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• Notes on Contributors ix Editors' Introduction xv About the Editors xix Part I Intellectual Foundations 1
• 1 Adorno: A Biographical Sketch 3 Peter E. Gordon
• 2 Adorno's Inaugural Lecture: The Actuality of Philosophy in the Age of Mass Production 21 Roger Foster
• 3 Reading Kierkegaard 35 Marcia Morgan
• 4 Guilt and Mourning: Adorno's Debt to and Critique of Benjamin 51 Alexander Stern
• 5 Adorno and the Second Viennese School 67 Sherry D. Lee Part II Cultural Analysis 85
• 6 The Culture Industry 87 Fred Rush
• 7 Adorno and Horkheimer on Anti-Semitism 103 Fabian Freyenhagen
• 8 Adorno and Jazz 123 Andrew Bowie
• 9 Adorno's Democratic Modernism in America: Leaders and Educators as Political Artists 139 Shannon Mariotti
• 10 Inhuman Methods for an Inhumane World: Adorno's Empirical Social Research, 1938-1950 153 Charles Clavey Part III History and Domination 173
• 11 Adorno and Blumenberg: Nonconceptuality and the Bilderverbot 175 Martin Jay
• 12 Philosophy of History 193 Iain Macdonald
• 13 The Anthropology in Dialectic of Enlightenment 207 Pierre-Francois Noppen
• 14 Adorno's Reception of Weber and Lukacs 221 Michael J. Thompson
• 15 Adorno's Aesthetic Model of Social Critique 237 Andrew Huddleston
• 16 The Critique of the Enlightenment 251 Martin Shuster Part IV Social Theory and Empirical Inquiry 271
• 17 "Nothing is True Except the Exaggerations:" The Legacy of the Authoritarian Personality 273 David Jenemann
• 18 Exposing Antagonisms: Adorno on the Possibilities of Sociology 287 Matthias Benzer and Juljan Krause
• 19 Adorno and Marx 303 Peter Osborne
• 20 Adorno's Three Contributions to a Theory of Mass Psychology and Why They Matter 321 Eli Zaretsky
• 21 Adorno and Postwar German Society 335 Jakob Norberg Part V Aesthetics 349
• 22 Aesthetic Autonomy 351 Owen Hulatt
• 23 Adorno and Literary Criticism 365 Henry W. Pickford
• 24 Adorno as a Modernist Writer 383 Richard Eldridge
• 25 Adorno's Aesthetic Theory 397 Eva Geulen
• 26 Aesthetic Theory as Social Theory 413 Peter Uwe Hohendahl
• 27 Adorno, Music, and the Ineffable 427 Michael Gallope
• 28 Adorno and Opera 443 Richard Leppert Part VI Negative Dialectics 457
• 29 What is Negative Dialectics?: Adorno's Reevaluation of Hegel 459 Terry Pinkard
• 30 Adorno's Critique of Heidegger 473 Espen Hammer
• 31 Concept and Object: Adorno's Critique of Kant 487 J. M. Bernstein
• 32 Critique and Disappointment: Negative Dialectics as Late Philosophy 503 Max Pensky
• 33 Negative Dialectics and Philosophical Truth 519 Brian O'Connor
• 34 Adorno and Scholem: The Heretical Redemption of Metaphysics 531 Asaf Angermann
• 35 Adorno's Concept of Metaphysical Experience 549 Peter E. Gordon Part VII Ethics and Politics 565
• 36 After Auschwitz 567 Christian Skirke
• 37 Forever Resistant? Adorno and Radical Transformation of Society 583 Maeve Cooke
• 38 Adorno's Materialist Ethic of Love 601 Kathy J. Kiloh
• 39 Adorno's Metaphysics of Moral Solidarity in the Moment of its Fall 615 James Gordon Finlayson Index 631.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

A definitive contribution to scholarship on Adorno, bringing together the foremost experts in the field As one of the leading continental philosophers of the last century, and one of the pioneering members of the Frankfurt School, Theodor W. Adorno is the author of numerous influential-and at times quite radical-works on diverse topics in aesthetics, social theory, moral philosophy, and the history of modern philosophy, all of which concern the contradictions of modern society and its relation to human suffering and the human condition. Having authored substantial contributions to critical theory which contain searching critiques of the 'culture industry' and the 'identity thinking' of modern Western society, Adorno helped establish an interdisciplinary but philosophically rigorous study of culture and provided some of the most startling and revolutionary critiques of Western society to date. The Blackwell Companion to Adorno is the largest collection of essays by Adorno specialists ever gathered in a single volume. Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, this important contribution to the field explores Adorno's lasting impact on many sub-fields of philosophy. Seven sections, encompassing a diverse range of topics and perspectives, explore Adorno's intellectual foundations, his critiques of culture, his views on ethics and politics, and his analyses of history and domination. Provides new research and fresh perspectives on Adorno's views and writings Offers an authoritative, single-volume resource for Adorno scholarship Addresses renewed interest in Adorno's significance to contemporary questions in philosophy Presents over 40 essays written by international-recognized experts in the field A singular advancement in Adorno scholarship, the Companion to Adorno is an indispensable resource for Adorno specialists and anyone working in modern European philosophy, contemporary cultural criticism, social theory, German history, and aesthetics.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface and Acknowledgments viii
