Natural language and linguistic theory. 17(3):541-586
Analyse contrastive, Contrastive analysis, Bulgare, Clitique, Interrogatif, Macédonien, Ordre des mots, Word order, Position syntaxique, Syntactic position, Pragmatique, Pragmatics, Prosodie, Prosody, Question oui-non, Syntaxe générative, Generative syntax, Sciences du langage, Linguistics, Etudes descriptives et applications des théories, Descriptive studies and applied theories, Syntaxe, Syntax, and Linguistique
The distribution of the yes/no-interrogative clitic li in Macedonian and Bulgarian reveals a complex interaction of syntax with non-syntactic factors. The underlying syntactic uniformity of questions with li in the two languages is obscured by a series of prosodic idiosyncracies in one language or the other. In Macedonian, the major prosodic phenomenon affecting the placement of li is the option for certain sequences of words to share a single stress. In Bulgarian, two different prosodic phenomena are relevant: stressing of clitics after the negative element ne and inversion of initial clitics with the following verb. When these factors are controlled for, the syntax of li questions in the two languages is strikingly homogeneous. If no element is focused (i.e., moved to SpecCP), then, in both languages, the tensed verb head-incorporates into li in C. Additional non-syntactic factors, including lexical differences between the two languages in the clitic/non-clitic status of certain auxiliaries and differences in the usage of li questions, are also discussed.
PIGDEN, Charles R, JOYCE, Richard, and KIRCHIN, Simon
Moral skepticism: 30 years of inventing right and wrongEthical theory and moral practice. 10(5):441-456
Anti-realism, Bertrand Russell, Crispin Wright, Doppelganger, Error theory, J. L. Mackie, Morality, Moralizing, Nietzsche, Nihilism, Richard Schacht, Ronald Dworkin, Sayre-McCord, Simon Blackburn, Philosophie, Philosophy, Theorie des valeurs et philosophie morale. Philosophie de l'action, Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action, Théorie des valeurs et philosophie morale, and Theory of values and moral philosophy
Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht's exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie's error theory can't be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin's. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality.