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Book
220 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
  • 1. Introduction, Marco Sgarbi and Matteo Cosci (University Ca' Foscari Venice, Italy) 2. Existence and Modality in Avicenna's Syllogistic, Allan Back (Kutztown University, USA) 3. Ideology and "Reception" in Renaissance Logic, Alan R. Perreiah (University of Kentucky, USA) 4. Syllogistic and Formal Reasoning: the Cartesian Critique, Stephen Gaukroger (University of Sydney, Australia) 5. Hobbes and the Syllogism, Douglas Jesseph (University of South Florida, USA) 6. Syllogism in the Port-Royal Logic, Russel Wahl (Idaho State University, USA) 7. Locke and Syllogism. The "Perception grounded" Logic of the Way of Ideas, Davide Poggi (Universita di Verona, Italy) 8. Leibniz's Transformation of the Theory of the Syllogism into an Algebra of Concepts, Wolfgang Lenzen (Universitat Osnabruck, Germany) 9. Kant's False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures in Its Intellectual Context, Alberto Vanzo (University of Warwick, UK) 10. "Everything Rational is a Syllogism": Hegel's Logic of Inference, Georg Sans, SJ (Hochschule fur Philosophie, Munchen, Germany) Index.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9781350043527 20180306
Syllogism is a form of logical argument allowing one to deduce a consistent conclusion based on a pair of premises having a common term. Although Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop this way of reasoning, he left open a lot of conceptual space for further modifications, improvements and systematizations with regards to his original syllogistic theory. From its creation until modern times, syllogism has remained a powerful and compelling device of deduction and argument, used by a variety of figures and assuming a variety of forms throughout history. The Aftermath of Syllogism investigates the key developments in the history of this peculiar pattern of inference, from Avicenna to Hegel. Taking as its focus the longue duree of development between the Middle Ages and the nineteenth century, this book looks at the huge reworking scientific syllogism underwent over the centuries, as some of the finest philosophical minds brought it to an unprecedented height of logical sharpness and sophistication. Bringing together a group of major international experts in the Aristotelian tradition, The Aftermath of Syllogism provides a detailed, up to date and critical evaluation of the history of syllogistic deduction.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781350043527 20180306
Green Library
Book
xii, 304 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
Emotions are powerful. In newspaper headlines and on social media, they have become the primary way of understanding the world. But strong feelings make it more difficult to see the reality behind the rhetoric. In The Art of Logic, Eugenia Cheng shows how mathematical logic can help us see things more clearly - and know when politicians and companies are trying to mislead us. First Cheng explains how to use black-and-white logic to illuminate the world around us, giving us new insight into thorny political questions like public healthcare, Black Lives Matter and Brexit. Then she explains how logic and emotions, used side-by-side, can help us not only to be more rational individuals, but also to live more thoughtfully. Clear-sighted, revelatory and filled with useful real-life examples of logic and illogic at work, The Art of Logic is an essential guide to decoding modern life.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781788160384 20180910
Green Library
Book
xii, 197 pages ; 23 cm
Fallibilists claim that one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Jessica Brown offers a compelling defence of this view against infallibilists, who claim that it is contradictory to claim to know and yet to admit the possibility of error.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780198801771 20180604
Green Library
Book
272 pages ; 18 cm.
  • Les usages du concept d'intention -- L'expression d'intention revue et corrigée -- "La charte mentaliste" -- Le problème avec les intentions pures -- Formation de concept et identité conceptuelle -- Le holisme du mental -- Le monisme anomal -- Corrélations naturelles et corrélations conventionnelles -- Le véritable projet d'Anscombe -- Un humain a l'intention de faire ce qu'il fait -- Pas de modification sans aberration -- En termes de langage -- Sous une description -- Les causes mentales et la connaissance non observationnelle -- Les raisons d'agir -- Plusieurs sortes d'explications -- Le volontaire et l'intentionnel -- Connaissance et compétence -- La solution dualiste -- L'expérience de l'action -- Savoir ce que je fais et savoir que j'y parviens -- L'erreur théorique et l'erreur pratique -- L'objet de la connaissance pratique -- Les directions d'ajustement -- L'erreur pratique exclut la contingence -- La temporalité de l'action -- Savoir ce que je fais est une connaissance pratique -- L'intensionalité de la connaissance pratique -- La multiplicité des niveaux de description de l'action -- Le problème de l'individuation de l'action -- Une "thèse Anscombe-Davidson" sur l'individuation de l'action ? -- Davidson et la forme logique des phrases d'action -- Critère d'individuation de l'action et extensionnalité de l'action -- L'imbrication des descriptions de l'action : l'effet accordéon -- Ordre des descriptions et unité de l'action -- La causalité naturelle de l'action -- Le critère d'individuation, c'est la description -- Remarques conclusives sur le rôle des intentions.