• Contributors ix
• Introduction: Rorty's Approach to Philosophy: Time for Reassessment 1 Alan Malachowski
• Prologue 9
• 1 Reading Rorty: A Sketch of a Plan 11 Danielle Macbeth
• Part I Early Developments 25
• 2 Was Rorty an Eliminative Materialist? 27 William Ramsey
• 3 Rorty's Philosophy of Consciousness 43 James Tartaglia
• 4 Rorty and Transcendental Arguments 59 Neil Gascoigne
• Part II Texts 79
• 5 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 81 James Tartaglia
• 6 The Uses of Philosophy after the Collapse of Metaphysics: Ironism and Liberalism in Rorty's Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity 100 Colin Koopman
• 7 Rhetoric Between Philosophy and Poetry: Rorty as Essayist 119 William M. Curtis
• 8 Rorty's Inspirational Liberalism 135 Richard J. Bernstein
• Part III Themes 147
• 9 Are Pragmatists About Truth True Democrats? 149 Pascal Engel
• 10 Richard Rorty and (the End of) Metaphysics (?) 163 David Macarthur
• 11 Rorty, Pragmatism, and Ethics: The Value of Hope 178 Marjorie C. Miller
• 12 The Center and Circumference of Knowledge: Rorty on Pragmatism and Romanticism 194 Isaac Nevo
• 13 Rorty and Analytic Philosophy 211 Gary Gutting
• 14 Speculative Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Hyperboles of Philosophy 229 Paul Trembath
• Part IV Appropriations 251
• 15 Rorty on Hegel on the Mind in History 253 Paul Redding
• 16 Rorty and the Mirror of Nietzsche 268 Steven Michels
• 17 The Truth of Being and the History of Philosophy 281 Mark Okrent
• 18 Rorty's Romantic Polytheism: The Influence of William James 297 Carol Nicholson
• 19 Inconvenient Conversational Partners: Rorty and Freud 312 Alan Malachowski
• 20 Rorty and Dewey 335 David L. Hildebrand
• 21 Common Understanding Without Uncommon Certainty: Rorty's Wittgenstein Revisited 357 Alan Malachowski
• 22 Rorty, Davidson, and Representation 370 Steven Levine
• 23 The Rorty-Habermas Debate: A Critical Appraisal 395 Anton A. van Niekerk
• Part V Culture, Politics, and Religion 411
• 24 Rorty and Literature 413 Serge Grigoriev
• 25 The Contested Marriage of Rorty and Feminism 427 Elizabeth Sperry
• 26 Rorty and Religion: Beyond the Culture Wars? 444 Molly B. Farneth
• 27 Rorty's Philosophy of Religion 456 Emil Visn?ovsky
• 28 Rorty and the Intellectual Culture of Central Europe 467 Emil Visn?ovsky, Alexander Kremer, and Krzysztof Piotr Skowro?ski
• 29 Rorty and Nihilism 482 Tracy Llanera
• 30 Rorty's Ethics of Responsibility 490 Christopher J. Voparil
• Part VI Coda 505
• 31 Poetry as (a Kind of) Philosophy: For Richard Rorty 507 Christopher Norris
• Internet Resources 528
• Index 529.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

A groundbreaking reference work on the revolutionary philosophy and intellectual legacy of Richard Rorty A provocative and often controversial thinker, Richard Rorty and his ideas have been the subject of renewed interest to philosophers working in epistemology, metaphysics, analytic philosophy, and the history of philosophy. Having called for philosophers to abandon representationalist accounts of knowledge and language, Rorty introduced radical and challenging concepts to modern philosophy, generating divisive debate through the new form of American pragmatism which he advocated and the renunciation of traditional epistemology which he espoused. However, while Rorty has been one of the most widely-discussed figures in modern philosophy, few volumes have dealt directly with the expansive reach of his thought or its implications for the fields of philosophy in which he worked. The Blackwell Companion to Rorty is a collection of essays by prominent scholars which provide close, and long-overdue, examination of Rorty's groundbreaking work. Divided into five parts, this volumecovers the major intellectual movements of Rorty's career from his early work on consciousness and transcendental arguments, to the lasting impacts of his major writings, to his approach to pragmatism and his controversial appropriations from other philosophers, and finally to his later work in culture, politics, and ethics. Offers a comprehensive, balanced, and insightful account of Rorty's approach to philosophy Provides an assessment of Rorty's more controversial thoughts and his standing as an "anti-philosopher's philosopher" Contains new and original exploration of Rorty's thinking from leading scholars and philosophers Includes new perspectives on topics such as Rorty's influence in Central Europe Despite the relevance of Rorty's work for the wider community of philosophers and for those working in fields such as international relations, legal and political theory, sociology, and feminist studies, the secondary literature surrounding Rorty's work and legacy is limited. A Companion to Rorty address this absence, providinga comprehensive resource for philosophers and general readers.
