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POLITICAL parties, PARTISANSHIP, CITIZENS, IDEOLOGICAL conflict, COLLECTIVE representation, FORTUNE, and IDEOLOGY

While scholars posit an electoral link between congressional approval and majority party electoral fortunes, it is unclear whether citizens are grounding their assessments of approval on policy or valence grounds, such as retrospective economic evaluations. Whereas it is commonly understood that there is an ideological component to constituents' job approval of their individual members of Congress, in addition to a strong partisan effect, the ideological basis of institutional approval has not been established. Using cross-sectional and panel survey data, which allow for scaling citizens and the congressional parties in the same ideological space, I demonstrate that, distinct from the partisan basis of congressional approval, citizens' ideological distance from the majority party has a separate and distinct effect. These results suggest that the link between congressional approval and majority party fortunes is rooted in the collective ideological representation provided by the legislative majority in an increasingly responsible U.S. Congress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

POLITICAL science, ACTIVISM, PRESIDENTIAL administrations, HISTORICAL analysis, CONTENT analysis, and CHINA-United States relations

The Sino-U.S. relations tumbled during the Trump Administration. The talk of decoupling permeated the decision-making circle in Washington D.C. Many factors have contributed to the free fall. The roles Congress has played are undoubtedly one of them. Based on the new institutionalist approach, this study provides three analyses of recent China-related legislative activities. First, the historical analysis of legislative data illustrates a surge in congressional activism on China-related legislative activities. Second, the content analysis reveals some of the triggers in the deterioration of bilateral relations in recent years. Third, the political analysis of the critical congressional players and the structures and procedures Congress created provides some insight into the domestic and political logic of the congressional crusade against China. Finally, the paper ends with assessing the impact of the surge in Congressional activism on the new Biden Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UNITED States legislators, REPRESENTATIVE government, DEMOCRACY, RESPECT, POLITICAL parties, and MEDIATION

Canonical theories of democratic representation envision legislators cultivating familiarity to enhance esteem among their constituents. Some scholars, however, argue that familiarity breeds contempt, which if true would undermine incentives for effective representation. Survey respondents who are unfamiliar with their legislator tend not to provide substantive answers to attitude questions, and so we are missing key evidence necessary to adjudicate this important debate. We solve this problem with a randomized field experiment that gave some constituents an opportunity to gain familiarity with their Member of Congress through an online Deliberative Town Hall. Relative to controls, respondents who interacted with their member reported higher esteem as a result of enhanced familiarity, a mediation effect supporting canonical theories of representation. This effect is statistically significant among constituents who are the same political party as the member but not among those of the opposite party, although in neither case did familiarity breed contempt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CONGRESSIONAL hearings (U.S.), DELIBERATION, SOCIAL groups, WOMEN legislators, and PARTICIPATION

The rising number of women in Congress changes deliberation. Using committee hearing transcripts from 1995 to 2017, we analyze how the gender composition of committees affects group dynamics in committee hearings. While we find limited evidence that increasing proportions of women affects women's participation, we find that discussion norms within committees change significantly in the presence of more women. Namely, interruptions decrease when there are more women on the committee; with higher proportions of women, men are less likely to interrupt others. Furthermore, committee members are more likely to engage and stay on the same topics in the presence of more women, suggesting a shift in norms toward more in-depth exchange. Overall, our results show that increasing the proportion of women changes discussion dynamics within Congress by shifting norms away from interruptions and one-sided talk in committees, thereby shifting group norms that govern decision-making during an important policy-making stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

LEGISLATIVE bodies, UNITED States legislators, LEGISLATIVE committees, LEADERSHIP, and LOBBYISTS

The article provides a blueprint for making the U.S. Congress great again and re-empowering the legislature. Topics discussed are disappearance of legislative victories of the Congress starting in the late 1970s with the shrinking of the size and effectiveness of the Congressional Representative and crumbling committees, as well as the rise of powerful leadership staff and lobbyists, and atrophy of the Congress driven by the Republican Revolution of 1994 and former House Speaker Newt Gingrich.

PRESIDENTS of the United States, AGGRESSION (International law), NUCLEAR weapons, WAR powers, EXCLUSIVE & concurrent legislative powers, and WAR of 1812

This article argues that Congress can exercise its constitutional war powers to enact a law restricting the President from using nuclear weapons first. The article contends that using a nuclear weapon is qualitatively different from conventional warfare and that the first use of nuclear weapons marks a decision to enter into war. Therefore, nuclear first use is not a battlefield decision within the President's commander in chief power but rather a choice to enter the United States into a new type of conflict that could pose a direct, immediate, and existential threat to the U.S. homeland. Regulating that decision falls under Congress's exclusive war powers. Congress can limit its authorizations of war and prohibit military actions beyond its authorization. Therefore, Congress could stipulate that its war authorizations extend only to conventional hostilities unless Congress expressly authorizes the first use of nuclear weapons. Using its authority to limit authorizations of for the use of military force, Congress can enact a no-first-use law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

QUANTITATIVE research, CHINA-United States relations, LEGISLATION, ACTIVISM, and GOVERNMENTALITY

Through a quantitative analysis of Taiwan–related legislation between 1979 and 2020, the article finds that the degree of Taiwan–related legislation is significantly correlated with the degree of tension in U.S.—China relations. While a deteriorating cross–Taiwan Strait relationship is clearly associated with the increasing legislative activities for the sake of Taiwan, an improving relationship from the state of fair to good cannot guarantee a decrease of such activities. A unified government and the extent of the Taiwan lobby are both helpful in passing pro–Taiwan acts but statistically insignificant. A content analysis of pro–Taiwan bills approved by the Trump administration suggests a creeping movement to "normalize" U.S–Taiwan relations with congressional activism and the less-restrained White House as a co–engine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

POLITICAL development, BUREAUCRACY, DEMOCRACY, and POLITICAL systems

The institutional history of the United States Congress has lagged in recent decades as historians of American political development have focused on the history of administration and defined the state in terms of the autonomy of bureaucratic government institutions. In this article, I argue that the history of both Congress and the American state would benefit from analyzing Congress as an institution of the democratic state—an ongoing historical project in which the American people and their representatives in Congress have shaped American democracy and the creation, evolution, and administration of the American state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PRIVATE sector, OPPORTUNITY costs, LEGISLATORS, LOBBYISTS, and UNITED States senators

Does the potential for a successful private sector career induce legislators to leave office? How does this affect the representation voters receive? I show that when former US senators—who now work as lobbyists—become more successful, currently serving senators with similar characteristics are more likely to take private sector employment. I replicate all results on data from the House. A number of tests suggest that senators react to the opportunity costs of holding office. Investigating selection effects, I find that legislative specialists are attracted the most in the Senate. Preliminary evidence suggests that the least wealthy respond most strongly in the House. This suggests that the revolving door shapes the skill set of legislators and the representation voters receive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]