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• Parrhesia, frankness, and post-classical politics
• Speaking freely
• Kings: frankness to power
• Demos: rhetoric in the post-classical city
• Elites: hierarchy, oligarchy, and friendship
• Authorizing frankness: Lucian's satire
• Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Frankness, Greek Culture, and the Roman Empire discusses the significance of parrhesia (free and frank speech) in Greek culture of the Roman empire. The term parrhesia first emerged in the context of the classical Athenian democracy and was long considered a key democratic and egalitarian value. And yet, references to frank speech pervade the literature of the Roman empire, a time when a single autocrat ruled over most of the known world, Greek cities were governed at the local level by entrenched oligarchies, and social hierarchy was becoming increasingly stratified. This volume challenges the traditional view that the meaning of the term changed radically after Alexander the Great, and shows rather that parrhesia retained both political and ethical significance well into the Roman empire. By examining references to frankness in political writings, rhetoric, philosophy, historiography, biographical literature, and finally satire, the volume also explores the dynamics of political power in the Roman empire, where politics was located in interpersonal relationships as much as, if not more than, in institutions. The contested nature of the power relations in such interactions - between emperors and their advisors, between orators and the cities they counseled, and among fellow members of the oligarchic elite in provincial cities - reveals the political implications of a prominent post-classical intellectual development that reconceptualizes true freedom as belonging to the man who behaves - and speaks - freely. At the same time, because the role of frank speaker is valorized, those who claim it also lay themselves open to suspicions of self-promotion and hypocrisy. This volume will be of interest to students and scholars of rhetoric and political thought in the ancient world, and to anyone interested in ongoing debates about intellectual freedom, limits on speech, and the advantages of presenting oneself as a truth-teller.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction: hidden liberalism--
• 2. Aspects of political liberalism in Iran--
• 3. The specter of westernism--
• 4. Liberation without liberalism--
• 5. Conclusion: (in)visible liberalisms.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Compared to rival ideologies, liberalism has fared rather poorly in modern Iran. This is all the more remarkable given the essentially liberal substance of various social and political struggles - for liberal legality, individual rights and freedoms, and pluralism - in the century-long period since the demise of the Qajar dynasty and the subsequent transformation of the country into a modern nation-state. The deeply felt but largely invisible purchase of liberal political ideas in Iran challenges us to think more expansively about the trajectory of various intellectual developments since the emergence of a movement for reform and constitutionalism in the late nineteenth century. It complicates parsimonious accounts of Shi'ism, secularism, socialism, nationalism, and royalism as defining or representative ideologies of particular eras. Hidden Liberalism offers a critical examination of the reasons behind liberalism's invisible yet influential status, and its attendant ethical quandaries, in Iranian political and intellectual discourses.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Dramatis Personae-- Introduction--
• 1. "Individual rights were not enough for true freedom"--
• 2. Who Will Tame the Will to Defy Humanity?--
• 3. The Consequences of 1948--
• 4. Exit from North Africa--
• 5. From Antisemitism to "Zionism is Racism"--
• 6. The Inadequacy of Madison Avenue Methods-- 7."Good words have become the servants of evil masters"-- Conclusion-- Bibliography.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Nathan A. Kurz charts the fraught relationship between Jewish internationalism and international rights protection in the second half of the twentieth century. For nearly a century, Jewish lawyers and advocacy groups in Western Europe and the United States had pioneered forms of international rights protection, tying the defense of Jews to norms and rules that aspired to curb the worst behavior of rapacious nation-states. In the wake of the Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel, however, Jewish activists discovered they could no longer promote the same norms, laws and innovations without fear they could soon apply to the Jewish state. Using previously unexamined sources, Nathan Kurz examines the transformation of Jewish internationalism from an effort to constrain the power of nation-states to one focused on cementing Israel's legitimacy and its status as a haven for refugees from across the Jewish diaspora.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

A searing critique of our contemporary policy agenda, and a call to implement radical change. Although it is well known that the United States has an inequality problem, the social science community has failed to mobilize in response. Social scientists have instead adopted a strikingly insipid approach to policy reform, an ostensibly science-based approach that offers incremental, narrow-gauge, and evidence-informed "interventions." This approach assumes that the best that we can do is to contain the problem. It is largely taken for granted that we will never solve it. In Manifesto for a Dream Michelle Jackson asserts that we will never make strides toward equality if we do not start to think radically. It is the structure of social institutions that generates and maintains social inequality, and it is only by attacking that structure that progress can be made. Jackson makes a scientific case for large-scale institutional reform, drawing on examples from other countries to demonstrate that reforms that have been unthinkable in the United States are considered to be quite unproblematic in other contexts. She persuasively argues that an emboldened social science has an obligation to develop and test the radical policies that would be necessary for equality to be assured for all. -- Provided by publisher.

• Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: The Source of My Idea chapter abstractThe author's public lecture on the possible merits of slightly less democratic accountability led to a wave of social media outrage. That wave of outrage was one piece of evidence that potential readers would be drawn to a book on the topic. The author brings three areas of personal expertise to the book. In the U.S. Senate, he saw that when elections draw close, politicians become less brave and more attentive to voters back home. As a monetary economist, the author learned the academic consensus that politically independent central banks, kept far from the influence of voters and elected politicians, achieve better economic results. And in an earlier book on human intelligence, he documented the value of informed voters for improving governance. The early chapters of the book follow the path of those three lines of inquiry.
• 1The Big Benefits of a Small Dose of Democracy chapter abstractSome degree of democracy appears to be extremely valuable. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen showed, democracies never have famines-- other empirical research argues that democracies are less likely to go to war (especially with each other) and are less likely to kill their own citizens. However, in the case of government-organized killing of citizens, it appears that only a moderate degree of democracy is needed to achieve these excellent results. Beyond that "dose, " there is perhaps little or no payoff to extra levels of democracy, for either peace or prosperity. In the area of taxation, the Laffer curve is the concept that there's a bliss point, a happy medium, an optimal tax rate somewhere between 0% and 100%. The same concept probably applies to the level of democracy as well. This metaphor of balancing benefits of democracy against costs sets the stage for the rest of 10% Less Democracy.
• 2Braver Politician chapter abstractWhen legislators have long terms, they tend to behave differently toward the end of those terms as they prepare for election. Evidence from around the world is offered to show that these effects are real and that they shape economic policy. In the areas of international trade, labor market regulation, and exchange rate devaluations, politicians appear to be reluctant to implement policies supported by economic experts when an election is around the corner. Since elections appear to encourage worse policy choices, this is an argument for fewer elections-for longer terms in office, and hence less immediate electoral accountability. Scholars of democracy argue that frequent elections are central to democracy, so a shift toward longer terms is a slight shift away from pure democracy.
• 3Central Bank "Independence" chapter abstractMonetary economists have studied which institutions, which rules of the game, are best for creating low, stable inflation-- low unemployment rates-- and high stable economic growth. The evidence is reasonably strong that central banks that are independent of the political process are effective at lowering inflation and appear to have no adverse effects on unemployment or economic growth. Politically independent central banks are a free lunch, a benefit you don't have to pay for. Keeping democratically elected politicians far away from the banking system is at least somewhat undemocratic, and that distance is good for national economic performance.
• 4The 2% Solution chapter abstractThe entire judicial system in many democracies is kept quite undemocratic. This is often called "judicial independence": judges with long terms who can't easily be fired are quite unaccountable to voters. Evidence suggests that appointed judges with long terms are good for national economic policy, and judges appointed by merit commissions in particular appear to be quite productive by conventional legal measures. Electricity and telecom regulators who are appointed rather than elected also are arguably more effective, though here the evidence is more mixed-- in any case, there's no clear, strong case for elected regulators. There may be little gained or lost if more regulators are appointed, so the overall risks of less democracy in the regulatory sphere appear to be modest. Professor Alan Blinder's proposal for an independent Federal Tax Board, akin to an independent central bank but for writing tax law, is discussed.
• 5This Chapter Does Not Apply to Your Country chapter abstractA vast empirical literature spanning political science and economics demonstrates both widespread voter ignorance and the fact that voters with more education tend to know more about government. This chapter takes that standard literature largely for granted and offers a variety of potential voting reforms to give more weight to better-informed voters, while simultaneously maintaining a high level of democracy, and a high level of voter involvement across demographic groups. The title of the
• chapter is a reminder that keeping some distance from difficult reform questions is a path to more objective thinking-and that any voting reform proposals should accord with the moral standards of the citizens of the nation that adopts them.
• 6Bondholders as a Separate and Coequal Branch of Government chapter abstractSovereign bondholders should be treated more like corporate shareholders. They have a long time horizon and care about the government's future ability to repay its debts, which likely gives them a strong incentive to encourage persistent increases in national productivity. Some organizations, including the Council of Foreign Bondholders and the Paris Club, which have performed similar tasks of conveying views from lenders to sovereign borrowers, are discussed. A variety of proposals are offered to give sovereign bondholders some modest form of a seat at the table, including a small number of seats in the upper house of the national legislature.
• 7Jonathan Rauch, Prophet of Political Realism chapter abstractThe quest for politically pure government has weakened democratic performance. Logrolling and earmarks help politicians with diverse interests to come together and pass legislation. Recent quests to create greater transparency and end perceived corruption make it harder for government to cut win-win deals. In addition, the rise of social media likely increases the noise and reduces the signal value of any single election. This strengthens the case for more small-stakes elections, with perhaps half or one-third of elected officials up for reelection at a time.
• 8The Hard Case of the European Union chapter abstractThe European Union is often considered an example of the failure of elite technocracy. Furthermore, there's an academic literature on the "democratic deficit" in the European Union. So it's taken for granted that the EU is insufficiently democratic and is failing at key goals. But in practice, the EU has been reasonably successful and fits normal definitions of democracy. Some of its key difficulties come instead from the supermajority and unanimity rules that are an unavoidable feature of a democracy that embraces such diverse nations. And as the chapter emphasizes, there's an important theoretical literature in the social sciences, especially work by Knut Wicksell, Nobel laureate James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock, arguing that the unanimity rule should be the starting point for democratic decision making.