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• 1: Introduction
• 2: Bootstrapping
• 3: Scope
• 4: Normativity I
• 5: Normativity II
• 6: Belief
• 7: Intention
• 8: Conclusion.
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Rationality requires that we intend the means that we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. Instrumental Rationality explores the formulation and status of this requirement of means-ends coherence. In particular, it is concerned with understanding what means-ends coherence requires of us as believers and agents, and why. Means-ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. Nor is means-ends coherence strongly normative, such that we always ought to be means-ends coherent. A promising strategy for assessing why this requirement should exist is to consider the constitutive aim of intention. Just as belief has a constitutive aim (truth) that can explain some of the theoretical requirements of consistency and coherence governing beliefs, intention has a constitutive aim (here called "controlled action") that can explain some of the requirements of consistency and coherence governing intentions. We can therefore better understand means-ends coherence by understanding the constitutive aims of both of the attitudes governed by the requirement, intention, and belief.
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• Chapter 1. Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency (Anika Fiebich).- Part I. Minimal Cooperation.-
• Chapter 2. What is Minimally Cooperative Behaviour? (Kirk Ludwig).-
• Chapter 3. Social Groups, Roles, and Cooperation (Katherine Ritchie).-
• Chapter 4. Conversation, Context, and Joint Action (Shaun Gallagher).-
• Chapter 5. Towards a Blueprint for a Social Animal (Stephen Butterfill).-
• Chapter 6. Natural Intersubjectivity and Minimal Cooperation (Michael Wilby).-
• Chapter 7. Emerging Joint Actions (Cedric Paternotte).- Part II. Minimal Shared Agency.-
• Chapter 8. Shared Intention: If It Is "lite", Then It Is Dark (Thomas Smith).-
• Chapter 9. What do We Experience of Actions When We Act Together With a Purpose? (Corrado Sinigaglia).-
• Chapter 10. Shared Agency and the Cooperative Evolutionary Thesis (Glenda Satne).-
• Chapter 11. Group Metamemory: Does Collaborative Remembering Imply Group Metacognition? (Santiago Arango-Munoz).-
• Chapter 12. Proprietary Reasons and Shared Agency (Abraham Roth).-
• Chapter 13. The Cognitive Basis of Institutions (Francesco Guala). .
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This volume examines minimality in cooperation and shared agency from various angles. It features essays written by top scholars in the philosophy of mind and action. Taken together, the essays provide a genuine contribution to the contemporary joint action debate. The main accounts in this debate present sufficient rather than necessary or minimal criteria for there to be cooperation. Much discussion in the debate deals with robust rather than more attenuate and simple cases of cooperation or shared agency. Focusing on such minimal cases, however, may help to explain how cooperation comes into existence and how minimal cooperation interrelates with more complex cases of cooperation. The contributors discuss minimality in cooperation by focusing on particular aspects. For example, they consider how social roles might deliver minimal cooperation constraints or what the minimal contextual criteria are for cooperation to emerge. Readers will find the answers to these and other questions: What is minimally cooperative behavior? By what steps could full members of a society organized by conventions, norms and institutions be constructed from creatures with minimal social skills and cognitive abilities? What do we experience of actions when we act together with a purpose?
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Claims about what is metaphysically necessary or possible have long played a central role in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy. Such claims are traditionally thought of as aiming to describe a special kind of modal fact or property, or perhaps facts about other possible worlds. But that assumption leads to difficult ontological, epistemological, and methodological puzzles. Should we accept that there are modal facts or properties, or other possible worlds? If so, what could these things be? How could we come to know what the modal facts or properties are? How can we resolve philosophical debates about what is metaphysically necessary or possible? Norms and Necessity develops a new approach to understanding our claims about metaphysical possibility and necessity: Modal Normativism. The Normativist rejects the assumption that modal claims aim to describe modal features or possible worlds, arguing instead that they serve as useful ways of conveying, reasoning with, and renegotiating semantic rules and their consequences. By dropping the descriptivist assumption, the Normativist is able to unravel the notorious ontological problems of modality, and provide a clear and plausible story about how we can come to know what is metaphysically necessary or possible. Most importantly, this approach helps demystify philosophical methodology. It reveals that resolving metaphysical modal questions does not require a special form of philosophical insight or intuition. Instead, it requires nothing more mysterious than empirical knowledge, conceptual mastery, and an ability to explicitly convey and renegotiate semantic rules.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1: Guided Tour
• 2: The Bayesian Model (Probabilism)
• 3: The Bayesian Theory of States: Critical Discussion
• 4: The Bayesian Transition Theory: Critical Discussion
• 5: The Belief Model (AGM)
• 6: Critical Discussion of the Belief Model
• 7: Conditional Commitment and the Ramsey Test
• 8: Puzzling about Epistemic Attitudes
• 9: Belief-First Epistemology
• 10: Credence-First Epistemology: Strengths and Challenges
• 11: Force-Based Attitudes
• 12: Force-Based Confidence at Work
• 13: Inference and Rationality.
