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• Reasoning about games
• Dynamic models of rational deliberation in games / Eric Pacuit
• Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games / Giacomo Bonanno
• Finite reasoning procedures for dynamic games / Andrés Perea
• Formal frameworks for strategies
• Logics for reasoning about strategic abilities in multi-player games / Nils Bulling, Valentin Goranko, and Wojciech Jamroga
• Using STIT theory to talk about strategies / Jan Broersen and Andreas Herzig
• Automata and compositional strategies in extensive form games / Soumya Paul, R. Ramanujam, and Sunil Simon
• Languages for imperfect information / Gabriel Sandu
• Strategies in social situations
• Strategies of persuasion, manipulation and propaganda: Psychological and social aspects / Michael Franke and Robert van Rooij
• Strategies in social software / Jan van Eijck
• Future perspective
• Logic of strategies: What and how? / Johan van Benthem.

Strategic behavior is the key to social interaction, from the ever-evolving world of living beings to the modern theatre of designed computational agents. Strategies can make or break participants' aspirations, whether they are selling a house, playing the stock market, or working toward a treaty that limits global warming. This book aims at understanding the phenomenon of strategic behavior in its proper width and depth. A number of experts have combined forces in order to create a comparative view of the different frameworks for strategic reasoning in social interactions that have been developed in game theory, computer science, logic, linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive and social sciences. The chapters are organized in three topic-based sections, namely reasoning about games; formal frameworks for strategies; and strategies in social situations. The book concludes with a discussion on the future of logical studies of strategies.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Preliminaries:
• 1. Bargaining-equilibrium analysis: a new approach to game theory and to the analysis of social behavior--
• 2. Rational-choice models of social behavior--
• 3. Rational behavior under certainty, risk, and uncertainty--
• 4. Morality and social welfare A constructive approach-- Part II. General principles:
• 5. Some basic concepts of game theory--
• 6. Rationality postulates for game situations--
• 7. The four basic problems facing the players of a game-- Part III. Solutions for specific classes of games:
• 8. Two-person simple bargaining games: the Nash solution--
• 9. General two-person cooperative games--
• 10. n-Person simple bargaining games--
• 11. n-Person cooperative games with transferable utility: the modified Shapley value--
• 12. n-person cooperative games: the general case--
• 13. n-Person cooperative games: discriminatory solutions--
• 14. Noncooperative and almost-noncooperative games.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a rational manner.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book draws on ideas from philosophical logic, computational logic, multi-agent systems, and game theory to offer a comprehensive account of logic and games viewed in two complementary ways. It examines the logic of games: the development of sophisticated modern dynamic logics that model information flow, communication, and interactive structures in games. It also examines logic as games: the idea that logical activities of reasoning and many related tasks can be viewed in the form of games. In doing so, the book takes up the "intelligent interaction" of agents engaging in competitive or cooperative activities and examines the patterns of strategic behavior that arise. It develops modern logical systems that can analyze information-driven changes in players' knowledge and beliefs, and introduces the "Theory of Play" that emerges from the combination of logic and game theory. This results in a new view of logic itself as an interactive rational activity based on reasoning, perception, and communication that has particular relevance for games. Logic in Games, based on a course taught by the author at Stanford University, the University of Amsterdam, and elsewhere, can be used in advanced seminars and as a resource for researchers.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of Illustrations vii List of Tables ix Foreword xi Preface xiii Introduction 1
• Chapter 1: The Hi-Lo Paradox 35
• Chapter 2: Groups 69
• Chapter 3: The Evolution of Group Action 95
• Chapter 4: Team Thinking 120 Conclusion 155 References 203 Index 211.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves (or "frame") their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups (or "teams"), each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal. Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Sex and justice--
• 2. Commitment--
• 3. Mutual aid--
• 4. Correlated convention--
• 5. The evolution of meaning.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand the social contract. The book is not technical and requires no special background knowledge. As such, it could be enjoyed by students and professionals in a wide range of disciplines: political science, philosophy, decision theory, economics and biology.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface
• 1. Principles of Rational Decision Two Paradigms of Rational Decision Expected Utility The Theory of Games Integrating the Two Paradigms
• 2. Dynamic Deliberation: Equilibria Deliberational Dynamics and Game Theory Deliberational Equilibria Games Played by Bayesian Deliberators Equilibrium Selection The Bayes Dynamics Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Normal Form Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium for the Extensive Form Correlated Equilibria Equilibria and Rationality
• 3. Dynamic Deliberation: Stability Dynamic Stability of Equilibria Imprecise Priors and Elicitation through Deliberation Structural Stability I Structural Stability II Stability and Rationality
• 4. The Value of Knowledge Good Thinking Probable Knowledge Ramsey's Anticipation Dynamic Probability and Generalized Learning Generalized Learning Generalized Generalized Causal Decision Theory Deliberational Equilibrium Reconsidered M Is for Martingale
• 5. Dynamic Coherence Pumping Gold Coherent Expectations Utility Prevision and Measure Coherent Preferences and Upper and Lower Probabilities Dynamic Coherence Bayes' Rule Bayes' Method Probability Kinematics Black-Box Learning and Higher-Order Probabilities Rules and Reference Coherence and Deliberation
• 6. Good Habits On the Rational Stability of Good Habits Finite Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Beyond Common Knowledge of Rationality Choosing Good Habits Just Habits The Social Contract Revisited Taking Turns Good Habits and Game Theory
• 7. Prospects for a Theory of Rational Deliberation Consistency Proofs Causal Independence and Rationalizability Nash Equilibrium Reconsidered Dynamics Fictitious Play by Carnapians More Sophisticated Deliberators The Tracing Procedure Toward a Theory of Dynamic Deliberation Appendix. Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer Notes References Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Brian Skyrms constructs a theory of dynamic deliberation and uses it to investigate rational decisionmaking in cases of strategic interaction. This illuminating book will be of great interest to all those in many disciplines who use decision theory and game theory to study human behavior and thought. Skyrms begins by discussing the Bayesian theory of individual rational decision and the classical theory of games, which at first glance seem antithetical in the criteria used for determining action. In his effort to show how methods for dealing with information feedback can be productively combined, the author skillfully leads us through the mazes of equilibrium selection, the Nash equilibria for normal and extensive forms, structural stability, causal decision theory, dynamic probability, the revision of beliefs, and, finally, good habits for decision. The author provides many clarifying illustrations and a handy appendix called Deliberational Dynamics on Your Personal Computer. His powerful model has important implications for understanding the rational origins of convention and the social contract, the logic of nuclear deterrence, the theory of good habits, and the varied strategies of political and economic behavior.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)