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• Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation: Perspective on Future Collaborations.- A Horizon of Simulation and Gaming: Difficulties and Expectations of Facilitating Science, Technology, and Practice.- The U-Mart Project: New Research and Education Program for Market Mechanism.- The Gaming of Firm Strategy in High-Tech Industry: Human Agents and Artificial Intelligence Agents Intermingled in a Simulation Model.- Simulation Analysis Using the Garbage Can Model for Designing a Citizen Participation System for Comprehensive Municipal Planning.- Exploring Business Gaming Strategies by Learning Agents.- Business Simulator Development Cycle with Both Human and Computer Players.- Analyzing Barnga Gaming Simulation Using an Agent-Based Model.- User Type Identification in Virtual Worlds.- A Model for Collusive Tendering Based on a Multiagent Approach.- An Agent-Based Simulation Model of Disruptive Technologies.- Agent-Based Simulation on the Diffusion of Research and Development for Environmentally Conscious Products.- Evaluation of the Dealings Form in an Artificial Fruit and Vegetable Market II.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This collection of excellent papers cultivates a new perspective on agent-based social system sciences, gaming simulation, and their hybridization. Most of the papers included here were presented in the special session titled Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation at ISAGA2003, the 34th annual conference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA) at Kazusa Akademia Park in Kisarazu, Chiba, Japan, August 25-29, 2003. This post-proceedings was supported by the twenty-?rst century COE (Centers of Excellence) program Creation of Agent-Based Social Systems Sciences (ABSSS), established at the Tokyo Institute of Technology in 2004. The present volume comprises papers submitted to the special session of ISAGA2003 and provides a good example of the diverse scope and standard of research achieved in simulation and gaming today. The theme of the special session at ISAGA2003 was Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation. Nowadays, agent-based simulation is becoming very popular for modeling and solving complex social phenomena. It is also used to arrive at practical solutions to social problems. At the same time, however, the validity of simulation does not exist in the magni?cence of the model. R. Axelrod stresses the simplicity of the agent-based simulation model through the "Keep it simple, stupid" (KISS) principle: As an ideal, simple modeling is essential.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

Duke and Greenblat present three basic frame games (games for which the framework is fixed although the subject matter may change according to occasion) designed for citizen or student participation in organized discussions. The games (IMPASSE!, AT-ISSUE! and THE CONCEPTUAL MAPPING GAME) can have their content loaded in advance or provided by the participants. They will accommodate a wide range of intellectual levels and will last from an hour to a day.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Game Theory How It Is Used Imperfect and Incomplete Information Repeated Games N-Player Games.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Game theory, particularly the use of repeated games, N-person games, and incomplete information games have been popular research techniques in political science, sociology and management, but difficult for new social researchers to use until now. This book aims makes these topics accessible to all social scientists. Using a common social science game, Chicken, to illustrate the concepts, the book introduces readers to: games of incomplete information; how to build uncertainty into game theoretic models; the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium; and the role of repetition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part 1 Decision-theoretic foundations: game theory, rationality and intelligence-- basic concepts of decision theory-- axioms-- the expected-utility maximization theorem-- equivalent representations-- Bayesian conditional-probability systems-- limitations of the Bayesian model-- domination-- proofs of the domination theorems.
• Part 2 Basic models: games in extensive form-- strategic form and the normal representation-- equivalance of strategic-form games-- reduced normal representations-- elimination of dominated strategies-- multiagent representations-- common knowledge-- Bayesian games-- modelling games with incomplete information.
• Part 3 Equilibria of strategic-form games: domination and rationalizability-- Nash equilibrium-- computing Nash equilibria-- significance of Nash equilibria-- the focal-point effect-- the decision-analytic approach to games-- evolution, resistance and risk dominance-- two-person zero-sum games-- Bayesian equilibria-- purification of randomized strategies in equilibria-- auctions-- proof of existence of equilibrium-- infinite strategy sets.
• Part 4 Sequential equilibria of extensive-form games: mixed strategies and behavioural strategies-- equilibria in behavioural strategies-- sequential rationality at information states with positive probability-- consistent beliefs and sequential rationality at all information states-- computing sequential equilibria-- subgame-perfect equilibria-- games with perfect information-- adding chance events with small probability-- forward induction-- voting and binary agendas-- technical proofs.