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Scott Sturgeon presents an original account of mental states and their dynamics. He develops a detailed story of coarse- and fine-grained mental states, a novel perspective on how they fit together, an engaging theory of the rational transitions between them, and a fresh view of how formal methods can advance our understanding in this area. In doing so, he addresses a deep four-way divide in literature on epistemic rationality. Formal epistemology is done in specialized languages-often seeming a lot more like mathematics than Plato-and so can alienate philosophers who are drawn to more traditional work on thought experiments in epistemic rationality. Conversely, informal epistemology appears to be a lot more like Plato than mathematics and, as such, it tends to deter philosophers drawn to formal models of the phenomena. Similarly, the epistemology of coarse-grained states boils down everything to a discussion of rational belief-making the area appear a lot more like foundations of knowledge than anything useful for the theory rational decision, such as decision-making under uncertainty. The Rational Mind unifies work in all of these areas for the first time.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• I. Background. In search of human uniqueness ; Evolutionary foundations
• II. The ontogeny of uniquely human cognition. Social cognition ; Communication ; Cultural learning ; Cooperative thinking
• III. The ontogeny of uniquely human sociality. Collaboration ; Prosociality ; Social norms ; Moral identity
• IV. Conclusion. A neo-Vygotskian theory ; The power of shared agency.

A radical reconsideration of how we develop the qualities that make us human, based on decades of cutting-edge experimental work by the former director of the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Virtually all theories of how humans have become such a distinctive species focus on evolution. Here, Michael Tomasello proposes a complementary theory of human uniqueness, focused on development. Building on the seminal ideas of Vygotsky, his data-driven model explains how those things that make us most human are constructed during the first years of a child's life. Tomasello assembles nearly three decades of experimental work with chimpanzees, bonobos, and human children to propose a new framework for psychological growth between birth and seven years of age. He identifies eight pathways that starkly differentiate humans from their closest primate relatives: social cognition, communication, cultural learning, cooperative thinking, collaboration, prosociality, social norms, and moral identity. In each of these, great apes possess rudimentary abilities. But then, Tomasello argues, the maturation of humans' evolved capacities for shared intentionality transform these abilities-through the new forms of sociocultural interaction they enable-into uniquely human cognition and sociality. The first step occurs around nine months, with the emergence of joint intentionality, exercised mostly with caregiving adults. The second step occurs around three years, with the emergence of collective intentionality involving both authoritative adults, who convey cultural knowledge, and coequal peers, who elicit collaboration and communication. Finally, by age six or seven, children become responsible for self-regulating their beliefs and actions so that they comport with cultural norms. Becoming Human places human sociocultural activity within the framework of modern evolutionary theory, and shows how biology creates the conditions under which culture does its work.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Notes on Contributors viii
• Acknowledgments xii
• Introduction 1 Graham Oppy
• Part I Individual Thinkers 13
• 1 Hume 15 Jennifer Smalligan Marusic?
• 2 Holbach 28 Michael LeBuffe and Emilie Gourdon
• 3 Marx 43 Vanessa Wills
• 4 Wollstonecraft 58 Sandrine Berges
• 5 Cady Stanton 71 Claudette Fillard
• 6 Russell 83 Carolyn Swanson
• Part II Philosophical Movements 97
• 7 Empiricism 99 Gregory Dawes
• 8 Pragmatism 111 Robert Almeder
• 9 Existentialism 123 Mariam Thalos
• 10 Postmodernism 138 Christopher Watkin
• 11 Naturalism 152 Eric Steinhart
• Part III Critiques of Theism 167
• 12 Logical Objections to Theism 169 Stephen Law
• 13 Evidential Objections to Theism 191 Herman Philipse
• 14 Normative Objections to Theism 204 Stephen Maitzen
• 15 Prudential Objections to Theism 216 Guy Kahane
• Part IV Metaphysics 235
• 16 Freedom 237 Alfred Mele
• 17 Supernatural 250 Berit Brogaard
• 18 Death 262 Beth Seacord
• Part V Epistemology 275
• 19 Skepticism 277 Duncan Pritchard
• 20 Methods of Science 291 Elliott Sober
• 21 Evidence 303 Michael Tooley
• 22 Evolution 323 Michael Ruse
• Part VI Ethics 341
• 23 Meta-Ethics 343 Elizabeth Tropman
• 24 Meaning 355 Thaddeus Metz
• 25 Normative Skepticism 367 Susana Nuccetelli
• Part VII Politics 381
• 26 Education 383 Jennifer Bleazby
• 27 Happiness 396 Gregory S. Paul
• 28 Violence 421 Steve Clarke
• 29 Church and State 436 Cristina Lafont
• Part VIII Critiques of Atheism 449
• 30 Logical Objections to Atheism 451 Christopher Gregory Weaver
• 31 Evidential Objections to Atheism 476 Helen De Cruz
• 32 Normative Objections to Atheism 491 C. Stephen Evans
• 33 Prudential Objections to Atheism 506 Amanda Askell
• Bibliography 521