• 9Singapore: Flourishing with 50% Less Democracy chapter abstractSingapore is an example of a successful economy that is much less democratic than the rich democracies of the world. It's not an example that rich democracies should widely emulate, but it's still an example to learn from. While some academics asked how countries can "Get to Denmark, " to a mix of competent government and prosperity, it's worthwhile to spend some time learning to "Get to Singapore." This chapter reviews Singapore's unique path to less democratic prosperity.
• 10Conclusion: Buying the Right Dose of Democracy chapter abstractClassical political philosophers debated which form of government was best. A number of important thinkers, from Aristotle and Xenophon to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, have concluded that a blend of multiple forms of government is the best path. With the rise of modern statistical methods and large data sets it's possible to go beyond anecdotes and test theories of which government institutions are likely to work best. Armchair theorizing has its role, but so does formal statistical evidence-and the previous chapters have brought such evidence to bear on the question of the best form of government. The conclusion offers a variety of broadly oligarchical and epistocratic proposals as suggestions for the rich democracies to consider and urges readers to weigh their preexisting ethical attitudes toward democratic governance against the evidence that slightly less democracy in the richest democracies could offer large benefits to the citizens of these nations.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

During the 2016 presidential election, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders argued that elites were hurting the economy. But, drawing together evidence and theory from across economics, political science, and even finance, Garett Jones says otherwise. In 10% Less Democracy, he makes the case that the richest, most democratic nations would be better off if they slightly reduced accountability to the voting public, turning up the dial on elite influence. To do this, Jones builds on three foundational lines of evidence in areas where he has personal experience. First, as a former staffer in the U.S. Senate, he saw how senators voted differently as elections grew closer. Second, as a macroeconomist, Jones knows the merits of "independent" central banks, which sit apart from the political process and are controlled by powerful insiders. The consensus of the field is that this detached, technocratic approach has worked far better than more political and democratic banking systems. Third, his previous research on the effects of cognitive skills on political, social, and economic systems revealed many ways in which well-informed voters improve government. Discerning repeated patterns, Jones draws out practical suggestions for fine-tuning, focusing on the length of political terms, the independence of government agencies, the weight that voting systems give to the more-educated, and the value of listening more closely to a group of farsighted stakeholders with real skin in the game-a nation's sovereign bondholders. Accessible to political news junkies while firmly rooted and rigorous, 10% Less Democracy will fuel the national conversation about what optimal government looks like.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: The Source of My Idea chapter abstractThe author's public lecture on the possible merits of slightly less democratic accountability led to a wave of social media outrage. That wave of outrage was one piece of evidence that potential readers would be drawn to a book on the topic. The author brings three areas of personal expertise to the book. In the U.S. Senate, he saw that when elections draw close, politicians become less brave and more attentive to voters back home. As a monetary economist, the author learned the academic consensus that politically independent central banks, kept far from the influence of voters and elected politicians, achieve better economic results. And in an earlier book on human intelligence, he documented the value of informed voters for improving governance. The early chapters of the book follow the path of those three lines of inquiry.
• 1The Big Benefits of a Small Dose of Democracy chapter abstractSome degree of democracy appears to be extremely valuable. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen showed, democracies never have famines-- other empirical research argues that democracies are less likely to go to war (especially with each other) and are less likely to kill their own citizens. However, in the case of government-organized killing of citizens, it appears that only a moderate degree of democracy is needed to achieve these excellent results. Beyond that "dose, " there is perhaps little or no payoff to extra levels of democracy, for either peace or prosperity. In the area of taxation, the Laffer curve is the concept that there's a bliss point, a happy medium, an optimal tax rate somewhere between 0% and 100%. The same concept probably applies to the level of democracy as well. This metaphor of balancing benefits of democracy against costs sets the stage for the rest of 10% Less Democracy.
• 2Braver Politician chapter abstractWhen legislators have long terms, they tend to behave differently toward the end of those terms as they prepare for election. Evidence from around the world is offered to show that these effects are real and that they shape economic policy. In the areas of international trade, labor market regulation, and exchange rate devaluations, politicians appear to be reluctant to implement policies supported by economic experts when an election is around the corner. Since elections appear to encourage worse policy choices, this is an argument for fewer elections-for longer terms in office, and hence less immediate electoral accountability. Scholars of democracy argue that frequent elections are central to democracy, so a shift toward longer terms is a slight shift away from pure democracy.
• 3Central Bank "Independence" chapter abstractMonetary economists have studied which institutions, which rules of the game, are best for creating low, stable inflation-- low unemployment rates-- and high stable economic growth. The evidence is reasonably strong that central banks that are independent of the political process are effective at lowering inflation and appear to have no adverse effects on unemployment or economic growth. Politically independent central banks are a free lunch, a benefit you don't have to pay for. Keeping democratically elected politicians far away from the banking system is at least somewhat undemocratic, and that distance is good for national economic performance.
