%{search_type} search results

• Acknowledgements
• Preface to the 2019 edition
• Introduction
• Gambling with other people's money
• Did creditors expect to get rescued?
• What about equity holders?
• Heads : they win a ridiculously enormous amount : tails : they win just an enormous amount
• How creditor rescue and housing policy combined with regulation to blow up the housing market
• Fannie and Freddie
• Fannie and Freddie : cause or effect?
• Commercial banks and investment banks
• Picking up nickels
• Basel : faulty
• Where do we go from here?
• Notes
• Index
• About the author.

What caused the Financial Crisis of 2008? While government mandates and private sector mistakes did contribute to the crisis and can be blamed at least in part for what happened, this book takes a different approach. Russ Roberts argues that the true underlying cause of the mess was the past bailouts of large financial institutions that allowed these institutions to gamble carelessly because they were effectively using other people's money. The author warns that despite the passage of Dodd-Frank, it is widely believed that we have done nothing to eliminate 'Too Big to Fail.' That perception allows the largest financial institutions to continue to gamble with taxpayer money.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

Distinguished economist Michael D. Bordo argues for the importance of monetary stability and monetary rules, offering theoretical, empirical, and historical perspectives to support his case. He shows how the pursuit of stable monetary policy guided by central banks following rule-like behavior produces low and stable inflation, stable real performance, and encourages financial stability. In contrast, he explains how the failure to adhere to rules that produce monetary stability will inevitably produce the dire consequences of real, nominal, and financial instability. Bordo examines theoretical perspectives in monetary theory on the case for stable money and the importance of monetary rules. The author also looks at the historical and empirical record of economic performance (both inflation and real output) across policy regimes. He examines the performance of the Federal Reserve in its pursuit of discretionary monetary policy, and he reviews the history of monetary policy during the Great Depression.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

As a response to the Great Depression and an expression of executive power, President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal is widely understood as a turning point in American history. In How Public Policy Became War, David Davenport and Gordon Lloyd go even further, calling the New Deal ""America's French Revolution, "" refashioning American government and public policy in ways that have grown to epic proportions today. Roosevelt's decisions of 1933 were truly revolutionary. They reset the balance of power away from Congress and the states toward a strong executive branch. They shifted the federal government away from the Founders' vision of deliberation and moderation toward war and action. Succeeding presidents seized on the language of war to exert their will and extend their power into matters previously thought to be the province of Congress or state and local governments. Having learned that a sense of crisis is helpful in moving forward a domestic agenda, modern-day presidents have declared war on everything from poverty and drugs to crime and terror. Exploring the consequences of these ill-defined (and never-ending) wars, How Public Policy Became War calls for a re-examination of this destructive approach to governance and a return to the deliberative vision of the Founders. ""If we are constantly at war, "" the authors write, ""America becomes a nation under siege.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface: spiritus mundi
• Introduction : Bloody Sunday
• Looking for the Heart of the Revolution (1916-1917)
• The World of Tomorrow (1800s-1921)
• Russian Roulette (1921-1928)
• The End of Reason (1928-1932)
• Voyage of discovery (1932-1935)
• Trone's America (1935-1936)
• A simple matter of perspective (1936-1940)
• Investigating Trone, investigating the world (1940-1949)
• End game (1945, 1945-1953)
• Bibliography

• List of Illustrations
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Chronology of events
• Abbreviations and Archives
• 1. "Just Be Careful, Remember How Frightening Everything Is for Us" : The Problem of the Zhivago Royalties
• 2. "Moscow Has Ears Everywhere!" : From Pasternak's Death to the Arrests of Olga Ivinskaya and Irina Emelianova
• 3. "We Need to Help the Russians Save Face" : The Ivinskaya Case in the West
• Documentary Appendix
• Bibliography
• About the Author
• Index.