• Index 565.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Philosophers throughout history have debated the existence of gods, but it is only in recent years that the absence of such a belief has become a significant topic of philosophical analysis, in particular for philosophers of religion. Although it is difficult to trace the historical contours of atheism as the lack of belief in a higher power, the reasoned, reflective, and thoughtful rejection of theism has become commonplace in many modern intellectual circles, including academic philosophy where disciplinary data indicates that a large majority of philosophers self-identify as atheists. As the first book of its kind to bring together a collection of writing on the philosophical aspects of atheism both historical and contemporary, the Companion to Atheism and Philosophy stages an explicit, constructive, and comprehensive conversation between philosophy and atheism to examine the ways in which atheist thought intersects with ideas and positions from a variety of philosophical and theological sub-disciplines. The Companion begins by addressing the foundational questions and lingering controversies which underpin philosophical thought about atheism, exploring the implications of major developments in the history of philosophy for the modern atheistic worldview. Divided into eight distinct sections, essays consider a range of thinkers who were widely believed to have been atheists--including David Hume, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton--and survey different kinds of objections to theism and atheism, including logical, evidential, normative, and prudential. Later chapters trace the relationship between atheism and metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy oriented around topics such as pragmatism, postmodernism, freedom, education, violence, and happiness. Deftly curated and thoughtfully composed, A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy is the most ambitious and authoritative account of philosophical thinking on atheism available, and is a first-rate resource for academics, professionals, and students of philosophy, religious studies, and theology.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Notes on Contributors ix
• Preface xiii
• Chronology of Nineteenth-Century Philosophers xv
• Timeline of Philosophers xvi
• Introduction 1 John Shand
• 1 Transcendental Idealism: Kant 20 John J. Callanan
• 2 Theory of Science: Fichte, Schelling 55 Gabriel Gottlieb
• 3 Absolute Idealism: Hegel 83 Sebastian Stein
• 4 The World as Will and Representation: Schopenhauer 117 Mary S. Troxell
• 5 Historicizing Naturalism: Mill, Comte 140 Christopher Macleod
• 6 The Single Individual is Higher than the Universal: Kierkegaard 160 Karl Aho and C. Stephen Evans
• 7 The Rise of Liberal Utilitarianism: Bentham, Mill 185 Piers Norris Turner
• 8 Critique of Religion: Strauss, Feuerbach, Marx 212 Todd Gooch
• 9 Historical Materialism: Marx 236 Jan Kandiyali
• 10 Philosophy and Historical Meaning: Schleiermacher, Dilthey 261 Benjamin D. Crowe
• 11 Late Utilitarian Moral Theory and Its Development: Sidgwick, Moore 281 Anthony Skelton
• 12 American Pragmatism: Peirce, James 311 Douglas McDermid
• 13 The Value of Our Values: Nietzsche 339 Andrew Huddleston
• 14 British Idealism: Green, Bradley, McTaggart 365 James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro
• 15 Neo?Kantianism: Marburg, Southwest Schools 389 Evan Clarke
• 16 The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro?German Philosophy: Brentano, Husserl 418 Guillaume Frechette
• 17 New Logic and the Seeds of Analytic Philosophy: Boole, Frege 454 Kevin C. Klement
• 18 Time, Memory and Creativity: Bergson 480 Michael R. Kelly
• Index 506.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Investigate the challenging and nuanced philosophy of the long nineteenth century from Kant to Bergson Philosophy in the nineteenth century was characterized by new ways of thinking, a desperate searching for new truths. As science, art, and religion were transformed by social pressures and changing worldviews, old certainties fell away, leaving many with a terrifying sense of loss and a realization that our view of things needed to be profoundly rethought. The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy covers the developments, setbacks, upsets, and evolutions in the varied philosophy of the nineteenth century, beginning with an examination of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, instrumental in the fundamental philosophical shifts that marked the beginning of this new and radical age in the history of philosophy. Guiding readers chronologically and thematically through the progression of nineteenth-century thinking, this guide emphasizes clear explanation and analysis of the core ideas of nineteenth-century philosophy in an historically transitional period. It covers the most important philosophers of the era, including Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Mill, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bradley, and philosophers whose work manifests the transition from the nineteenth century into the modern era, such as Sidgwick, Peirce, Husserl, Frege and Bergson. The study of nineteenth-century philosophy offers us insight into the origin and creation of the modern era. In this volume, readers will have access to a thorough and clear understanding of philosophy that shaped our world.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of contributors Acknowledgments Introduction David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro, and Kevin Toh
• 1. Peter Railton, University of Michigan 'We'll see you in court!': The Rule of Law as an Explanatory and Normative Kind
• 2. Nicholas Southwood, Australian National University Law as Conventional Norms
• 3. David Copp, University of California, Davis Legal Teleology: A Naturalist Account of the Normativity of Law
• 4. David Enoch, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?
