George H.W. Bush, United States, El Salvador, Cold War, foreign policy, human rights, democracy, United Nations, peace process, FMLN, Congress, Jesuit murders, negotiations, civil war, 1989-1992, post-Cold War era, Ignacio Ellacuria, Soviet Union, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, administration, and Central America
At the start of the George H.W. Bush administration, American involvement in El Salvador‘s civil war, one of the last Cold War battlegrounds, had disappeared from the foreign policy agenda. However, two events in November 1989 shattered the bipartisan consensus on US policy toward El Salvador: the failure of the FMLN‘s largest military offensive of the war and the murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daughter by the Salvadoran military, the FAES. Despite more than one billion dollars in US military assistance, the war had stalemated, promoting both sides to seek a negotiated political settlement mediated by the United Nations. The Jesuit murders demonstrated the failure of the policy of promoting respect for democracy and human rights and revived the debate in Congress over US aid to El Salvador.This thesis argues that the Bush administration sought to remove the burden of El Salvador from its foreign policy agenda by actively pushing for the investigation and prosecution of the Jesuit case and fully supporting the UN-mediated peace process. Using recently declassified government documents from the George Bush Presidential Library, this thesis will examine how the Bush administration fundamentally changed US policy toward El Salvador. Administration officials carried out an unprecedented campaign to pressure the FAES to investigate the Jesuit murders and bring the killers to justice while simultaneously attempting to prevent Congress from cutting American military assistance. The Bush administration changed the objective of its El Salvador policy from military victory over the guerrillas to a negotiated political settlement. The US facilitated the peace process by pressuring the Salvadoran government and the FMLN to negotiate in good faith and accept compromises. When both sides signed a comprehensive peace agreement on January 16, 1992, the burden of El Salvador was lifted.
Humans, Smoking, Health Behavior, Military Medicine, Human Rights, Health Policy, Military Personnel, United States, Smoking Prevention, Clinical Research, Prevention, Tobacco, Smoking and Health, 8.3 Policy, ethics and research governance, Strategic, Defence & Security Studies, Public Health and Health Services, Human Movement and Sports Sciences, Strategic, and Defence & Security Studies
The Institute of Medicine recently called for a tobacco-free military, citing evidence that high rates of tobacco use harm readiness and create enormous costs for the Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration. The pro-tobacco activities of the tobacco industry and others, sometimes supported by military authorities even when prohibited by policy, have created a culture highly hospitable to smoking. Through qualitative secondary analysis of data from interviews and focus groups, this article explores the reasons enlisted personnel and their supervisors, installation tobacco control managers, and service policy leaders give for why tobacco control policy change "cannot" effectively be achieved. Three primary reasons were given: policies would impinge on the "right to smoke," policies would be unenforceable and lead to disciplinary breakdown, and the rights of civilian workers on military installations precluded policy enforcement. Yet evidence suggests that these reasons are not only invalid, but inconsistent with military policies addressing other threats to the health of personnel. This pervasive tobacco "exceptionalism" is a significant barrier to achieving a tobacco-free military. The military, Congress, and the President should re-evaluate the "can'ts" that have prevented effective action, and act to regulate and eventually abolish tobacco use in the armed forces.
American History, European History, History, Political Science, Russian History, Human Rights, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Soviet dissent, Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Cold War
My dissertation will explore the complexities of the role human rights played in U.S.-Soviet relations from 1975 to 1989 through the prism of globalization. It will describe how Western private citizens, Soviet dissenters, and members of Congress exploited the language of Final Act (Helsinki Accords) to forge a transnational network committed to globalizing the issue of Soviet human rights violations. This development challenged bureaucratic discretion in ways that gave the Carter and Reagan administrations little choice but to challenge Soviet internal behavior in forthright fashion. Instead of viewing transnational activities as a threat to their expertise, many officials in each administration made working with and supporting non-governmental groups an integral element of their approach to undermining the international and internal legitimacy of the USSR. Utilizing Soviet internal documents available in English, this dissertation will also explain why many Soviet policymakers feared the human rights critiques of dissenters and Western private citizens just as much, if not more, than the statements of U.S. politicians. Without losing sight of the pivotal role private citizens and Congress played in tarnishing the international reputation of the Soviet Union, this work will also offer an in-depth comparison of the Carter and Reagan administrations' efforts to promote human rights in USSR. It will argue that a transnational perspective calls into question many of the standard interpretations of each administration's efforts to promote human rights in the Soviet Union. In the case of the USSR, a transnational framework complicates arguments that focus on the inherent weaknesses of Soviet dissent during the early to mid 1980s. After exploring these topics, this work will outline the limitations of “constructivist” accounts of how international human rights “norms” shaped Soviet reform efforts after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary.