"Exprimer ses intentions, c'est décrire une action présente ou future. C'est pourquoi une meilleure compréhension de l'intention exige une philosophie de l'action. Depuis la parution en 1957 de la monographie éponyme d'Elizabeth Anscombe sur l'intention, cette thèse a fait l'objet de nombreux malentendus que le présent ouvrage voudrait dissiper. Au premier chef, il y a l'idée qu'on pourrait isoler logiquement l'intention, comme un pur état d'esprit parfaitement indépendant de l'action qu'elle vise. De ce premier écueil émerge la conviction, promue entre autres par Donald Davidson et John R. Searle, qu'on pourrait traiter l'intention comme une sorte de cause spéciale de l'action ou comme un état d'esprit auquel le monde devrait s'ajuster par la réalisation de l'action. Mais l'intention ne fait pas que coïncider avec l'action. Elle ne fait pas qu'en expliciter le sens. Elle constitue un mode de description spécifique de ce qui se passe, lorsque ce qui se passe est une action. Elle dévoile ainsi l'unité de l'action à travers le temps. Avant de pouvoir s'en distinguer, l'intention est d'abord et avant tout en action."--Page 4 of cover.
Green Library
Book
503 pages ; 23 cm
  • Vorwort
  • Analytik des Verstehens
  • Formale Kennzeichen des Verstehens
  • Einleitende Begriffsklärungen : Verstehen, Auslegen, Deuten, Interpretieren, Hermeneutik, Geisteswissenschaften
  • Universalität des Verstehens?
  • Die besondere Schwierigkeit, Verstehen zu erklären : der Behaviorismus als Kurzschlussreaktion : eine Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Verstehens als Ausweg aus dem Zirkel
  • Gegenstände und Akte des Verstehens
  • Die Stufenordnung des Mentalen
  • Eigenschaften des Mentalen : das Problem des Unbewussten
  • Formen der Intentionalität
  • Formen der Rationalität
  • Ausdrucksformen des Mentalen
  • Der Ausdruck von Affekten und Emotionen
  • Die Handlung als Ausdruck von Mentalem
  • Das Werk als Ausdruck von Mentalem
  • Die sprachliche Äusserung als Ausdruck pro-positionaler Einstellungen
  • Sprache als nicht-natürliches Zeichensystem
  • Der Weg von Signalen zu einem nicht-natürlichen Zeichensystem
  • Sprache als willkürliches Zeichensystem
  • Die Funktionen der Sprache und die Natur von Sprechakten
  • Die Abweichungen der menschlichen Sprache von dem Ideal einer logischen Kunstsprache : Nicht-verbale Kommunikation; indirekte Mitteilung; die poetische Funktion der Sprache
  • Verstehen der Ausdrucksformen des Mentalen
  • Formen des Verstehens : Perzeptuelles, noetisches und noematisches Verstehen
  • Zum perzeptuellen Verstehen : Prinzipien der Textkritik : Perzeptuelles Verstehen und ästhetischer Genuss
  • Zum noetischen Verstehen : Theoretisches, widerhallendes und sympathetisches Verstehen : Internes und externes noetisches Verstehen
  • Zum noematischen Verstehen : Explizites und impliziertes Noema : Jemanden besser verstehen, als er sich selbst versteht : Produktive Missverständnisse
  • Direktes und erschliessendes Verstehen : Verstehen und Erklären
  • Verstehen der vier Ausdrucksformen des Mentalen
  • Verstehen des Ausdrucks von Affekten
  • Handlungsverstehen
  • Werkverstehen
  • Sprachverstehen
  • Wann muss Verstehen sich an der Autorintention orientieren, wann darf oder muss es sie überschreiten?