• 5. Kathyrn Lindeman, Saint Louis University Legal Metanormativity: Lessons for and from Constitutivist Accounts in the Philosophy of Law
• 6. David Plunkett, Dartmouth College Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism
• 7. Mitchell Berman, University of Pennsylvania Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems
• 8. George Letsas, University College London Law's Full-Blooded Normativity
• 9. Stephen Finlay, University of Southern California Defining Normativity
• 10. Kevin Toh, University College London Legal Philosophy a la carte
• 11. Brian Leiter, University of Chicago Theoretical Disagreements in Law: Another Look
• 12. Teresa Marques, Logos / University of Barcelona Hybrid Dispositionalism and the Law
• 13. Alex Silk, University of Birmingham Normativity in Language and Law
• 14. Katharina Nieswandt, Concordia University Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right
• 15. Luis Duarte d'Almeida, University of Edinburgh On the Legal Syllogism
• 16. Sam Shpall, University of Sydney Dworkin's Literary Analogy
• 17. Connie Rosati, University of Arizona Constitutional Realism Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Understood one way, the branch of contemporary philosophical ethics that goes by the label "metaethics" concerns certain second-order questions about ethics-questions not in ethics, but rather ones about our thought and talk about ethics, and how the ethical facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Analogously, the branch of contemporary philosophy of law that is often called "general jurisprudence" deals with certain second order questions about law- questions not in the law, but rather ones about our thought and talk about the law, and how legal facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Put more roughly (and using an alternative spatial metaphor), metaethics concerns a range of foundational questions about ethics, whereas general jurisprudence concerns analogous questions about law. As these characterizations suggest, the two sub-disciplines have much in common, and could be thought to run parallel to each other. Yet, the connections between the two are currently mostly ignored by philosophers, or at least under-scrutinized. The new essays collected in this book are aimed at changing this state of affairs. Dimensions of Normativity collects together works by metaethicists and legal philosophers that address a number of issues that are of common interest, with the goal of accomplishing a new rapprochement between the two sub-disciplines.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg: Foreword
• 1: Richard Kimberly Heck: The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number
• 2: Patricia Blanchette: Axioms in Frege
• 3: Walter B. Pedriali: When Logic Gives Out: Frege on Basic Logical Laws
• 4: Oystein Linnebo: The Context Principle in Frege's Grundgesetze
• 5: Joan Weiner: Why Does Frege Care Whether Julius Caesar is a Numbera
• Section 10 of Basic Laws and the Context Principle
• 6: Kevin C. Klement: Grundgesetze and the Sense/Reference Distinction
• 7: Peter Simons: Double Value-Ranges
• 8: Robert C. May and Kai F. Wehmeier: The Proof of Hume's Principle
• 9: William Stirton: Frege's Theorems on Simple Series
• 10: Jamie Tappenden: Infinitesimals, Magnitudes, and Definition in Frege
• 11: Erich H. Reck: Frege's Relation to Dedekind: Basic Laws and Beyond
• 12: Michael Hallett: Frege on Creation
• 13: Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg: Mathematical Creation in Frege's Grundgesetze
• 14: Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro: Frege on the Real Numbers
• 15: Roy T. Cook: Frege's Little Theorem and Frege's Way Out
• 16: Crispin Wright: How did the serpent of inconsistency enter Frege's paradise?
• 17: Matthias Schirn: Second-Order Abstraction Before and After Russell's Paradox
• 18: Richard Kimberly Heck: Formal Arithmetic Before Grundgesetze
• 19: Michael Kremer: Definitions in Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze
• 20: Michael Beaney: A Brief History of English Translations of Frege's Writings
• 21: Michael Beaney: Translating 'Bedeutung' in Frege's Writings: A Case Study and Cautionary Tale in the History and Philosophy of Translation
• 22: Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg: Contemporary Reviews of Frege's Grundgesetze.