• Part 5 Refinements of equilibrium in strategic form: perfect equilibria-- existence of perfect and sequential equilibria-- proper equilibria-- persistent equilibria-- stable sets of equilibria-- general properties-- conclusions.
• Part 6 Games with communication: contracts and correlated strategies-- correlated equilibria-- Bayesian games with communication-- Bayesian collective-choice problems and Bayesian bargaining problems-- trading problems with linear utility-- general participation constraints for Bayesian games with contracts-- sender-receiver games-- acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria-- communication in extensive-form and multistage games.
• Part 7 Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma-- a general model of repeated games-- stationary equilibria of repeated games with complete state information and discounting-- repeated games with standard information - examples-- general feasibility theorems for standard repeated games-- finitely repeated games and the role of initial doubt-- imperfect observability of moves-- repeated games in large decentralized groups-- repeated games with incomplete information-- continuous time-- evolutionary simulation of repeated games. (Part Contents).
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface
• 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises
• 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises
• 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises
• 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises
• 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises
• 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note
• 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises
• 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises
• 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note
• 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Roger Myerson's introductory text aims to provide a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of nonco-operative and co-operative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the advances made in the subject over the past 15 years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part 1 Decision-theoretic foundations: game theory, rationality and intelligence-- basic concepts of decision theory-- axioms-- the expected-utility maximization theorem-- equivalent representations-- Bayesian conditional-probability systems-- limitations of the Bayesian model-- domination-- proofs of the domination theorems.
• Part 2 Basic models: games in extensive form-- strategic form and the normal representation-- equivalance of strategic-form games-- reduced normal representations-- elimination of dominated strategies-- multiagent representations-- common knowledge-- Bayesian games-- modelling games with incomplete information.
• Part 3 Equilibria of strategic-form games: domination and rationalizability-- Nash equilibrium-- computing Nash equilibria-- significance of Nash equilibria-- the focal-point effect-- the decision-analytic approach to games-- evolution, resistance and risk dominance-- two-person zero-sum games-- Bayesian equilibria-- purification of randomized strategies in equilibria-- auctions-- proof of existence of equilibrium-- infinite strategy sets.
• Part 4 Sequential equilibria of extensive-form games: mixed strategies and behavioural strategies-- equilibria in behavioural strategies-- sequential rationality at information states with positive probability-- consistent beliefs and sequential rationality at all information states-- computing sequential equilibria-- subgame-perfect equilibria-- games with perfect information-- adding chance events with small probability-- forward induction-- voting and binary agendas-- technical proofs.
• Part 5 Refinements of equilibrium in strategic form: perfect equilibria-- existence of perfect and sequential equilibria-- proper equilibria-- persistent equilibria-- stable sets of equilibria-- general properties-- conclusions.
• Part 6 Games with communication: contracts and correlated strategies-- correlated equilibria-- Bayesian games with communication-- Bayesian collective-choice problems and Bayesian bargaining problems-- trading problems with linear utility-- general participation constraints for Bayesian games with contracts-- sender-receiver games-- acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria-- communication in extensive-form and multistage games.
• Part 7 Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma-- a general model of repeated games-- stationary equilibria of repeated games with complete state information and discounting-- repeated games with standard information - examples-- general feasibility theorems for standard repeated games-- finitely repeated games and the role of initial doubt-- imperfect observability of moves-- repeated games in large decentralized groups-- repeated games with incomplete information-- continuous time-- evolutionary simulation of repeated games. (Part Contents).
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface
• 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises
• 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises
• 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises
• 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises
• 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises
• 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note
• 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises
• 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises
• 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note
• 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Roger Myerson's introductory text aims to provide a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of nonco-operative and co-operative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the advances made in the subject over the past 15 years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models. Written as an introductory text, it looks at the subject from the viewpoint of a newcomer to the field, beginning with utility theory and arriving at the most sophisticated ideas discussed today.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part 1 Decision-theoretic foundations: game theory, rationality and intelligence-- basic concepts of decision theory-- axioms-- the expected-utility maximization theorem-- equivalent representations-- Bayesian conditional-probability systems-- limitations of the Bayesian model-- domination-- proofs of the domination theorems.
