Fort Monroe, Va. : Military History Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1997, 1996.
Book — x, 160 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm.
This historical study treats the development of the Army's first doctrine for the post-Cold War. Raised to new prominence in the modernization and reform of the United States Army of the 1970s-1980s, Army operational doctrine was rendered obsolescent in the early l990s by the Cold War's end and by the advanced military technological capabilities demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War. The new doctrine formulated under General Frederick Franks, Commanding General of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, sprang from the assumptions of a new strategic era. In the process of rethinking war fighting, a new dynamics of battle emerged, and a new operational doctrine was formulated. This study is intended to present a critical documented record of that important event in late-20th century American Army history. Treated are: its listurical antecedents, strategic context, study and formulation, finished results, propagation, and the mecloanics of the effort. This monograph is additionally intended to provided, in its ideational detail, a case-study of the intellectual and institutional processes involved, for use by future doctrine planners.
Fort Monroe, Va. : Military History Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1996. 1997 Fort Monroe, Va. : Military History Office, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command ; Washington, D.C. : Center of Military History, United States Army