The conflict between Soviet Communists and Boris Pasternak over the publication of Doctor Zhivago did not end when he won the Nobel Prize, or even when the author died. Paolo Mancosu tells how Pasternak's expulsion from the Soviet Writers' Union left him in financial difficulty. Milan publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli and Sergio d'Angelo, who had brought the typescript of Doctor Zhivago to Feltrinelli, were among those who arranged a smuggling operation to help him.After Pasternak's death, Olga Ivinskaya, his companion, literary assistant, and the inspiration for Zhivago's Lara, also received some of the Zhivago royalties. After the KGB intercepted Pasternak's will on her behalf, the Soviets arrested and sentenced her and her daughter, Irina Emelianova, to eight years and three years of labor camp, respectively. The ensuing international outrage inspired a secret campaign in the West to win their freedom.Mancosu's new book-the first to explore the post-Nobel history of Pasternak and Ivinskaya-provides extraordinary detail on these events, in a thrilling account that involves KGB interceptions, fabricated documents, smugglers, and much more. While a general reader will respond to the dramatic human story, specialists will be rewarded with a rich assemblage of new archival material, especially letters of Pasternak, Ivinskaya, Feltrinelli, and d'Angelo from the Hoover Institution Library and Archives and the Feltrinelli Archives in Milan.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of Figures and Tables
• Foreword
• 1. Setting the Stage
• 2. September 2001-July 2003: NATO Absence
• 3. August 2003-September 2008: NATO Getsinto the Game
• 4. October 2008-December 2014: NATO Surges
• 5. Why Cohesion Endured under Adversity
• Appendix 1: Command Structures (OEF and ISAF), 2001-2012
• Appendix 2: ISAF Rotations and Commanders
• Appendix 3: Coalition Force Levels
• Appendix 4: Provincial Reconstruction Teams
• Glossary
• Notes
• References
• About the Author
• Index

When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became involved in security operations during the War in Afghanistan, it faced a range of complex challenges, including a highly motivated Afghan insurgency that changed over time and repeatedly defied assumptions. Conflicts within NATO also posed challenges. The alliance brought together a quarter of the world's nations, each with its own goals and interests, in an effort to stabilize an agrarian country that posed no immediate security threat. For more than a decade, through changes in leadership and strategy, the nations experienced bitter disagreements, resentments, and a conflict that escalated to a level of violence and uncertainty few had anticipated. In NATO in the Crucible, Deborah Lynn Hanagan analyzes these challenges and explains how the alliance maintained cohesion despite them. She examines why NATO succeeded in Afghanistan when history suggests most coalitions fracture under such intense pressure. In the end, she argues, member nations summoned the political will and organizational capacity to cooperate and endure. And they agreed, above all, that failure in Afghanistan would be catastrophic-both for NATO and for the world.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part 1. The Stolypins in Vilno, 1862-1879
• Part 2. The district and guberniya marshal of nobility of Kovno, 1889-1902
• Part 3. Govenor of Grodno, 1902-1903
• Conclusions.

• Making the rules and breaking the mold : Allan Meltzer, 1928-2017 / John Taylor
• Allan Meltzer and the history of the Federal Reserve / Michael D. Bordo
• Allan Meltzer : how he underestimated his own contribution to the modern concept of a central bank / Robert L. Hetzel
• "They profess to fear that for which they dare not hope" : how the Fed contributed to the Great Depression and the Great Recession by boosting banks' demand for reserves / George Selgin
• Allan Meltzer's model of the transmission mechanism and its implications for today / Peter N. Ireland
• The monetary base in Allan Meltzer's analytical framework / Edward Nelson
• Monetary policy and the interest rate : reflections on Allan Meltzer's contributions to monetary economics / Joshua R. Hendrickson
• Allan Meltzer and the search for a nominal anchor / James Bullard
• The Meltzer Commission / Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr.
• Memories of Allan H. Meltzer / Robert Lucas
• Allan Meltzer's contributions to public policy thought as applied to the Federal Reserve / Charles Plosser
• Macro musings : Allan Meltzer / Allan Meltzer and David Beckworth

