, 1.
Subjects
political ideology, roll-call voting, public choice, public policy, and United States Congress
Abstract
This study extends the political science and political psychology literature on the political ideology of lawmakers by addressing the following question: How stable is a legislator’s political ideology over time? In doing so, we employ Nokken–Poole scores of legislators’ political ideology for members of the United States (U.S.) House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who were elected prior to the 103rd Congress that began in early 1991 and who served consecutively through the 115th Congress, which ended in early 2019. Results from individual time-series estimations suggest that political ideology is unstable over time for a sizable portion of the members of both major political parties who serve in the U.S. Congress, while analysis of the pooled data suggests that, after accounting for inertia in political ideology and individual legislator effects, Republican legislators become more conservative over time. These results run somewhat counter to the finding in prior studies that the political ideologies of lawmakers and other political elites are stable over time.
Do elections affect legislators' voting patterns? We investigate this question in the context of environmental policy in the U.S. Congress. We theorize that since the general public is generally in favor of legislation protecting the environment, legislators have an incentive to favor the public over industry and vote for pro‐environment legislation at election time. The argument is supported by analyses of data on environmental roll call votes for the U.S. Congress from 1970 to 2013 where we estimate the likelihood of casting a pro‐environment vote as a function of the time to an election. While Democrats are generally more likely to cast a pro‐environment vote before an election, this effect is much stronger for Republicans when the legislator won the previous election by a thinner margin. The election effect is maximized for candidates receiving substantial campaign contributions from the (anti‐environment) oil and gas industry. Analysis of Twitter data confirms that Congressmembers make pro‐environmental statements and highlight their roll call voting behavior during the election season. These results show that legislators do strategically adjust their voting behavior to favor the public immediate prior to an election. 选举与政策响应度：来自美国国会环境投票的证据 选举会影响立法者的投票模式吗？我们以美国国会的环境政策为背景，对该疑问进行研究。我们的理论认为，既然公众整体上支持亲环境的法律，那么立法者就会被激励去支持公众而不是产业，并在选举期间为亲环境法投票。该主张基于1970年至2013年期间美国国会环境点名投票的数据分析，我们在分析中预测了在一次选举中为亲环境法投票的可能性的时间函数。尽管民主党一般更有可能在选举前为亲环境法投票，但该效果对共和党的作用更强，当立法者以微弱优势赢得之前的选举时。对那些从（反环境的）石油天然气产业中获得大量竞选资助的候选人而言，该选举效果发挥的作用达到最大化。推特数据分析证明，国会成员在选举期间作出亲环境的论断并强调其点名投票行为。研究结果表明，立法者确实会从战略上调整其投票行为，以期在选举前迎合大众。 Elecciones y capacidad de respuesta política: evidencia de la votación ambiental en el Congreso de los EE. UU. ¿Las elecciones afectan los patrones de votación de los legisladores? Investigamos esta cuestión en el contexto de la política ambiental en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos. Teorizamos que, dado que el público en general está a favor de la legislación que protege el medio ambiente, los legisladores tienen un incentivo para favorecer al público sobre la industria y votar por la legislación favorable al medio ambiente en las elecciones. El argumento está respaldado por análisis de datos sobre votaciones nominales ambientales para el Congreso de EE. UU. Desde 1970 hasta 2013, donde estimamos la probabilidad de emitir un pro ambiente en función del tiempo para una elección. Si bien los demócratas generalmente tienen más probabilidades de emitir un voto favorable al medio ambiente antes de una elección, este efecto es mucho más fuerte para los republicanos cuando el legislador ganó las elecciones anteriores por un margen más delgado. El efecto electoral se maximiza para los candidatos que reciben contribuciones sustanciales de campaña de la industria del petróleo y el gas (anti medioambiente). El análisis de los datos de Twitter confirma que los miembros del Congreso hacen declaraciones a favor del medio ambiente y destacan su comportamiento de votación nominal durante la temporada electoral. Estos resultados muestran que los legisladores ajustan estratégicamente su comportamiento de votación para favorecer al público inmediatamente antes de una elección.
Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini, Max F. Steinhardt, and Maurizio Zanardi
Economics and Politics, 2020, 32, 2, 250.
Abstract
We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled‐labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low‐skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low‐skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high‐skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled‐labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high‐skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.
Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini, Max F. Steinhardt, and Maurizio Zanardi
CEP Discussion Papers, 2018.
Subjects
trade reforms, immigration reforms, and roll-call votes
Abstract
We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled-labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.
Conconi, Paola, Facchini, Giovanni, Steinhardt, Max F., and Zanardi, Maurizio
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, 2018.
Subjects
trade reforms, immigration reforms, and roll-call votes
Abstract
We systematically examine the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970's. Standard trade theory suggests that reforms that lower barriers to goods and migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low-skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high-skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled labor abundant districts are more likely to support both trade and migration liberalization. Still, important differences exist: Democrats favor trade reforms less than Republicans, while the opposite is true for immigration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape support for immigration, but not for trade.
Eoin McGuirk, Nathaniel Hilger, and Nicholas Miller
NBER Working Papers, 2017.
Abstract
Why do wars occur? We exploit a natural experiment to test the longstanding hypothesis that leaders declare war because they fail to internalize the associated costs. We test this moral hazard theory of conflict by compiling data on 9,210 children of 3,693 U.S. legislators who served in Congress during the four conscription-era wars of the 20th century: World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. We test for agency problems by comparing the voting behavior of legislators with draft-age sons versus draft-age daughters. We estimate that (i) having a draft-age son reduces legislator support for pro-conscription bills by 10-17%; (ii) support for conscription increases by a quarter as a legislator's son crosses the upper age threshold; and (iii) legislators with draft-age sons are more likely to win reelection when the draft is less popular. These results are consistent with a political agency model in which voters update their beliefs about politicians' motives when they make unpopular legislative decisions. Our findings provide new evidence that agency problems contribute to political violence, and that elected officials can be influenced by changing private incentives.
This paper uses data on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship in the U.S. House of Representatives to estimate gender differences in cooperative behavior. We employ a number of econometric methodologies to address the potential selection of female representatives into electoral districts with distinct preferences for cooperativeness, including regression discontinuity and matching. After accounting for selection, we find that among Democrats there is no significant gender gap in the number of cosponsors recruited, but women-sponsored bills tend to have fewer cosponsors from the opposite party. On the other hand, we find robust evidence that Republican women recruit more cosponsors and attract more bipartisan support on the bills that they sponsor. This is particularly true on bills that address issues more relevant for women, over which female Republicans have possibly preferences that are closer to those of Democrats. We interpret these results as evidence that cooperation is mostly driven by a commonality of interest, rather than gender per se.
Michael Becher, Stegmueller, Daniel, and Käppner, Konstantin
CAGE Online Working Paper Series, 2016.
Subjects
JEL Classification
Abstract
While the political power of labor unions is a contentious issue in the social sciences, it is often conceived mainly as a question of aggregate union membership. Going beyond the common focus on numerical strength, we argue that unions’ influence on national lawmaking has significant roots in their local organization. We delineate and test the hypothesis that the horizontal concentration of union members within electoral districts shapes legislators’ voting behavior. Drawing on extensive administrative records, we map the membership size and concentration of union locales to districts of the U.S. House of Representatives, 2003-2012. Our new data reveal that concentration clearly cuts across membership size. Consistent with theoretical expectations, both concentration and membership are robustly linked to legislators’ ideology and votes on key issues. Lower membership concentration means more legislative support of union positions. Altogether, we suggest a new perspective on the political power of unions in the twenty- first century.
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