• 4The 2% Solution chapter abstractThe entire judicial system in many democracies is kept quite undemocratic. This is often called "judicial independence": judges with long terms who can't easily be fired are quite unaccountable to voters. Evidence suggests that appointed judges with long terms are good for national economic policy, and judges appointed by merit commissions in particular appear to be quite productive by conventional legal measures. Electricity and telecom regulators who are appointed rather than elected also are arguably more effective, though here the evidence is more mixed-- in any case, there's no clear, strong case for elected regulators. There may be little gained or lost if more regulators are appointed, so the overall risks of less democracy in the regulatory sphere appear to be modest. Professor Alan Blinder's proposal for an independent Federal Tax Board, akin to an independent central bank but for writing tax law, is discussed.
• 5This Chapter Does Not Apply to Your Country chapter abstractA vast empirical literature spanning political science and economics demonstrates both widespread voter ignorance and the fact that voters with more education tend to know more about government. This chapter takes that standard literature largely for granted and offers a variety of potential voting reforms to give more weight to better-informed voters, while simultaneously maintaining a high level of democracy, and a high level of voter involvement across demographic groups. The title of the
• chapter is a reminder that keeping some distance from difficult reform questions is a path to more objective thinking-and that any voting reform proposals should accord with the moral standards of the citizens of the nation that adopts them.
• 6Bondholders as a Separate and Coequal Branch of Government chapter abstractSovereign bondholders should be treated more like corporate shareholders. They have a long time horizon and care about the government's future ability to repay its debts, which likely gives them a strong incentive to encourage persistent increases in national productivity. Some organizations, including the Council of Foreign Bondholders and the Paris Club, which have performed similar tasks of conveying views from lenders to sovereign borrowers, are discussed. A variety of proposals are offered to give sovereign bondholders some modest form of a seat at the table, including a small number of seats in the upper house of the national legislature.
• 7Jonathan Rauch, Prophet of Political Realism chapter abstractThe quest for politically pure government has weakened democratic performance. Logrolling and earmarks help politicians with diverse interests to come together and pass legislation. Recent quests to create greater transparency and end perceived corruption make it harder for government to cut win-win deals. In addition, the rise of social media likely increases the noise and reduces the signal value of any single election. This strengthens the case for more small-stakes elections, with perhaps half or one-third of elected officials up for reelection at a time.
• 8The Hard Case of the European Union chapter abstractThe European Union is often considered an example of the failure of elite technocracy. Furthermore, there's an academic literature on the "democratic deficit" in the European Union. So it's taken for granted that the EU is insufficiently democratic and is failing at key goals. But in practice, the EU has been reasonably successful and fits normal definitions of democracy. Some of its key difficulties come instead from the supermajority and unanimity rules that are an unavoidable feature of a democracy that embraces such diverse nations. And as the chapter emphasizes, there's an important theoretical literature in the social sciences, especially work by Knut Wicksell, Nobel laureate James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock, arguing that the unanimity rule should be the starting point for democratic decision making.
• 9Singapore: Flourishing with 50% Less Democracy chapter abstractSingapore is an example of a successful economy that is much less democratic than the rich democracies of the world. It's not an example that rich democracies should widely emulate, but it's still an example to learn from. While some academics asked how countries can "Get to Denmark, " to a mix of competent government and prosperity, it's worthwhile to spend some time learning to "Get to Singapore." This chapter reviews Singapore's unique path to less democratic prosperity.