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The volume is the first collection of essays that focuses on Gottlob Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic (1893/1903), highlighting both the technical and the philosophical richness of Frege's magnum opus. It brings together twenty-two renowned Frege scholars whose contributions discuss a wide range of topics arising from both volumes of Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The original chapters in this volume make vivid the importance and originality of Frege's masterpiece, not just for Frege scholars but for the study of the history of logic, mathematics, and philosophy.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Mattias Skipper and Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Introduction
• 1: David Christensen: Formulating Independence
• 2: Kevin Dorst: Higher-Order Uncertainty
• 3: Anna-Maria A. Eder and Peter Broessel: Evidence of Evidence as Higher-Order Evidence
• 4: Daniel Greco: Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence
• 5: Sophie Horowitz: Predictably Misleading Evidence
• 6: Klemens Kappel: Escaping the Akratic Trilemma
• 7: Maria Lasonen-Aarnio: Higher-Order Defeat and Evincibility
• 8: Ram Neta: The Puzzles of Easy Knowledge and of Higher-Order Evidence: A Unified Solution
• 9: Mattias Skipper: Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence
• 10: Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen: Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience
• 11: Michael G. Titelbaum: Return to Reason
• 12: Daniel Whiting: Whither Higher-Order Evidence?
• 13: Timothy Williamson: Evidence of Evidence in Epistemic Logic
• 14: Alex Worsnip: Can Your Total Evidence Mislead About Itself?
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or by other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the truth of theirs contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life. But it has also become clear that higher-order evidence plays a central role in many epistemological debates, spanning from traditional discussions of internalism/externalism about epistemic justification to more recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. This volume brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a wide range of interrelated issues about higher-order evidence.
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A history of how political philosophy was recast by the rise of postwar liberalism and irrevocably changed by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice In the Shadow of Justice tells the story of how liberal political philosophy was transformed in the second half of the twentieth century under the influence of John Rawls. In this first-ever history of contemporary liberal theory, Katrina Forrester shows how liberal egalitarianism-a set of ideas about justice, equality, obligation, and the state-became dominant, and traces its emergence from the political and ideological context of the postwar United States and Britain. In the aftermath of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, Rawls's A Theory of Justice made a particular kind of liberalism essential to political philosophy. Using archival sources, Forrester explores the ascent and legacy of this form of liberalism by examining its origins in midcentury debates among American antistatists and British egalitarians. She traces the roots of contemporary theories of justice and inequality, civil disobedience, just war, global and intergenerational justice, and population ethics in the 1960s and '70s and beyond. In these years, political philosophers extended, developed, and reshaped this liberalism as they responded to challenges and alternatives on the left and right-from the New International Economic Order to the rise of the New Right. These thinkers remade political philosophy in ways that influenced not only their own trajectory but also that of their critics. Recasting the history of late twentieth-century political thought and providing novel interpretations and fresh perspectives on major political philosophers, In the Shadow of Justice offers a rigorous look at liberalism's ambitions and limits.
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• Part I: Knowledge
• 1: On the logics of knowledge and belief
• 2: Luminosity and the KK principle
• 3: Iterated belief revision
• 4: Modeling a perspective on the world
• 5: Reflection, Endorsement, Calibration
• 6: Rational reflection and the notorious unmarked clock
• 7: Expressivism and propositions
• 8: Contextualism and the logic of knowledge Part II: Conditionals
• 9: A theory of conditionals
• 10: Conditional assertions and conditional propositions
• 11: Counterfactuals and probability
• 12: Dispositions and chance.
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Robert C. Stalnaker presents a set of essays on the structure of inquiry. In the first part he focuses on the concepts of knowledge, belief, and partial belief, and on the rules and procedures we use - or ought to use - to determine what to believe, and what to claim that we know. In the second part he examines conditional statements and conditional beliefs, their role in epistemology, and their relations to causal and explanatory concepts, such as dispositions, objective chance, relations of dependence, and independence. A central concern of the book is the interaction of different cognitive perspectives - the ways in which the attitudes of rational agents are or should be influenced by critical reflection on their present cognitive situation, on their own cognitive situations at other times, and on the cognitive situations of others with whom they interact. The general picture that is developed is naturalistic, following Hume in rejecting a substantive role for pure reason in the defense of inductive rules, and in giving causal concepts a central role in the description and explanation of our cognitive practices. However, Stalnaker rejects the side of Hume that aims to reduce concepts involving natural necessity to more basic descriptive concepts. Instead, he argues that the development of inductive rules and practices takes place in interaction with the development of concepts for giving a theoretical description of the world.
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• Preface
• 1: Semantic Analysis and Metaphysical Inquiry
• 2: The Metaphysical Modesty of Narrowly Linguistic Semantics
• 3: The Way of Ideas and the Way of Reference
• 4: Some Considerations against the Way of Ideas
• 5: Modesty as Incompleteness: Feature or Bug?
• 6: Against the Metaphysical Transparency of Semantic Adicity
• 7: Metaphysical Embarrassment, Indefinite Modifiability and Rules of Use
• 8: Conclusion: A Way Forward in Semantics and Metaphysics.
