Book — 1 online resource (333 pages) : illustrations
1 The Strategic Setting
2 Pearson on the Superpower Confrontation
3 Canada and the Baruch Plan, 1945â€?46
4 The Propaganda Wars: Defending the Baruch Plan, 1947â€?49
5 The Erosion of the Majority Plan, 1950â€?53
6 Narrowing the Gap between East and West, 1954â€?55
7 Working to Maintain Franco-American Harmony, 1955â€?56
8 Final Negotiations 1956â€?57: The Nuclear Test Ban and Aerial Inspection
Appendix: Key Actors and Meetings
In Pearson and Canada's Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations Joseph Levitt traces the history of these negotiations from the Canadian diplomatic perspective. He analyses the various proposals and documents the reactions of Pearson and his colleagues. Levitt reveals Pearson's own view of the strategic stalemate between the USSR and the United States -- Pearson did not believe that an open and liberal society such as the United States would ever launch an unprovoked offensive on the USSR; he thought instead that the danger of a major military confrontation arose only from the possibility that the Soviet Union might attack. Consequently the main thrust of Canadian diplomatic activity in these negotiations was not prevention of an American arms build-up but support of a strategy which would compel the USSR to accept an agreement that would benefit the Americans militarily or, failing that, to hold the Soviets responsible for the impasse in the talks and thus win the all-important propaganda war. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
Book — 1 online resource (xii, 171 pages) Digital: data file.
Introduction The Special Assembly UNSCOP The Ad Hoc Committee Sub-Committee 1 In the Working Group Back to the General Assembly Personal Policy Making Lobbying Activities Canada's Role in Jewish, Arab, and Canadian Eyes Conclusions Epilogue Bibliography.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Without the Canadian mediation between the two world blocs in 1947, UN resolution 181(II) to partition Palestine would likely have failed to secure the two thirds majority necessary for adoption by the General Assembly. In fact, the Canadians were among the main initiators of the partition plan and the establishment of a Jewish state. Tauber demonstrates that this Canadian involvement was not an official government policy, but rather a private initiative of some high-ranking Canadian foreign service officials who believed partition to be the only practicable solution for the Palestine question. Thus, due to humanitarian concerns, these officials followed an independent policy against the express will of their prime minister. The results would forever change the history of the Middle East. Tauber explores this little known aspect of Canadian foreign policy. Canada's under secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, assisted by other foreign service officials, decided on his own accord which policy to follow in this instance. Based upon many original Canadian, British, American, UN, and Israeli documents, this study shows that Pearson's motivation was not the desire to make Canada a middle power involved in international affairs, as some scholars of Canadian international affairs have previously argued. Instead, the impact of the Holocaust drove these officials to break ranks with their superiors at home to support the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. (source: Nielsen Book Data)