• 10Conclusion: Buying the Right Dose of Democracy chapter abstractClassical political philosophers debated which form of government was best. A number of important thinkers, from Aristotle and Xenophon to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, have concluded that a blend of multiple forms of government is the best path. With the rise of modern statistical methods and large data sets it's possible to go beyond anecdotes and test theories of which government institutions are likely to work best. Armchair theorizing has its role, but so does formal statistical evidence-and the previous chapters have brought such evidence to bear on the question of the best form of government. The conclusion offers a variety of broadly oligarchical and epistocratic proposals as suggestions for the rich democracies to consider and urges readers to weigh their preexisting ethical attitudes toward democratic governance against the evidence that slightly less democracy in the richest democracies could offer large benefits to the citizens of these nations.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

During the 2016 presidential election, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders argued that elites were hurting the economy. But, drawing together evidence and theory from across economics, political science, and even finance, Garett Jones says otherwise. In 10% Less Democracy, he makes the case that the richest, most democratic nations would be better off if they slightly reduced accountability to the voting public, turning up the dial on elite influence. To do this, Jones builds on three foundational lines of evidence in areas where he has personal experience. First, as a former staffer in the U.S. Senate, he saw how senators voted differently as elections grew closer. Second, as a macroeconomist, Jones knows the merits of "independent" central banks, which sit apart from the political process and are controlled by powerful insiders. The consensus of the field is that this detached, technocratic approach has worked far better than more political and democratic banking systems. Third, his previous research on the effects of cognitive skills on political, social, and economic systems revealed many ways in which well-informed voters improve government. Discerning repeated patterns, Jones draws out practical suggestions for fine-tuning, focusing on the length of political terms, the independence of government agencies, the weight that voting systems give to the more-educated, and the value of listening more closely to a group of farsighted stakeholders with real skin in the game-a nation's sovereign bondholders. Accessible to political news junkies while firmly rooted and rigorous, 10% Less Democracy will fuel the national conversation about what optimal government looks like.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Frontmatter
• CONTENTS
• FIGURES
• TABLES
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• A NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A Theory of Polarization in Authoritarian Regimes
• 3 The Historical Origins of Authoritarian Repression
• 4 Targeted and Widespread Repression in Authoritarian Regimes
• 5 Repression and Polarization in Tunisia, 1987-2010
• 6 Repression and Polarization in Egypt, 1981-2011
• 7 Identity and Polarization in the Lab
• 8 Polarization during Democratic Transitions
• 9 Conclusion
• APPENDIX
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• INDEX
• A NOTE ON THE TYPE

How differing forms of repression shape the outcomes of democratic transitions In the wake of the Arab Spring, newly empowered factions in Tunisia and Egypt vowed to work together to establish democracy. In Tunisia, political elites passed a new constitution, held parliamentary elections, and demonstrated the strength of their democracy with a peaceful transfer of power. Yet in Egypt, unity crumbled due to polarization among elites. Presenting a new theory of polarization under authoritarianism, After Repression reveals how polarization and the legacies of repression led to these substantially divergent political outcomes. Drawing on original interviews and a wealth of new historical data, Elizabeth Nugent documents polarization among the opposition in Tunisia and Egypt prior to the Arab Spring, tracing how different kinds of repression influenced the bonds between opposition groups. She demonstrates how widespread repression created shared political identities and decreased polarization-such as in Tunisia-while targeted repression like that carried out against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt led opposition groups to build distinct identities that increased polarization among them. This helps explain why elites in Tunisia were able to compromise, cooperate, and continue on the path to democratic consolidation while deeply polarized elites in Egypt contributed to the rapid reentrenchment of authoritarianism. Providing vital new insights into the ways repression shapes polarization, After Repression helps to explain what happened in the turbulent days following the Arab Spring and illuminates the obstacles to democratic transitions around the world.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

How differing forms of repression shape the outcomes of democratic transitions In the wake of the Arab Spring, newly empowered factions in Tunisia and Egypt vowed to work together to establish democracy. In Tunisia, political elites passed a new constitution, held parliamentary elections, and demonstrated the strength of their democracy with a peaceful transfer of power. Yet in Egypt, unity crumbled due to polarization among elites. Presenting a new theory of polarization under authoritarianism, After Repression reveals how polarization and the legacies of repression led to these substantially divergent political outcomes. Drawing on original interviews and a wealth of new historical data, Elizabeth Nugent documents polarization among the opposition in Tunisia and Egypt prior to the Arab Spring, tracing how different kinds of repression influenced the bonds between opposition groups. She demonstrates how widespread repression created shared political identities and decreased polarization-such as in Tunisia-while targeted repression like that carried out against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt led opposition groups to build distinct identities that increased polarization among them. This helps explain why elites in Tunisia were able to compromise, cooperate, and continue on the path to democratic consolidation while deeply polarized elites in Egypt contributed to the rapid reentrenchment of authoritarianism. Providing vital new insights into the ways repression shapes polarization, After Repression helps to explain what happened in the turbulent days following the Arab Spring and illuminates the obstacles to democratic transitions around the world.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

The rise of a populist conservative nationalism in the United States has triggered unease at home and abroad. Riding the populist wave, Donald Trump achieved the presidency advocating a hardline nationalist approach. Yet critics frequently misunderstand the Trump administration's foreign policy, along with American nationalism. In Age of Iron, leading authority on Republican foreign policy Colin Dueck demonstrates that conservative nationalism is the oldest democratic tradition in US foreign relations. Designed to preserve self-government, conservative nationalism can be compatible with engagement overseas. But 21st century diplomatic, economic, and military frustrations led to the resurgence of a version that emphasizes US material interests. No longer should the US allow its allies to free-ride, and nor should it surrender its sovereignty to global governance institutions. Because this return is based upon forces larger than Trump, it is unlikely to disappear when he leaves office. Age of Iron describes the shifting coalitions over the past century among foreign policy factions within the Republican Party, and shows how Trump upended them starting in 2015-16. Dueck offers a balanced summary and assessment of President Trump's foreign policy approach, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses. He also describes the current interaction of conservative public opinion and presidential foreign policy leadership in the broader context of political populism. Finally, he makes the case for a forward-leaning realism, based upon the understanding that the US is entering a protracted period of geopolitical competition with other major powers. The result is a book that captures the past, present, and, possibly, future of conservative foreign policy nationalism in the US.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Contents and AbstractsIntroduction: Aiding Freedom: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance chapter abstractThe Introduction provides an overview of U.S. foreign aid policy from Truman to Trump, including the creation of key agencies and programs such as USAID, Food for Peace, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. It highlights the long-standing conflict in U.S. foreign aid policy between supporting the common good and furthering the United States' security interests. The chapter then addresses the many foreign policy tools available to the United States in promoting human rights abroad and situates foreign aid in this context. It concludes by introducing the core argument and structure of the book.
