History, International relations, Amnesty International, Amnesty International USA, Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and International League for the Rights of Man
Using archival collections and published primary sources, this dissertation offers a bottom-up, social historical perspective on how several international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the United States during the Cold War--the International League for the Rights of Man, Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch--formed a transnational advocacy network that exposed abuses and shamed governments into ending them. It finds that a small circle of rooted cosmopolitans--a term used by Sidney Tarrow to describe "outsiders inside/insiders outside"--was responsible for the emergence of a movement during the mid-1970s that was centered in New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The activists profiled here were not the powerful, but neither were they the powerless. They tended to be highly-educated professionals who were drawn into activism after their moral sensibilities had been greatly offended. The emotional connections that formed between activists and victims thus arose within the historical context of intensifying market relations in this contemporary era of globalization. But why the spectacle of distant suffering drove some people to devote themselves to advancing the cause of human rights can be answered only in deeply personal terms. Biography is crucial to understanding how this transformation occurred for them: religious beliefs, a long-held cultural interest, a friend who experienced political repression and symbolized the plight of an entire country, previous work on domestic civil liberties, or their own victimization. Their worldview was based on a far-reaching conception of one's ethical responsibilities. As Kwame Anthony Appiah has argued, lives are given value by the identities that shape them--the philosophical basis of a cosmopolitanism that is premised upon "kindness to strangers." Activists proceeded in a similar path from an abstract notion of the rights-bearing individual to immersing themselves in the lived experiences of prisoners, dissidents, and other persecuted individuals they may have never actually met in person. Lacking the authority of state actors, activists had to act as moral entrepreneurs. Their social value was providing elites with information. The researchers who gathered the material for the reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch became experts who were called to testify before Congress. Journalists quoted their findings to counter or corroborate the official version of events. NGOs also developed legal expertise that they used to expand the reach of international human rights law. As this subfield became more widely taught at law schools, some of which established programs dedicated to it, a generation of lawyer-activists took the international human rights movement in a new, more litigious direction. Publicity was just as important. It was easier to mobilize public opinion against repressive governments if the victims were well known; even better if activists became part of the story. By reaffirming their accuracy and objectivity, activists could gain the trust of reliable donors, philanthropic foundations, wealthy benefactors, and celebrities, all of whom became important sources of income that enabled their NGOs to expand during the last three decades of the twentieth century.
In 1939, as the UK was barreling towards war with Germany, the King and Queen of England visited the United States and toured five states with President Roosevelt. On March 13, 2015-- two weeks before a closely contested election in Israel-- Prime Minister Netanyahu traveled to the United States to address Congress. Why spend such significant time and resources on these trips? While many dismiss this public diplomacy as strategically insignificant, I argue that leaders can use these seemingly low-cost appeals appeals to foreign audiences to indirectly influence either the government of the foreign country or their own domestic audience.Because most citizens form their policy opinions based on elite cues, low-cost statements from leaders can sometimes shape the conversation surrounding a policy issue in another country. By influencing the political discourse and public opinion in a foreign country, leaders can place strategic political constraints on the leaders of those countries. First, I collect data on international trips made by 11 G20 leaders along with daily internet searches to test when foreign leaders can garner attention abroad. Next I use detailed case studies and public opinion data to examine when leaders can persuade a foreign audience or use a foreign backlash to build domestic support. I match micro-level trade exposure data with survey data from the UK to demonstrate that Obama had a significant influence on the Brexit debate during his 2016 visit. Additionally, I combine the geographic route of the British royal couple in 1939 with survey data to show that they had a measurable effect on American public opinion on intervention into WWII.Furthermore, political leaders often require both domestic support and cooperation from other countries in order to achieve foreign policy goals. Rather than merely limiting a leader's policy options, I argue that this tension can be exploited by a leader to help him communicate credibly to his domestic audience. Leaders can leverage an international backlash to signal alignment with their domestic audience and increase their domestic support. I develop a formal model to identify the conditions under which a leader can benefit from this counter-intuitive strategy.