Journal of Economics. 1996, Vol. 63 Issue 1, p41-56. 16p.
PERFECT competition, RAPID prototyping, NEW product development, PRODUCT management, INDUSTRIAL research, MARKET equilibrium, and COMPETITION
We analyze endogenous timing in the switching of technology. Each user chooses when to purchase a new product which embodies new technologies characterized by Marshallian externalities. The technological switch occurs when a large number of users purchase new products. Under complete information, multiple market equilibria exist, and one of the equilibria in which technological switching occurs is efficient. However, if we introduce even a small amount of uncertainty, the switch is delayed in the unique equilibrium under perfect competition, resulting in a loss of social welfare. The market power of a monopolistic supplier of new products alleviates this inefficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. Winter2006, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p27-39. 13p.
NEW product development, COMMERCIAL products, COMMERCIAL markets, RAPID prototyping, ORGANIZATION, and PRODUCT management
This article attempts to understand the idea fruition process or the fuzzy front-end set of activities that an organization may informally engage in before it adopts a formal process for developing a new product The authors propose that the idea fruition process consists of three sub-processes: idea creation, idea concretization, and idea commitment. They also propose and test the individual and organizational factors that influence the idea`s degrees of creativity, concretization, and commitment to further the understanding of the phenomenon and, thus, boost the creation and harnessing of worthwhile ideas in organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
INFORMATION technology, INDUSTRIAL research, PRODUCT management, COMMERCIAL products, RAPID prototyping, and JOINT ventures
The Information Technology (IT) industry is seeing a great increase in the number of alliances between firms. It is important for the providers, customers and sometimes even the government to know the implications of such a development. We consider two competing organizations with differentiated products forming a strategic joint venture to offer a new product which will compete with their existing products. (An example would be the joint venture between Apple and IBM to develop a new operating system.) We focus on the ownership structure of the new product and the strategic re-positioning of the old products in terms of their price, with an emphasis on the latter. We show that the prices of the old products will increase after the introduction of the new product and they will not be taken off the market. We also show that our model unifies the salient aspects of the spatial com- petition and the monopolistic competition approaches of analyzing product differentiation. As a partner's stake in the joint venture increases, its price for the old product shifts further away from the level that will maximize the profit from the old product. However, the overall profit (from the old and new products) increases with the stake in the new product. The resulting feasible set of ownership structures (where both firms are better off by entering the joint venture) shifts towards greater control by the firm with the initial premium product, as the mean reservation price for the new product increases. Initially, the prices of the two products will be set at their respective mean reservation prices (and these will increase after the introduction of the new product). We show the nature of the new prices of the two old products under different scenarios. We show situations where the ordering of the prices of the old products will be maintained, and where it may be changed. The price of the new product will be set at its mean reservation price. When a part of the stake of one of the firms is distributed to a third party, it leads to lower prices for both the products. We discuss generalizations of the model and various areas of potential research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Wagner, Joachim and von der Schulenburg, J.-Matthias Graf
Small Business Economics. Dec1992, Vol. 4 Issue 4, p315-326. 12p.
TECHNOLOGICAL innovations, NEW product development, INDUSTRIAL research, PRODUCT management, INDUSTRIAL organization (Economic theory), and RAPID prototyping
In discussing the nexus between innovations and market structure it is often argued that industry characteristics (called `opportunities') might play an important role as determinants of innovation, and that simultaneity rather than one-way causality prevails. We consider a three-equation model for innovation, advertising, and concentration. Based on pooled cross-section time-series data for 26 German manufacturing industries we estimate single equation models with and without fixed industry and/or time effects (to control for unobservable industry or time effects, respectively) and simultaneous equation systems including fixed effects, and controlling for extreme cases (`outliers') or not. Furthermore, we use two different measures for innovations, i.e., the percentage of shipments due to new products, and the percentage of firms which classified themselves as innovators. Our results can be summarized as follows: (1) The firm size has no significant effect on innovation. One can, therefore, not conclude from this data set that large firms are more innovative than small ones; (2) unobservable industry effects do matter; (3) the treatment of outliers does matter; (4) simultaneity does matter; (5) the way innovations are measured does matter; (6) different stories could be told based on the results of the systems of interdependent equations estimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]