• 1Abetting Violence: The Coercive Effect of Foreign Aid chapter abstract
• Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of why states resort to the use of violence against their citizens. It then presents a theory of the coercive effect of foreign aid based on the phenomenon of aid fungibility, which enables foreign assistance to be used as a general government resource. The coercive effect of foreign aid explains how bilateral (government-to-government) foreign aid can be as easily channeled into state violence as into economic development. The result is that states may, through foreign aid, come to possess the resources necessary to violently repress their citizens.
• 2Patterns of Foreign Aid and State Violence chapter abstractThis chapter tests the plausibility of the coercive effect of foreign aid through statistical analyses. Data on U.S. bilateral foreign assistance flows over the past forty years is used to identify broad trends in the relationship between foreign aid and various forms of state violence, including state-led killings, torture, and government repression. Other relevant factors such as the country's political regime type, natural resource wealth, level of government service provision, armed forces size, and past history of conflict are taken into account. The results show that U.S. foreign assistance is in fact associated with negative changes in a range of human rights-related behaviors. Economic aid, in particular, is found to worsen human rights.
• 3Indonesia: Arming and Oppressing chapter abstractThis chapter presents a deep historical analysis of American (and to a lesser degree, Soviet) foreign assistance to Indonesia from its independence in 1949 to the present. Foreign aid played a direct role in building up Indonesia's military strength. Economic aid from the United States, as well as Export-Import Bank loans, also contributed to the military through an income effect. The U.S. government used economic aid, and in particular, food aid, to provide general budgetary support for Suharto's government. These resources were used to fund the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), the country's armed forces. In addition to providing evidence of aid's fungibility, Indonesia illustrates the human capital dimension of the coercive effect of foreign aid. By increasing the lethality of the TNI, U.S. aid-funded military training meant that the negative effects of foreign aid for human rights endured well beyond temporary reductions or cutoffs of aid.
• 4El Salvador: Buying Guns and Butter chapter abstractThis chapter examines how both economic and military assistance from the United States supported the government of El Salvador's brutal civil war with the FMLN. The vast quantity of food aid and cash transfers (which constituted the majority of U.S. economic assistance) not only staved off the country's economic collapse but also underwrote the entirety of El Salvador's military budget. Although many have singled out U.S. military assistance as a factor prolonging the civil war, this chapter demonstrates the additional damage done by economic aid.
• 5South Korea: Constraining Coercion chapter abstractIn South Korea, more than anywhere else, the United States was directly involved in developing the state's security apparatus through foreign assistance. However, the decades of authoritarian rule that followed the end of the Korean War resulted in significant government repression but few episodes of outright state violence, in spite of sustained high levels of U.S. foreign aid. This chapter argues that the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, the threat posed by North Korea, and the noncommunist orientation of the country's political opposition constrained but did not completely eliminate the coercive effect of foreign aid.
• 6Aiding and Abetting in the Twenty-First Century chapter abstractThis chapter uses statistical analysis to examine whether the coercive effect of foreign aid was simply an outcome of Cold War geopolitics, and limited to that period. By examining differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, as well as the impact of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, this chapter presents evidence that the coercive effect of foreign aid persists today. It offers additional evidence that the harmful effects of U.S. foreign assistance are driven primarily by economic aid. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the human rights impact of U.S. foreign assistance in South Sudan, the world's newest country.