  • Beispiele legitimen und illegitimen Uberschreitens der Autorintention
  • Das besondere Problem des Auslegens von mehreren Autoren verfasster, zumal autoritativer Texte
  • Jurisprudenz
  • Theologie
  • Die Verflechtung der Geisteswissenschaften mit den anderen Wissenschaften
  • Deuten der Wirklichkeit und der Geistesgeschichte
  • Bedingungen der Möglichkeit des Verstehens : Transzendentalphilosophie und objektiver Idealismus
  • Transzendentale ästhetik der Hermeneutik : Was wahrgenommen werden muss, damit Verstehen möglich ist
  • Transzendentale Logik der Hermeneutik : Unterstellung von Rationalität
  • Transzendentale Pragmatik der Hermeneutik : Unterstellung von Rationalität zweiter Ordnung und Kooperationswille
  • Dialektik des Verstehens
  • Behavioristische Hermeneutik : die Fokussierung auf das Verhalten bei Quine
  • Noetische Hermeneutik : die Fokussierung auf das Erleben bei Dilthey
  • Die Ursachen des mentalen Lebens : Quellen und die Absicht zu wirken
  • Die unbewussten Ursachen : Freuds psychoanalytische Hermeneutik
  • Die Wirkungen des mentalen Lebens : Gadamers Projekt
  • Noematische Hermeneutik
  • Legitimer und illegitimer Anachronismusvorwurf
  • Leo Strauss' Verfolgungshermeneutik
  • Werk ohne Subjekt
  • Eine kurze Geschichte der Hermeneutik
  • Antike und Mittelalter : Wahrheit statt Sinn
  • Warum es in der klassischen Antike keine philosophische Hermeneutik gibt
  • Interpretation autoritativer Texte, zumal der Bibel
  • Augustinus' Synthese von Zeichenphilosophie und Bibelhermeneutik
  • Mittelalterliche Innovationen
  • Das Verstehen von Sinn unabhängig von seiner Wahrheit
  • Spinozas Revolution der biblischen Hermeneutik
  • Die Herausforderung des Historismus
  • Von Vico zu Schleiermacher
  • Die Selbstaufhebung des Historismus bei Dilthey
  • Die Wiedergewinnung der Wahrheitsdimension der Hermeneutik bei Gadamer und Davidson
  • Die Geisteswissenschaften der Zukunft
  • Anhang
  • Bibliographie
  • Personenregister.
Green Library
Book
xviii, 229 pages ; 24 cm
When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. Not all misleading arguments wear their flaws on their sleeve. Each step of a misleading argument might seem compelling and you might not be able to figure out what's wrong with it. Still, even if you can't figure out what's wrong with an argument, you can know that it's misleading. One way to know that an argument is misleading is, counterintuitively, to lack expertise in the methods and evidence-types employed by the argument. When you know that a counterargument is misleading, you shouldn't engage with it open-mindedly and sometimes shouldn't engage with it at all. You shouldn't engage open-mindedly because you shouldn't be willing to reduce your confidence in response to arguments you know are misleading. And you sometimes shouldn't engage closed-mindedly, because to do so can be manipulative or ineffective. In making this case, Jeremy Fantl discusses echo chambers and group polarization, the importance in academic writing of a sympathetic case for the opposition, the epistemology of disagreement, the account of open-mindedness, and invitations to problematic academic speakers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780198807957 20180717
Green Library
Book
viii, 133 pages ; 25 cm.