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Meaning Diminished examines the complex relationship between semantic analysis and metaphysical inquiry. Kenneth A. Taylor argues that we should expect linguistic and conceptual analysis of natural language to yield far less metaphysical insight into what there is - and the nature of what there is - than many philosophers have imagined. Taking a strong stand against the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy, Taylor contends that philosophers as diverse as Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, Frege, with his aspirational Platonism, Carnap with his distinction between internal and external questions, and Strawson, with his descriptive metaphysics, have placed too much confidence in the ability of linguistic and conceptual analysis to achieve deep insight into matters of ultimate metaphysics. He urges philosophers who seek such insight to turn away from the interrogation of language and concepts and back to the more direct interrogation of reality itself. In doing so, he maps out the way forward toward a metaphysically modest semantics, in which semantics carries less weighty metaphysical burdens, and toward a revisionary and naturalistic metaphysics, untethered to the a priori analysis of ordinary language.
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• Sophia Vasalou: Introduction
• 1: Terence Irwin: Magnanimity as Generosity
• 2: Christopher Gill: Stoic Magnanimity
• 3: Jennifer A. Herdt: Strengthening Hope for the Greatest Things: Aquinas s Redemption of Magnanimity
• 4: John Marenbon: Magnanimity, Christian Ethics and Paganism in The Latin Middle Ages
• 5: Sophia Vasalou: Greatness of Spirit in the Arabic Tradition
• 6: Michael Moriarty: Cartesian Generosite and its Antecedents
• 7: Ryan P. Hanley: Magnanimity and Modernity: Greatness of Soul and Greatness of Mind in the Enlightenment
• 8: Emily Brady: The Kantian Sublime and Greatness of Mind
• 9: Andrew Huddleston: Nietzsche on Magnanimity, Greatness and Greatness of Soul
• 10: Andrew J. Corsa and Eric Schliesser: A Composite Portrait of a True American Philosophy on Magnanimity
• 11: Kristjan Kristjansson: 21st Century Magnanimity: The Relevance of Aristotle s Ideal of Megalopsychia for Current Debates in Moral Psychology, Moral Education and Moral Philosophy
• 12: Robert C. Roberts: Greatness of Soul Across the Ages.
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Magnanimity is a virtue that has led many lives. Foregrounded early on by Plato as a philosophical virtue par excellence, it became one of the crown jewels in Aristotle's account of human excellence and was accorded equally salient place by other ancient thinkers. It is one of the most distinctive elements of the ancient tradition to filter into the medieval Islamic and Christian worlds. It sparked important intellectual engagements and went on to carve deep tracks through several of the later philosophies to inherit from this tradition. Under changing names and reworked forms, it would continue to breathe in the thought of Descartes and Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche. Its many lives have been joined by important continuities, yet they have also been fragmented by discontinuities - discontinuities reflecting larger shifts in ethical perspectives and competing answers to questions about the nature of the good life, the moral nature of human beings, and their relationship to the social and natural world they inhabit. They have also been punctuated by moments of intense controversy in which the vision of human greatness has itself been called into doubt. The aim of this volume is to provide an insight into the complex trajectory of a virtue whose glitter has at times been as dazzling as it has been divisive. By exploring the many lives it has lived, we will be in a better position to evaluate whether this is a virtue we still want to make central to our own ethical lives, and why.
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The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality--namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.
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• Introduction: Strivers
• Recognizing the ethical costs of upward mobility
• Situating ethical costs in context
• Navigating an evolving identity
• Resisting complicity
• Constructing an ethical narrative
• Conclusion: Minimizing and mitigating ethical costs

The ethical and emotional tolls paid by disadvantaged college students seeking upward mobility and what educators can do to help these students flourish Upward mobility through the path of higher education has been an article of faith for generations of working-class, low-income, and immigrant college students. While we know this path usually entails financial sacrifices and hard work, very little attention has been paid to the deep personal compromises such students have to make as they enter worlds vastly different from their own. Measuring the true cost of higher education for those from disadvantaged backgrounds, Moving Up without Losing Your Way looks at the ethical dilemmas of upward mobility-the broken ties with family and friends, the severed connections with former communities, and the loss of identity-faced by students as they strive to earn a successful place in society. Drawing upon philosophy, social science, personal stories, and interviews, Jennifer Morton reframes the college experience, factoring in not just educational and career opportunities but also essential relationships with family, friends, and community. Finding that student strivers tend to give up the latter for the former, negating their sense of self, Morton seeks to reverse this course. She urges educators to empower students with a new narrative of upward mobility-one that honestly situates ethical costs in historical, social, and economic contexts and that allows students to make informed decisions for themselves. A powerful work with practical implications, Moving Up without Losing Your Way paves a hopeful road so that students might achieve social mobility while retaining their best selves.
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Terence Irwin's edition of the Nicomachean Ethics offers more aids to the reader than are found in any modern English translation. It includes an Introduction, headings to help the reader follow the argument, explanatory notes on difficult or important passages, and a full glossary explaining Aristotle's technical terms. The Third Edition offers additional revisions of the translation as well as revised and expanded versions of the notes, glossary, and Introduction. Also new is an appendix featuring translated selections from related texts of Aristotle.
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