• Conclusion: Can "Do No Harm" Be Done? chapter abstractThe Conclusion highlights the main findings of the book. It then turns to the current debate over the future of U.S. foreign assistance policy, which is shaped by low levels of American public support for foreign aid and fears over geostrategic competition with China. It explores ways to avoid the coercive effect of foreign aid, including turning foreign aid over to NGOs instead of governments, and dramatically reducing U.S. foreign assistance. It argues that foreign aid will become a tool for promoting human rights only when governments act to remedy the negative effects of U.S. foreign assistance policy.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The United States is the world's leading foreign aid donor. Yet there has been little inquiry into how such assistance affects the politics and societies of recipient nations. Drawing on four decades of data on U.S. economic and military aid, Aiding and Abetting explores whether foreign aid does more harm than good. Jessica Trisko Darden challenges long-standing ideas about aid and its consequences, and highlights key patterns in the relationship between assistance and violence. She persuasively demonstrates that many of the foreign aid policy challenges the U.S. faced in the Cold War era, such as the propping up of dictators friendly to U.S. interests, remain salient today. Historical case studies of Indonesia, El Salvador, and South Korea illustrate how aid can uphold human freedoms or propagate human rights abuses. Aiding and Abetting encourages both advocates and critics of foreign assistance to reconsider its political and social consequences by focusing international aid efforts on the expansion of human freedom.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction. Mortelle démocratie
• Quand le populisme avance masqué
• La France n'est pas une île
• L'invention du techno-populisme
• L'État contre le droit
• Critique de la déraison publique
• La tentation du renoncement
• Illibéralisme et instabilité
• L'implosion nationale
• Les poisons de la peur et de la violence
• Le peuple contre la liberté
• La mondialisation du populisme
• La revanche de l'histoire et de la politique
• Les raisons de la colère
• Les décombres
• Les guerres du droit
• Un monde, deux systèmes
• Le droit, instrument des nouveaux empires
• L'Europe garde les mains propres car elle n'a pas de mains
• Le spectre des années 1930
• Guerres et crises du XXe siècle
• La naissance des totalitarismes
• Le présent des passions collectives
• Le monde d'après l'Occident
• La démondialisation est en marche
• La nouvelle guerre froide entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine
• Repli américain et désoccidentalisation du monde
• L'Europe introuvable
• La démocratie n'est pas morte
• Les lendemains du djihadisme et de la démocrature ne sont pas radieux
• Le populisme, c'est le chaos !
• Les combattants de la liberté
• Réinventer la démocratie
• Réanimer la démocratie
• Capitalisme d'innovation contre capitalisme de rente
• Un contrat économique et social inclusif et soutenable
• L'impératif de la sécurité
• Refonder l'Europe comme puissance
• La relance du couple franco-allemand
• Refonder l'Europe comme puissance souveraine
• L'Union pour la sécurité
• Conclusion. Retrouvons foi dans la liberté.

"Et si la démocratie disparaissait sous nos yeux. Impensable ? Pourtant, elle se trouve aujourd'hui en état d'urgence, menacée par ses propres citoyens tentés par la démagogie et l'autoritarisme. Loin de prendre la mesure du danger, nous détournons le regard sur la corruption insidieuse de nos institutions et de notre vie publique. Nous nous rassurons à bon compte en moquant les dirigeants populistes ou en les réduisant à une simple parenthèse qui se refermera vite. L'histoire du XXe siècle nous rappelle que la démocratie est fragile ; qu'à tout moment, l'État de droit et l'esprit de modération sur lesquels elle repose peuvent s'effondrer ; que les régimes liberticides s'installent pour durer. Il est donc grand temps de nous attaquer aux maux qui rongent nos sociétés : la montée des inégalités, le désarroi identitaire, la contagion de la violence. Les nations libres doivent reprendre en mains leur destin. Non par l'emballement des passions protectionnistes ou nationalistes mais par un travail patient pour réengager les citoyens dans la vie publique, conforter les classes moyennes, transformer le capitalisme, répondre aux défis de la révolution numérique et du changement climatique, reconstruire un ordre international. Le seul antidote efficace à la crise de la démocratie, c'est la liberté politique !"--Page 4 of cover.

• First principles: three responses
• The fundamentals: tradition, religion, morality, and the individual
• Liberty and power: the state and the free market
• The ties that bind: the local and familiar
• The exceptional nation: America and the world

What is American conservatism? What are its core beliefs and values? What answers can it offer to the fundamental questions we face in the twenty-first century about the common good and the meaning of freedom, the responsibilities of citizenship, and America’s proper role in the world? As libertarians, neoconservatives, Never Trump-ers, and others battle over the label, this landmark collection offers an essential survey of conservative thought in the United States since 1900, highlighting the centrality of four key themes: the importance of tradition and the local, resistance to an ever-expanding state, opposition to the threat of tyranny at home and abroad, and free markets as the key to sustaining individual liberty. Andrew J. Bacevich’s incisive selections reveal that American conservatism—in his words “more akin to an ethos or a disposition than a fixed ideology”—has hardly been a monolithic entity over the last 120 years, but rather has developed through fierce internal debate about basic political and social propositions. Well-known figures such as Ronald Reagan and William F. Buckley are complemented here by important but less familiar thinkers such as Richard Weaver and Robert Nisbet, as well as writers not of the political right, like Randolph Bourne, Joan Didion, and Reinhold Niebuhr, who have been important influences on conservative thinking. More relevant than ever, this rich, too often overlooked vein of writing provides essential insights into who Americans are as a people and offers surprising hope, in a time of extreme polarization, for finding common ground. It deserves to be rediscovered by readers of all political persuasions

• Question 1. Citizenship : who are "we the people"?
• George Washington to the Hebrew congregation of Newport, Rhode Island / George Washington
• Fredrick Douglass: from What to the Slave is 4th of July? / Fredrick Douglass
• Elizabeth Cady Stanton: Solitude of self / Elizabeth Cady Stanton -- Henry Cabot Lodge: Speech in the Senate on immigration / Henry Cabot Lodge
• Question 2. Equality : how can it be achieved?