History, International relations, Amnesty International, Amnesty International USA, Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and International League for the Rights of Man
Using archival collections and published primary sources, this dissertation offers a bottom-up, social historical perspective on how several international human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the United States during the Cold War--the International League for the Rights of Man, Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), Americas Watch and Helsinki Watch--formed a transnational advocacy network that exposed abuses and shamed governments into ending them. It finds that a small circle of rooted cosmopolitans--a term used by Sidney Tarrow to describe "outsiders inside/insiders outside"--was responsible for the emergence of a movement during the mid-1970s that was centered in New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The activists profiled here were not the powerful, but neither were they the powerless. They tended to be highly-educated professionals who were drawn into activism after their moral sensibilities had been greatly offended. The emotional connections that formed between activists and victims thus arose within the historical context of intensifying market relations in this contemporary era of globalization. But why the spectacle of distant suffering drove some people to devote themselves to advancing the cause of human rights can be answered only in deeply personal terms. Biography is crucial to understanding how this transformation occurred for them: religious beliefs, a long-held cultural interest, a friend who experienced political repression and symbolized the plight of an entire country, previous work on domestic civil liberties, or their own victimization. Their worldview was based on a far-reaching conception of one's ethical responsibilities. As Kwame Anthony Appiah has argued, lives are given value by the identities that shape them--the philosophical basis of a cosmopolitanism that is premised upon "kindness to strangers." Activists proceeded in a similar path from an abstract notion of the rights-bearing individual to immersing themselves in the lived experiences of prisoners, dissidents, and other persecuted individuals they may have never actually met in person. Lacking the authority of state actors, activists had to act as moral entrepreneurs. Their social value was providing elites with information. The researchers who gathered the material for the reports published by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch became experts who were called to testify before Congress. Journalists quoted their findings to counter or corroborate the official version of events. NGOs also developed legal expertise that they used to expand the reach of international human rights law. As this subfield became more widely taught at law schools, some of which established programs dedicated to it, a generation of lawyer-activists took the international human rights movement in a new, more litigious direction. Publicity was just as important. It was easier to mobilize public opinion against repressive governments if the victims were well known; even better if activists became part of the story. By reaffirming their accuracy and objectivity, activists could gain the trust of reliable donors, philanthropic foundations, wealthy benefactors, and celebrities, all of whom became important sources of income that enabled their NGOs to expand during the last three decades of the twentieth century.
Sociology, Culture, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Latin America, and Political Sociology
My dissertation examines the relationship between law and society by analyzing the implementation of U.S. human rights legislation. In the 1970s, the U.S. Congress, reflecting the growing international consensus that human rights were a matter of international policy, legislated that respect for human rights be considered in all foreign aid decisions. A central feature of this legislation stipulated that aid should not go to countries “engaged in gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Subsequently, many have concluded that the United States has inconsistently applied this legislation, especially in United States-Latin America relations. These researchers have studied human rights as a self-evident concept, obscuring the fact that policy advocates—those with a vested interest in defining human rights and their violation and the United States’ response—imbue the concept with of human rights with meaning through policy debates. This dissertation takes a different approach, studying what I call the politics of meaning-making: the process by which policy advocates define and contest the meaning of these phenomena. In order to develop this approach, I examine two cases testing the United States’ commitment to promoting respect for human rights abroad: the ‘dirty war’ in Argentina (1976-1983) and the civil war in El Salvador (1980-1992). The similar scope and severity of human rights violations in both cases provides for a powerful comparison. Based upon a content analysis of 160 U.S. Congressional hearings—summing to more than 35,000 pages of documents, I find that policy advocates assessed each society’s supposed capacity for self-governance and leveraged their own analysis to develop a plan of restoring respect for human rights in Argentina and of establishing respect for human rights in El Salvador. The distinction between restoring and establishing respect for human rights is important because each had significant social consequences for all of the nations involved, both during and after these conflicts officially ended. This analysis served as a foundation for both how policy advocates framed human rights violations perpetrated during each conflict, and how they measured progress towards curbing human rights abuses. I trace the logics and resources policy advocates used to respond to each specific case of human rights violations abroad. My analysis offers a new way to understand the United States’ response to human rights violations through a unique lens. Moreover, my research points to the importance of examining the boundaries between crime and human rights violations. How and by whom these boundaries are drawn and redrawn, impacted all of the societies studied, and continues to have a contemporary impact on local, national, and global levels.
