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• Preface-- Introduction Jon Elster--
• 1. Selfdeception and the voter's illusion George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky--
• 2. The goals and strategies of self-deception David Pears--
• 3. Deception and division Donald Davidson--
• 4. Deception and self-deception in Stendhal Jon Elster--
• 5. Self-deception, akrasia and irrationality Amelie Oksenberg Rorty--
• 6. Beyond microeconomics George Ainslie--
• 7. The mind as a consuming organ Thomas Schelling--
• 8. Goethe's Faust, Arrow's possibility theorem and the individual decision-taker Ian Steedman and Ulrich Krause--
• 9. The Buddhist theory of 'no-self' Serge-Christophe Kolm-- Index of names.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The essays in this volume consider the question of whether the self is a unity or whether it should be conceived without metaphor as divided - as a 'multiple self'. The issue is a central one for several disciplines. It bears directly on the account of rationality and the explanation of individual decision-making and behaviour. Is the hypothesis of a multiple self required to deal with the problems of self-deception and weakness of will; and can the conceptual tools developed in the study of interpersonal conflict be applied to the analysis of intra-personal struggle? Most of the essays, by a number of leading philosophers, psychologists and economists, appear here for the first time. They bring out the interdisciplinary importance of the question, and will interest readers in all those areas. The volume will also usefully supplement The Foundations of Social Choice Theory, edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, which appears in the same series and is also concerned with the foundations of rationality.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

The essays in this volume, all of which have been specially commissioned, examine the philosophical foundations of social choice theory. This field, a modern and sophisticated outgrowth of welfare economics, is best known for a series of impossibility theorems, of which the first and most crucial was proved by Kenneth Arrow in 1950. That has often been taken to show the impossibility of democracy as a procedure for making collective decisions. However, this interpretation is challenged by several of the contributors here. Other central issues discussed in the volume include the possibility of making interpersonal comparisons of utility, the question of whether all preferences are equally to be valued, and the normative individualism underlying the theoretical tradition. Criticisms of social choice theory are advanced and suggestions for alternative approaches are developed.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)