• Horace Mann: from Twelfth Annual Report to the Massachusetts Board of Education / Horace Mann -- Abraham Lincoln: Speech to the 166th Ohio Regiment / Abraham Lincoln
• Jane Addams: from The subtle problems of charity / Jane Addams
• W.E.B. Du Bois: from Black Reconstruction / W.E.B. Du Bois
• Question 3. A more perfect union : what is the government for?
• James Madison: The Federalist No. 51 / James Madison
• John Marshall: from Opinion for the Court in McCulloch v. Maryland / John Marshall
• Alexis de Tocqueville: from Democracy in America / Alexis de Tocqueville
• Franklin D. Roosevelt: Address to the Commonwealth Club of California / Franklin D. Roosevelt
• Paul Nitze et al.: from NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security / Paul Nitze
• Question 4. The power of money : how to control it?
• Andrew Jackson: from Veto to the Bank Charter / Andrew Jackson
• Carl Schurz: from Address on Civil Service reform / Carl Schurz
• Theodore Roosevelt: The new nationalism / Theodore Roosevelt
• John Paul Stevens: From Dissent in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission / John Paul Stevens
• Question 5. Protest : can we disobey the law?
• Henry David Thoreau: from Civil disobedience / Henry David Thoreau
• Martin Luther King, Jr.: Letter from Birmingham Jail / Martin Luther King, Jr.
• Hannah Arendt: from Civil Disobedience / Hannah Arendt.

• Introduction--
• 1. Dawn: 1934-50--
• 2. Africa, decolonisation and human rights in the 1950s--
• 3. Political imprisonment and human rights, 1945-64--
• 4. The early years of Amnesty International, 1961-4--
• 5. 'The crisis of growth', Amnesty International 1964-68--
• 6.
• 1968: the UN Year for Human Rights--
• 7. Torture states: 1967-75--
• 8. 'All things come to those who wait': the later 1970s-- Conclusion. The winds of history.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this definitive new account of the emergence of human rights activism in post-war Britain, Tom Buchanan shows how disparate individuals, organisations and causes gradually came to acquire a common identity as 'human rights activists'. This was a slow process whereby a coalition of activists, working on causes ranging from anti-fascism, anti-apartheid and decolonisation to civil liberties and the peace movement, began to come together under the banner of human rights. The launch of Amnesty International in 1961, and its landmark winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 provided a model and inspiration to many new activist movements in 'the field of human rights', and helped to affect major changes towards public and political attitudes towards human rights issues across the globe.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Frontmatter
• The Politics of Historical Thinking
• Contents
• Introduction
• 1 Early French Liberalism: Elites and Spontaneous Order
• 2 French Liberalism after 1870: Spontaneity Amended
• 3 Twentieth-Century French Liberal Thought: "The Political" Reinterpreted
• Conclusion: Towards a French-Liberal Paradigm of Elites
• Bibliography
• Index

Despite its prominence in public discourse, the notion of elites remains a highly contested and ambiguous part of modern political discourse. This monograph rehabilitates the idea of elites and gives it a solid theoretical footing, while relating it with the historical development of liberal thought in the west. The analysis offered in the book concentrates on the tradition of liberal political thought in France, which has consistently tackled the question of the elites, their role in society, and the process of their formation. Combining theoretical insights with practical wisdom, French liberal thinkers have seen the elite as an indispensable social category and as a vehicle for the development of human liberty. In their different prescriptive doctrines, French liberal thinkers have sought to reconcile the emergence of social elites with the requirements of social and political equality, as well as with the ongoing modernization of mores and institutions. The monograph offers a unique contribution to scholarship in modern political thought by engaging analytically with the notion of elites, as well as by offering a structured discussion on the historical development of liberalism in France.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction The New World Order: The End of Social Democracy and the Rise of the Liberal Cartel The Failure of the Liberal Cartel: The Political Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2008 Varieties of Anti-System Politics The Implications of Anti-System Politics: Nationalism, Socialism, Participation.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Recent elections in the advanced western democracies have undermined the basic foundations of political systems that had previously beaten back all challenges-from both the left and the right. The election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency, only months after the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, signaled a dramatic shift in the politics of the rich democracies. In Anti-System Politics, Jonathan Hopkin traces the evolution of this shift and argues that it is a long-term result of abandoning the post-war model of egalitarian capitalism in the 1970s. That shift entailed weakening the democratic process in favor of an opaque, technocratic form of governance that allows voters little opportunity to influence policy. With the financial crisis of the late 2000s these arrangements became unsustainable, as incumbent politicians were unable to provide solutions to economic hardship. Electorates demanded change, and it had to come from outside the system. Using a comparative approach, Hopkin explains why different kinds of anti-system politics emerge in different countries and how political and economic factors impact the degree of electoral instability that emerges. Finally, he discusses the implications of these changes, arguing that the only way for mainstream political forces to survive is for them to embrace a more activist role for government in protecting societies from economic turbulence. A deeply-rooted historical analysis of arguably the most important political phenomenon in the world at present, Anti-System Politics illuminates how and why the world seems upside down.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)