United States. Congress -- Military policy, Military policy -- Analysis, Presidents -- Political activity, and Presidents -- Analysis
This article explores the nature of congressional-presidential relations regarding war making in the early republic. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that Congress was not primary in war making during this period. Examining small wars, particularly those against native tribes, demonstrates how little influence Congress had, with oversight generally occurring only after the fact. Rhetorical presidential support for Congress's role did not accord with their practical readiness to initiate and manage hostilities unilaterally. The willingness of modern presidents to act without congressional consent is therefore not necessarily a historical aberration.
Agenda-setting (Political science) -- Analysis, Success -- Analysis, Presidents -- Political activity, and Legislation
The topic of presidential-congressional relations is well studied, with scholars identifying party control as a strong predictor of presidential success in Congress. Although the research recognizes the importance of policy variation to explaining political processes, few have examined its impact on presidential success in Congress. This article holds that policy scope is important to explaining presidential success in Congress in that different policies engender different levels of conflict and participation in the legislative process. Using data on individual policy proposals from 1949 to 2006, I demonstrate that the policy scope of the president's legislative agenda not only affects the likelihood of presidential success, it also conditions the impact of expected effects on presidential success.
Presidents -- Political activity, Political systems -- Analysis, Domestic policy -- Analysis, Government programs -- Analysis, and United States -- Political aspects
What has caused the secular (long-term) decline in presidential domestic policy-making activities over the past several decades? In a previously published article in this journal, Paul Light provides several interesting speculative reasons for this trend. I propose a general explanation for the secular decline in presidential domestic policy making that centers on the rising organizational size and scope of the institutional presidency. Specifically. I argue that the American presidency's greater than optimal organizational size and scope has hurt its domestic policy-making activities in absolute terms. The suboptimal organizational size and scope of the presidency has also led to a deterioration of its institutional comparative advantage in policymaking activities vis-a-vis Congress. Therefore, twenty-first century American presidents possess a strong incentive to restrict the organizational size and scope of the Executive Office of the President as a means to strive for optimal institutional performance.
Government regulation, Executive power -- Laws, regulations and rules, Recognition (International law) -- Interpretation and construction, Israeli Americans -- Civil rights, Passports -- Laws, regulations and rules, Presidents -- Political activity, Presidents -- Laws, regulations and rules, and Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012)
Presidential power to recognize foreign nations and governments, exercised since the dawn of the republic, has never been viewed as exclusive. Indeed, Congress has enacted legislation that conferred recognition upon foreign countries. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, asserted for the first time in American history an exclusive presidential power of recognition. This conclusion, built on a flawed historical record and faulty judicial premises stemming from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., exaggerates executive authority and ignores the largely ministerial role assigned to the president in receiving ambassadors and foreign ministers.
Commercial treaties -- Political aspects, Diplomacy -- Analysis, Foreign policy -- Analysis, Presidents -- Political activity, and Presidents -- Analysis
It is widely lamented, that lame-duck presidents are do-nothing presidents. But systematic studies of these periods focus almost exclusively on domestic policy, ignoring the implications for foreign affairs. In this article, I argue that presidents are no less ambitious at the end of their time in office and the desire to cement their historical legacies can even make them more so. However, this ambition is checked by a substantial increase in the constraints imposed by other political actors--most notably Congress. This mismatch between incentives and opportunity pushes presidents toward foreign policy, where meaningful achievements are still possible due to greater presidential autonomy. The result is an increase in diplomacy, and international agreements, and use of force. Keywords: lame duck, foreign policy, diplomacy, use of force, bilateral investment
The Wilson Quarterly. Wntr, 2010, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p68, 2 p.
Company business management, Executive power -- Management, Consensus (Social sciences) -- Management, Delegation of powers -- Management, Presidents -- Political activity, and Presidents -- Management
THE SOURCE: 'Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance' by Oona A. Hathaway, in The Yale Law Journal, Nov. 2009. IT MAY BE CONGRESS'S JOB TO write [...]