  • The early history of logical form
  • Preamble
  • Aristotle
  • The stoics
  • Logic in the middle ages
  • Leibniz's dream
  • The ideal of logical perfection
  • Frege
  • Russell
  • Wittgenstein
  • A logically perfect language
  • The old conception of logical form
  • Formal languages and natural languages
  • Tarski's method
  • Davidson's program
  • Montague semantics
  • The current conception of logical form
  • Two open questions
  • Logical form and syntactic structure
  • The uniqueness thesis
  • Intrinsicalism
  • LF
  • Semantic structure
  • Relationality in formal explanation
  • Further clarifications
  • Logical form and truth conditions
  • The truth-conditional notion
  • Truth conditions and propositions
  • Adequate formalization
  • A truth-conditional account
  • Logical form as a property of propositions
  • Extrinsicalism
  • Logical knowledge vs knowledge of logical form
  • Preliminaries
  • Logical identity and logical distinctness
  • Distinct objects must be denoted by distinct names
  • Distinct names must denote distinct objects
  • Logical knowledge
  • Linguistic competence and rationality
  • Validity
  • Interpretations of arguments
  • Validity and formal validity
  • The sorites
  • The fallacy of equivocation
  • Context-sensitive arguments
  • Quantified sentences
  • Two questions about quantified sentences
  • Quantifiers
  • Meaning and truth conditions
  • The issue of first order definability
  • Two kinds of formal variation
  • Conclusion
  • Further issues concerning quantification
  • Two kinds of indeterminacy
  • Precisifications of quantifier expressions
  • First order definability again
  • Logicality
  • Quantification over absolutely everything
  • Unrestricted quantification and precision
  • Afterword.
Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9783319741536 20180530
Green Library
Book
271 p. ; 24 cm
SAL3 (off-campus storage)
Book
xx, 342 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Green Library
Book
vi, 305 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
  • 1. Introduction. A Naturalist Landscape Sorin Bangu 2. Psychology and the A Priori Sciences Penelope Maddy 3. Reasoning, Rules, and Representation Paul D. Robinson and Richard Samuels 4. Numerical Cognition and Mathematical Knowledge: The Plural Property View Byeong-uk Yi 5. Intuitions, Naturalism, and Benacerraf's Problem Mark Fedyk 6. Origins of Numerical Knowledge Karen Wynn 7. What Happens When a Child Learns to Count?: The Development of the Number Concept Kristy vanMarle 8. Seeing Numbers as Affordances Max Jones 9. Testimony and Children's Acquisition of Number Concepts Helen De Cruz 10. Which Came First, the Number or the Numeral? Jean-Charles Pelland 11. Numbers through Numerals: The Role of External Representations Dirk Schlimm 12. Making Sense of Numbers without a Number Sense Karim Zahidi and Erik Myin 13. Beyond Peano: Looking Into the Unnaturalness of Natural Numbers Josephine Relaford-Doyle and Rafael Nunez 14. Beauty and Truth in Mathematics: Evidence from Cognitive Psychology Rolf Reber 15. Mathematical Knowledge, the Analytic Method, and Naturalism Fabio Sterpetti.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9781138244108 20180611
This book is meant as a part of the larger contemporary philosophical project of naturalizing logico-mathematical knowledge, and addresses the key question that motivates most of the work in this field: What is philosophically relevant about the nature of logico-mathematical knowledge in recent research in psychology and cognitive science? The question about this distinctive kind of knowledge is rooted in Plato's dialogues, and virtually all major philosophers have expressed interest in it. The essays in this collection tackle this important philosophical query from the perspective of the modern sciences of cognition, namely cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Naturalizing Logico-Mathematical Knowledge contributes to consolidating a new, emerging direction in the philosophy of mathematics, which, while keeping the traditional concerns of this sub-discipline in sight, aims to engage with them in a scientifically-informed manner. A subsequent aim is to signal the philosophers' willingness to enter into a fruitful dialogue with the community of cognitive scientists and psychologists by examining their methods and interpretive strategies.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781138244108 20180611
Green Library
Book
xviii, 356 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
  • Notes on Contributors Introduction â Marek Hetmanski 1 Minimal Expressivism and the Meaning of Practical Rationality â Maria Jose Frapolli and Neftali Villanueva 2 Group Decision Making as Rational Undertaking: Rationality Attributed or Described? â Marek Hetmanski 3 It Takes Effort to be (Collectively) Rational: Group as a Reasoning Agent â Barbara Trybulec 4 Seeing What a "Science of Rationality" Founders on (with a Little Help from Donald Davidson) â Sofia Miguens and Joao Alberto Pinto 5 Soft Rationality and Reticulated Universality: Reflecting on the Debate between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam â Angeles J. Perona 6 From Volleying to Distributed Embodied Rationality â Manuel de Pinedo 7 Psychology and the Norms of Rationality â Rui Sampaio da Silva 8 Inferentialism, Rationality, and