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Book
1 electronic document (21p.) : digital, PDF file
"This paper is intended to sound a warning - to raise awareness about the state of our ground forces today and the very real risk that poses to our future security. This paper also proposes an action plan for restoring the health and vitality of the U.S. military"--P. 1.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
xi, 24 pages : color illustrations ; 28 cm.
  • Analyzing cyber attacks against combat support
  • A decision support tool for identifying areas of highest interest.
"While combat support communities are not responsible for defending cyber networks, they are required to ensure mission execution, including when under cyber attack. Assessing mission assurance for combat support when under a cyber attack is challenging. The fact that many combat support systems do not reside on the most secure networks indicates potential vulnerabilities to cyber attack. Yet the sheer number of information systems that can be attacked, the range of vulnerabilities that these might have, the large number of combat support functions they support, and the complicated connections all of these have to operational missions makes assessments difficult. Add to this the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace, and the task of finding adequate mitigation plans for all possibilities is formidable. RAND researchers developed a tool that presents a sequential process for identifying those functions and information systems most likely to be problematic for the operational mission during cyber attacks"--Publisher's web site.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
xvi, 166 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)
Book
x, 359 p. : ill., maps ; 23 cm.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
xv, 53 p. : ill. ; 21 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)
Book
xii, 19 pages : 1 color illustration ; 28 cm.
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
pages cm
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
x, 297 p. ; 24 cm.
Political scientist James H. Lebovic establishes that the size, strength, flexibility, and adaptability of the U.S. military cannot ensure victory in asymmetrical conflicts. In The Limits of U.S. Military Capability, Lebovic shows how political and psychological factors trumped U.S. military superiority in Vietnam and Iraq, where inappropriate strategies, low stakes, and unrealistic goals mired the United States military in protracted, no-win conflicts. Lebovic contends that the United States is at a particular disadvantage when fighting a counterinsurgency without the full support of the host government; when leveraging various third parties (the adversary's foreign allies, societal leaders, and indigenous populations); when attempting to build coalitions and nations while involved in combat; and when sustaining government and public support at home when costs rise and benefits decline. Lebovic cautions against involving the U.S. military in operations without first considering U.S. stakes and suggests that the military take a less-is-more approach when choosing to employ force. Ambitious goals bring higher costs, unexpected results, diminished options, and a greater risk of failure. Rejecting the heavy-handed approach that is typical of most comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars, The Limits of U.S. Military Capability carefully assesses evidence to develop lessons applicable to other conflicts-especially the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780801894725 20160604
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)
Book
xvii, 243 p. : charts ; 23 cm.
SAL1&2 (on-campus shelving)

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