• Part 2 Basic models: games in extensive form-- strategic form and the normal representation-- equivalance of strategic-form games-- reduced normal representations-- elimination of dominated strategies-- multiagent representations-- common knowledge-- Bayesian games-- modelling games with incomplete information.
• Part 3 Equilibria of strategic-form games: domination and rationalizability-- Nash equilibrium-- computing Nash equilibria-- significance of Nash equilibria-- the focal-point effect-- the decision-analytic approach to games-- evolution, resistance and risk dominance-- two-person zero-sum games-- Bayesian equilibria-- purification of randomized strategies in equilibria-- auctions-- proof of existence of equilibrium-- infinite strategy sets.
• Part 4 Sequential equilibria of extensive-form games: mixed strategies and behavioural strategies-- equilibria in behavioural strategies-- sequential rationality at information states with positive probability-- consistent beliefs and sequential rationality at all information states-- computing sequential equilibria-- subgame-perfect equilibria-- games with perfect information-- adding chance events with small probability-- forward induction-- voting and binary agendas-- technical proofs.
• Part 5 Refinements of equilibrium in strategic form: perfect equilibria-- existence of perfect and sequential equilibria-- proper equilibria-- persistent equilibria-- stable sets of equilibria-- general properties-- conclusions.
• Part 6 Games with communication: contracts and correlated strategies-- correlated equilibria-- Bayesian games with communication-- Bayesian collective-choice problems and Bayesian bargaining problems-- trading problems with linear utility-- general participation constraints for Bayesian games with contracts-- sender-receiver games-- acceptable and predominant correlated equilibria-- communication in extensive-form and multistage games.
• Part 7 Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma-- a general model of repeated games-- stationary equilibria of repeated games with complete state information and discounting-- repeated games with standard information - examples-- general feasibility theorems for standard repeated games-- finitely repeated games and the role of initial doubt-- imperfect observability of moves-- repeated games in large decentralized groups-- repeated games with incomplete information-- continuous time-- evolutionary simulation of repeated games. (Part Contents).
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Game theory deals with questions that are basic to all social sciences; it offers insight into any economic, political, or social situation that involves people with different goals or preferences. This book presents some of the most important models, solution concepts, and resutls of noncooperative and cooperative game theory, as well as the methodological principles that have guided the development of the fundamental models of game theory: games in extensive form and strategic form and Bayesian games with incomplete information. He defines Nash equilibria, sequential equilibria, and other equlibrium concepts and discusses their uses and limitations. He also covers incentive compatibility in games with communication, repeated games, two-person bargaining problems, cooperative solutions for coalitional games, and cooperation under uncertainty.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation: Perspective on Future Collaborations.- A Horizon of Simulation and Gaming: Difficulties and Expectations of Facilitating Science, Technology, and Practice.- The U-Mart Project: New Research and Education Program for Market Mechanism.- The Gaming of Firm Strategy in High-Tech Industry: Human Agents and Artificial Intelligence Agents Intermingled in a Simulation Model.- Simulation Analysis Using the Garbage Can Model for Designing a Citizen Participation System for Comprehensive Municipal Planning.- Exploring Business Gaming Strategies by Learning Agents.- Business Simulator Development Cycle with Both Human and Computer Players.- Analyzing Barnga Gaming Simulation Using an Agent-Based Model.- User Type Identification in Virtual Worlds.- A Model for Collusive Tendering Based on a Multiagent Approach.- An Agent-Based Simulation Model of Disruptive Technologies.- Agent-Based Simulation on the Diffusion of Research and Development for Environmentally Conscious Products.- Evaluation of the Dealings Form in an Artificial Fruit and Vegetable Market II.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This collection of excellent papers cultivates a new perspective on agent-based social system sciences, gaming simulation, and their hybridization. Most of the papers included here were presented in the special session titled Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation at ISAGA2003, the 34th annual conference of the International Simulation and Gaming Association (ISAGA) at Kazusa Akademia Park in Kisarazu, Chiba, Japan, August 25-29, 2003. This post-proceedings was supported by the twenty-?rst century COE (Centers of Excellence) program Creation of Agent-Based Social Systems Sciences (ABSSS), established at the Tokyo Institute of Technology in 2004. The present volume comprises papers submitted to the special session of ISAGA2003 and provides a good example of the diverse scope and standard of research achieved in simulation and gaming today. The theme of the special session at ISAGA2003 was Agent-Based Modeling Meets Gaming Simulation. Nowadays, agent-based simulation is becoming very popular for modeling and solving complex social phenomena. It is also used to arrive at practical solutions to social problems. At the same time, however, the validity of simulation does not exist in the magni?cence of the model. R. Axelrod stresses the simplicity of the agent-based simulation model through the "Keep it simple, stupid" (KISS) principle: As an ideal, simple modeling is essential.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

The concepts of game theory (rationality etc) now pervade much of social science, so that Professor Zagare's exposition of game theory and its applications (intended to "convert the unconverted and initiate the uninitiated") is very welcome. He provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players. Diverse examples give the reader an idea of how the theory can be applied to a wide range of situations.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface
• Chapter 1: Evolutionary game theory
• Chapter 2: All those puzzling voting mysteries!