Value-driven Epistemology â Jesus Zamora-Bonilla 9 Rational Decisions and Wise Decisions: Two Names for the Same Thing? â Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik 10 The Means-End Rationality and Constitutive Elements of Action â Monika Walczak 11 Moral Conditions for Methodologically Rational Decisions â Jan Franciszek Jacko 12 Cognition and Rationality: Writing Straight with Crooked Lines? â Antonio Zilhao 13 When being Right is Not Good Enough: How Systematic Cognitive Biases Affect Decision Making Strategies â Marcin Rzadeczka 14 Heuristics: Daniel Kahneman vs Gerd Gigerenzer â Anna Wojtowicz and Jan Winkowski 15 Rationality and Psychological Accuracy of Risky Choice Models Based on Option- vs. Dimension-wise Evaluation â Joanna Sokolowska 16 Rationality in the Material World â Marcin Trybulec 17 Neurath's Decisionism and the Earliest Reviews of Logical Empiricism â Artur Koterski 18 From Pure Reason to Vital Reason: A Few Remarks on Ratiovitalism by Jose Ortega Y Gasset â Krzysztof Polit Index.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9789004357235 20180416
Rationality and Decision Making: From Normative Rules to Heuristics offers a broad overview of both classic and very recent discussions concerning rationality and strategies of individual and group decision making. They are considered from a methodological, ethical, sociological, historical, cultural as well as an evolutionary perspective. Decision making, both rational and irrational, is treated in its complexity as an algorithmic, heuristic and intuitive process. The volume analyzes the theoretical and practical aspects of decision making in individual intentional endeavors and group or institutionalized undertakings. The analyses are mostly theoretical but they also appeal to empirical studies, proposed by philosophers and cognitive scientists who have studied logical, cognitive, biological, social and evolutionary aspects of human rationality. Contributors include Maria Jose Frapolli, Marek Hetmanski, Jan F. Jacko, Artur Koterski, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Sofia Miguens, Angeles J. Perona, Manueal de Pinedo, Joao Alberto Pinto, Krzysztof Polit, Marcin Rzadeczka, Rui Sampaio da Silva, Joanna Sokolowska, Barbara Trybulec, Marcin Trybulec, Neftali Villanueva, Monika Walczak, Jan Winkowski, Anna Wojtowicz, Jesus Zamora-Bonilla, and Antonio Zilhao.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9789004357235 20180416
Green Library
Book
xxi, 136 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
  • PART I. Models with Set of Designated Points 1. The basic logic Bc and its semantics 2. Completeness of Bc 3. Extensions of Bc PART II. Models without a Set of Designated Points 4. The logic BK 5. Extensions of BK PART III. Formulations by Means of a Falsity Constant 6. The logics B+, F and BK+, F 7. Definitional equivalence PART IV. Relevance and Intuitionistic-Type Negations 8. The logic RBc and its extensions 9. The logic RB+, t, F and its extensions.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9780081007518 20180306
Routley-Meyer Ternary Relational Semantics for Intuitionistic-type Negations examines how to introduce intuitionistic-type negations into RM-semantics. RM-semantics is highly malleable and capable of modeling families of logics which are very different from each other. This semantics was introduced in the early 1970s, and was devised for interpreting relevance logics. In RM-semantics, negation is interpreted by means of the Routley operator, which has been almost exclusively used for modeling De Morgan negations. This book provides research on particular features of intuitionistic-type of negations in RM-semantics, while also defining the basic systems and many of their extensions by using models with or without a set of designated points.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780081007518 20180306
Green Library
Book
x, 249 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
This book aims to provide a solution to the semantic paradoxes. It argues for a unified solution to the paradoxes generated by our concepts of denotation, predicate extension, and truth. The solution makes two main claims. The first is that our semantic expressions 'denotes', 'extension' and 'true' are context-sensitive. The second, inspired by a brief, tantalizing remark of Goedel's, is that these expressions are significant everywhere except for certain singularities, in analogy with division by zero. A formal theory of singularities is presented and applied to a wide variety of versions of the definability paradoxes, Russell's paradox, and the Liar paradox. Keith Simmons argues that the singularity theory satisfies the following desiderata: it recognizes that the proper setting of the semantic paradoxes is natural language, not regimented formal languages; it minimizes any revision to our semantic concepts; it respects as far as possible Tarski's intuition that natural languages are universal; it responds adequately to the threat of revenge paradoxes; and it preserves classical logic and semantics. Simmons draws out the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary views of our semantic concepts, and concludes that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationism.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780198791546 20180723