同盟理論, 威脅平衡, 反恐, 人權, 軍事合作, 美國, 印尼, the alliance theory, balance of threat, anti-terror, human rights, military cooperation, the United States, and Indonesia
冷戰時期，蘇哈托所統治的印尼雖然標榜著不結盟運動，試圖在東西兩強的夾擊下另闢蹊徑。但是在同樣反對共產主義的主張下，印尼在這段時期，和美國建立起了相當友好的關係，包括軍事和經濟上的援助。在一個近年來已解密的文件中更顯示，福特總統以及季辛吉更曾經和蘇哈托有過正式及非正式的接觸，被認為是美國希望以對印尼軍政府的支持，換取其在反共同盟上的支持。 九十年代之後，印尼政府在人權問題上的處理失當，多次導致美國政府的不滿，進而暫停或取消對印尼的援助。在此事件上，美國國會更採取強硬的立場，要求美國政府必須更仔細而審慎的評估，對印尼的人權表現，是否有明顯的改善。 2001年的九一一事件，代表著美國政府外交政策的巨大改變，在對印尼的外交政策上也出現了明顯的變化。印尼為世界上最大的回教國家，其本身對美國較溫和的立場，使得美國政府在宣揚其反恐理念上，需要印尼的協助。而印尼本身與日俱增的戰略地位，如控制麻六甲海峽，龐大資源，以及在東南亞國協中的大國地位等，使美國政府不得不重新審視其對印尼的外交政策。 本論文主要在探討布希政府在九一一事變後，對印尼外交政策的特點，以及是否和過去出現不同之處。論文組織分為三個主要部分，分別為反恐、人權以及軍事合作。在理論架構方面，本論文借助Steven M. Walt(沃爾特)的同盟理論，希望能釐清兩國在反恐合作方面，是否已具備了同盟的性質。而其他同盟理論的重要內涵，如威脅平衡、意識型態、援助、滲透等，皆會被用來加強本文的論述。 研究發現，在沃爾特的同盟理論架構下，美國和印尼在反恐合作上，的確出現了有如同盟的密切關係。雖然彼此間不存在約束的同盟條約，然而，就同盟的實質而言，恢復的軍事關係和密切的反恐合作等，皆是同盟的重要指標。研究並發現，威脅平衡理論的確較合理的詮釋了美印兩國因反恐而強化的關係。而意識型態、援助和滲透等，對同盟的組成皆有一定程度的影響，但非強大的因素。 During the Cold War, Indonesia was noted for its leadership in the Non-Alignment Movement, which distinguished itself from the two-polar world. However, the Suharto government had in fact built an amicable relationship with the U.S. under the flag of anti-communism. In the 1990s, due to the notorious human rights records, the U.S. had moved to cancel or suspend military and economic aid to Indonesia. The Congress and Senate of the U.S. took a hard-line stance in dealing with these problems. The 9/11 event marked a significant change in the U.S. foreign policy. As the biggest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia’s comparably moderate nature gains its importance for America in promoting anti-terror in Muslim world. Also, the growing strategic status, like the location in the Malacca Straits, vast resources and key status in ASEAN, necessitates the U.S. to reconsider its policy toward Indonesia. The thesis is primarily dedicated to analyze the Bush Administration’s foreign policy toward Indonesia after the 9/11 event. There are three main pillars in the thesis—anti-terror, human rights and military cooperation. Steven M. Walt’s famous Alliance Theory contributes the analytic framework to this thesis. Also, some other arguments of alliance theory like balance of threat, ideology, foreign aid and penetration will be utilized to deepen the analysis of this thesis. Under Walt’s alliance theory, in spite of the fact that there is no concrete alliance binding between these two countries, the resumed military relationship, and close anti-terror cooperation are all noted indicators that shows the U.S. and Indonesia act as alliance partners. This thesis also demonstrates that the balance of threat theory is a better analytic framework to explain the relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia. Ideology, foreign aid and penetration in this case surely affects the formation of alliance, however, they are not causes of it as Walt concludes.