• Chapter 3: Voting theory applied elsewhere
• Chapter 4: Voting: Symmetry and decompositions
• Chapter 5: Game theory: A decomposition
• Chapter 6: The reductionist approach Bibliography Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The mathematical challenges coming from the social and behavioral sciences differ significantly from typical applied mathematical concerns. ""Change, "" for instance, is ubiquitous, but without knowing the fundamental driving force, standard differential and iterative methods are not appropriate. Although differing forms of aggregation are widely used, a general mathematical assessment of potential pitfalls is missing. These realities provide opportunities to create new mathematical approaches. These themes are described in an introductory, expository, and accessible manner by exploring new ways to handle dynamics and evolutionary game theory, to identify subtleties of decision and voting methods, to recognize unexpected modeling concerns, and to introduce new approaches with which to examine game theory. Applications range from avoiding undesired consequences when designing policy to identifying unanticipated voting (where the ""wrong"" person could win), nonparametric statistical, and economic ""supply and demand"" properties.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Rules of play: the starting point matters--
• 2. The anticipation problem: there may be no resolution--
• 3. Magnanimity: it sometimes pays--
• 4. Moving power: breaking the cycle--
• 5. Order and threat power: eliminating indeterminacy and communicating intentions--
• 6. Information in games: misperceptions, deception, and omniscience--
• 7. Incomplete information in larger games: a model of negotiations--
• 8. Summary and conclusions.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Steven J. Brams' Theory of Moves, though based on the classical theory of games, proposes changes in its rules to render it a truly dynamic theory. By postulating that players think ahead not just to the immediate consequences of making moves, but also to the consequences of countermoves to these moves, counter-countermoves, and so on, it extends the strategic analysis of conflicts into the more distant future. It elucidates the role that different kinds of power - moving, order and threat - may have on conflict outcomes, and it also shows how misinformation affects player choices. Applied to a series of cases drawn from politics, economics, sociology, fiction and the Bible, the theory provides not only a parsimonious explanation of their outcomes, but also shows why they unfolded as they did. This book, which assumes no prior knowledge of game theory or special mathematical background, will be of interest to scholars and students throughout the social sciences.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction An Approach to Game Design The 'What' and 'Why' of Gaming Seeking an Appropriate Gaming-Simulation An Overview of the Design Process Setting Objectives and Parameters Model Development Decisions about Representation Questions of Style Decisions about Representation Questions of Form From Representation to Construction The Four Case Studies Continued Construction and Modification Preparing Your Gaming-Simulation for Use by Others.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The first comprehensive, systematic, illustrated guide to designing games and simulations for use in teaching, training, policy-making and research. Greenblat covers both model development and how to translate a model into a game format. She covers such practical steps as: setting up objectives; making decisions about representation; how to construct, field test and modify the game/simulation; how to prepare it for use by others - including preparation of an operator's manual and arranging its publication. The key element of Designing Games and Simulations is the extensive set of illustrative materials. Four case studies of design are described at length; more than 70 games and simulations are used as examples and 92 figures show how top designers have made different decisions.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)