Green Library
Book
xlvii, 168 pages ; 24 cm
  • Editors' introduction Walter Carnielli, Frederique Janssen-Lauret and William Pickering-- W. V. O. Quine's philosophical development in the 1930s and 1940s Frederique Janssen-Lauret-- The Significance of the New Logic W. V. O. Quine-- Appendix. The United States and the revival of logic W. V. O. Quine.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107179028 20180611
W. V. Quine was one of the most influential figures of twentieth-century American analytic philosophy. Although he wrote predominantly in English, in Brazil in 1942 he gave a series of lectures on logic and its philosophy in Portuguese, subsequently published as the book O Sentido da Nova Logica. The book has never before been fully translated into English, and this volume is the first to make its content accessible to Anglophone philosophers. Quine would go on to develop revolutionary ideas about semantic holism and ontology, and this book provides a snapshot of his views on logic and language at a pivotal stage of his intellectual development. The volume also includes an essay on logic which Quine also published in Portuguese, together with an extensive historical-philosophical essay by Frederique Janssen-Lauret. The valuable and previously neglected works first translated in this volume will be essential for scholars of twentieth-century philosophy.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107179028 20180611
Green Library
Book
xiv, 237 pages ; 21 cm
Green Library
Book
xiv, 237 pages ; 21 cm
  • Preface: Why I wrote this book
  • Introduction: Our cultural rut
  • So close and yet so far
  • Toxic talk
  • The sound of silencing
  • What arguments can do
  • Why to learn how to argue
  • How to spot arguments
  • How to stop arguments
  • How to complete arguments
  • How to evaluate arguments
  • How to avoid fallacies
  • How to refute arguments
  • Conclusion: Rules to live by.
"In a polarized world, a good argument can help create understanding, respect, and compromise. The key is the word "good" : arguments should not resort to put-downs, abuse, accusations, or avoidance of issues. Sinnott-Armstrong shows readers what arguments are-- and what good they can do. When one understands and appreciates strong evidence, it is not necessary to "win" the argument merely to engage in constructive conversations."-- Adapted from back cover and preface.
Law Library (Crown)
Book
vii, 196 pages ; 23 cm
Should you care less about your distant future? What about events in your life that have already happened? How should the passage of time affect your planning and assessment of your life? Most of us think it is irrational to ignore the future but completely harmless to dismiss the past. But this book argues that rationality requires temporal neutrality: if you are rational you don't engage in any kind of temporal discounting. The book draws on puzzles about real-life planning to build the case for temporal neutrality. How much should you save for retirement? Does it make sense to cryogenically freeze your brain after death? How much should you ask to be compensated for a past injury? Will climate change make your life meaningless? Meghan Sullivan considers what it is for you to be a person extended over time, how time affects our ability to care about ourselves, and all of the ways that our emotions might bias our rational planning. Drawing substantially from work in social psychology, economics and the history of philosophy, the book offers a systematic new theory of rational planning.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780198812845 20180813
Green Library
Book
xiv, 239 pages ; 25 cm.
  • Suboptimality and pretence
  • Interests
  • Methodological suboptimality
  • Consequence
  • Pretendism
  • A research model for fiction
  • The specialness of fiction
  • Data
  • Unengageability
  • The suboptimality of the formal
  • Error theory again
  • Sherlock Regnant
  • Miracles and abductions
  • What readers know
  • Causal response cognition
  • Reading the world
  • Information
  • Empty revelations
  • Mysticism
  • Truth-making
  • A taxonomy for fiction
  • Revisiting illusion
  • Imagination
  • Making and telling
  • Sites and possible worlds
  • Fictionalism
  • Sherlock
  • Converting facts into never-have-beens
  • A metasemantic interlude
  • History-constitutivity
  • Transauctorial identity
  • Nonesuches
  • "Sherlock"
  • Roots of reference
  • Names and necessity
  • Ambiguity
  • The law of non-contradiction
  • Salty tears and racing hearts
  • Affective relations
  • The causal powers of texts
  • With understanding
  • Psychology
  • A glimpse of an old-fashioned semantics
  • A whiff of mereology
  • Other things Sherlock isn't
  • Hypothetical objects
  • Meinongean objects
  • Possibilia
  • Objects actual, abstract and artefactual
  • Dialethic objects, an exception
  • Foundation and method
  • Contra sites
  • Putting inconsistency in its place
  • Doubting the no-contradiction solution
  • Some further facts about inconsistency
  • Real world inconsistency-management
  • Methodological primitives
  • Keith
  • Models and formal representations
  • Formal semantics
  • Philosophy's enthusiasm for formal representability
  • Deflation and reinflation
  • Regimentation and canonical notation
  • Demonstrating formal representability
  • Where are we now?
