• Introduction. Enfermement et évasion
• L'identité brisée de la personne chrétienne
• L'identité renouvelée par les affects
• L'identité confessante (saint Augustin)
• La personne indéfinissable (Boèce et Thomas d'Aquin)
• L'identité absolue de la personne moderne
• La personne au-delà de l'anthropologie (Kant)
• L'identité absolue du je pur (Husserl)
• L'identité de la personne commune (Scheler)
• L'identité répondante
• Crise et identité liturgique
• L'identité dramatique
• L'identité impossible (Levinas)
• Conclusion. La personne à l'épreuve de sa différence.

"L'identité personnelle n'est pas l'identité de la chose, et pourtant l'ombre de la chose se retrouve encore dans bien des philosophies de la personne, quand elles veulent identifier une constance venant absolument de soi. Or, la constance proprement humaine ne saurait être un repli sur des caractères figés, et elle doit au contraire être pensée dynamiquement comme une réponse toujours ouverte et inquiète à ce qui nous touche au-delà de ce que nous pouvons recevoir. La philosophie médiévale de saint Augustin à saint Thomas d'Aquin a donné à penser et à vivre une identité brisée de la personne. La philosophie moderne (Kant) et la phénoménologie (Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Maldiney) permettent, elles, de redécouvrir cette identité impossible, voire anarchique, qui est notre avenir avant d'être notre présent et notre passé. Comprendre philosophiquement" la personne en tant que "créature", comme un être qui est pour autre chose que lui-même, c'est alors pouvoir surmonter les multiples formes du nihilisme actuel qui enferment l'homme dans des identités mortes. Dès lors, élucider cette différence personnelle, qui n'est plus la particularité d'un genre, mais la dimension dramatique, active, de l'existence, permet de mettre en lumière le fait que la signification éthique de la personne est toujours première."--Page 4 of cover.

• Introduction--
• 1. Meaning--
• 2. Logic--
• 3. Negation--
• 4. Nothing--
• 5. Not--
• 6. No.--
• 7. Falsity.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book argues that the meaning of negation, perhaps the most important logical constant, cannot be defined within the framework of the most comprehensive theory of proof-theoretic semantics, as formulated in the influential work of Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz. Nils Kurbis examines three approaches that have attempted to solve the problem - defining negation in terms of metaphysical incompatibility; treating negation as an undefinable primitive; and defining negation in terms of a speech act of denial - and concludes that they cannot adequately do so. He argues that whereas proof-theoretic semantics usually only appeals to a notion of truth, it also needs to appeal to a notion of falsity, and proposes a system of natural deduction in which both are incorporated. Offering new perspectives on negation, denial and falsity, his book will be important for readers working on logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

Gloss on Raghunathaśiromaṇi's Dīdhiti, commentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, basic work on neo-Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy.

Meditations, aphorisms, maxims, notes, and comments construct a philosophy of thought congruent with the inconsistency of our reality.Those who continue to think never return to their point of departure. -- InconsistenciesThese 130 short texts -- aphoristic, interlacing, and sometimes perplexing -- target a perennial philosophical problem: Our consciousness and our experience of reality are inconsistent, fragmentary, and unstable; God is dead, and our identity as subjects discordant. How can we establish a new mode of thought that does not cling to new gods or the false security of rationality? Marcus Steinweg, as he did in his earlier book The Terror of Evidence, constructs a philosophical position from fragments, maxims, meditations, and notes, formulating a philosophy of thought that expresses and enacts the inconsistency of our reality. Steinweg considers, among other topics, life as a game ("To think is to play because no thought is firmly grounded"); sexuality ("wasteful, contradictory, and contingent"); desire ("Desire has a thousand names; It's earned none of them"); reality ("overdetermined and excessively complex"); and world ("a nonconcept"). He disposes of philosophy in one sentence ("Philosophy is a continual process of its own redefinition.") but spends multiple pages on "A Tear in Immanence, " invoking Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and others. He describes "Wandering with Foucault" ("Thought entails wandering as well as straying into madness") and brings together Derrida and Debord. He poses a question: "Why should a cat be more mysterious than a dog?" and later answers one: "Beauty is truth because truth is beauty." By the end, we have accompanied Steinweg on converging trains of thought. "Thinking means continuing to think, " he writes, adding "But thinking can only pose questions by answering others." The question of inconsistency? Asked and answered, and asked.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)