  • Curtain
  • Bibliography of selected works
  • Index.
This monograph examines truth in fiction by applying the techniques of a naturalized logic of human cognitive practices. The author structures his project around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting it right? What would it take to write a book about truth in fiction as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? It is argued that the most semantically distinctive feature of the sentences of fiction is that they areunambiguously true and false together. It is true that Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street and also concurrently false that he did. A second distinctive feature of fiction is that the reader at large knows of this inconsistency and isn't in the least cognitively molested by it. Why, it is asked, would this be so? What would explain it? Two answers are developed. According to the no-contradiction thesis, the semantically tangled sentences of fiction are indeed logically inconsistent but not logically contradictory. According to the no-bother thesis, if the inconsistencies of fiction were contradictory, a properly contrived logic for the rational management of inconsistency would explain why readers at large are not thrown off cognitive stride by their embrace of those contradictions. As developed here, the account of fiction suggests the presence of an underlying three - or four-valued dialethic logic. The author shows this to be a mistaken impression. There are only two truth-values in his logic of fiction. The naturalized logic of Truth in Fiction jettisons some of the standard assumptions and analytical tools of contemporary philosophy, chiefly because the neurotypical linguistic and cognitive behaviour of humanity at large is at variance with them. Using the resources of a causal response epistemology in tandem with the naturalized logic, the theory produced here is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to a circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of language and cognition.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9783319726571 20180618
Green Library

19. Believable evidence [2017]

Book
vii, 267 pages ; 24 cm
  • Part I. Solid Metaethical Foundations: 1. The standard story-- 2. The beast of two burdens-- 3. Extreme psychologism about reasons-- 4. Truthy-- Part II. Sound Epistemological Structure: 5. Truthy psychologism-- 6. Truthy psychologism gives us everything we want-- 7. If E then EB?-- 8. If TB then E?-- Part III. Fruitful Metaepistemic Soil: 9. Who can tell us why to care about the evidence?-- 10. Truthy psychologism and the authority of evidence.
  • (source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107188600 20170717
Believable Evidence argues that evidence consists of true beliefs. This claim opens up an entirely overlooked space on the ontology of evidence map, between purely factualist positions (such as those of Williamson and Dancy) and purely psychologist ones (such as that of Conee and Feldman). Velislava Mitova provides a compelling three-level defence of this view in the first contemporary monograph entirely devoted to the ontology of evidence. First, once we see the evidence as a good reason, metaethical considerations show that the evidence must be psychological and veridical. Second, true belief in particular allows epistemologists to have everything they want from the concept of evidence. Finally, the view helps us locate the source of the normative authority of evidence. The book challenges a broad range of current views on the ontology of reasons and their normative authority, making it a must-read for scholars and advanced students in metaethics and epistemology.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9781107188600 20170717
Green Library
Book
viii, 302 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
Explanatory reasoning is ubiquitous. Not only are rigorous inferences to the best explanation used pervasively in the sciences, this kind of reasoning is common in everyday life. Despite its widespread use, inference to the best explanation is still in need of precise formulation, and it remains controversial. On the one hand, supporters of explanationism take inference to the best explanation to be a justifying form of inference; some even take all justification to be a matter of explanatory reasoning. On the other hand, critics object that inference to the best explanation is not a fundamental form of inference, and some argue that we should be skeptical of inference to the best explanation in general. This volume brings together twenty philosophers to explore various aspects of inference to the best explanation and the debates surrounding it. These specially commissioned essays constitute the cutting edge of research on the role explanatory considerations play in epistemology and philosophy of science.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)9780198746904 20180129
Green Library