Allan H. Meltzer (1928-2017), a leading monetary economist of the twentieth century, is memorialized in eleven essays by prominent economists. Among his achievements, Meltzer transformed the field of central banking and dissected the economic disasters of the 1930s and late 2000s, as well as the avoidance of disaster in the 1970s. Focusing on his landmark A History of the Federal Reserve, 1913-1986, the first section argues that the Fed's biggest successes are tied to its adherence to classical monetary theory and also examines the monetarist counterrevolution. Next, the book turns to Meltzer's thinking on the monetary transmission mechanism and his close work with Karl Brunner on the Brunner-Meltzer Model; it argues that Meltzer's understanding of monetary economics could be used to measure the impact of the Fed's activities. Finally, Meltzer's contributions to public policy are examined, including his proposed reforms to the International Monetary Fund and his activities at the Carnegie Mellon Graduate School of Industrial Administration.The conference papers that compose this volume celebrate Meltzer's fifty-year career at Carnegie Mellon. The book ends with a transcribed interview, conducted just a few months before his death, in which he shares sharp-witted insights about economics and his legacy.Contributors: Michael Bordo, James Bullard, Joshua R. Hendrickson, Robert Hetzel, Peter N. Ireland, Robert Lucas, Edward Nelson, Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., Charles Plosser, George Selgin, and John Taylor.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Accountability. A more accountable world? (2001)
• Chapter 2: Trust. The United States and Israel: partners for peace and freedom (1985). What I learned about Israel (2017)
• Chapter 3: A changing world. America can ride the 21st Century's waves of change (2018). Automation: a new dimension to old problems (1955)
• Chapter 4: The drug issue. Gary Becker and the War on Drugs (2011). The failed War on Drugs (2018)
• Chapter 5: Force and strength. The ethics of power (1984). Discerning strength from force (2017). Power and diplomacy (1984)
• Chapter 6: Practicing theories of governance. The new federalism (1970). Prescription for economic policy: steady as you go (1971)
• Chapter 7: America in the world. Resources are needed for effective foreign policy (1987). Proposed refugee admissions for FY 1989 (1988)
• Chapter 8: A balanced approach to climate change. A Reagan approach to climate change (2015). A conservative answer to climate change (2017)
• Chapter 9: Nuclear security, past and future. US-Soviet relations in the context of US foreign policy (1983). A world free of nuclear weapons (2007). Deterrence in the age of nuclear proliferation (2011). Lenten nukes, by the Rt. Rev. William E. Swing (2018)
• Acknowledgements
• Notes
• About the author
• Index.

In a rich and varied career, George P. Shultz has aided presidents, confronted national and international crises, and argued passionately that the United States has a vital stake in promoting democratic values and institutions. In speeches, articles, congressional testimony, and conversations with world leaders, he has helped shape policy and public opinion on topics ranging from technology and terrorism to drugs and climate change. The result is a body of work that has influenced the decisions of nations and leaders, as well as the lives of ordinary people. In Thinking About the Future, Shultz has collected and revisited key writings, applying his past thinking to America's most pressing contemporary problems. Each chapter includes new commentary from the author, providing context, color, and behind-the-scenes glimpses of how decisions are made in the halls of power. In the more than half a century since Shultz entered public life, the world has changed dramatically. But he remains guided by the belief that ""you can learn about the future-or at least relate to it-by studying the past and identifying principles that have continuing application to our lives and our world.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Volume 1: Invasion, insurgency, civil war, 2003-2006
• Volume 2: Surge and withdrawal, 2007-2011.

The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the Army's initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country's slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to "surge" additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the "surge" and its aftermath in the second volume.

• Foreword: Ardeshir Zahedi
• Foreword: Eric Wakin
• Introduction
• General Fazlollah Zahedi: A Profile
• Ardeshir Zahedi: A Profile
• Selected Documents: Document 1: 1922-1924, 1.1-1.5. Sheikh Khazal of Kurzestan: despot or king without a crown
• Document 2: 23 November 1933, 2.1. State permission for installation of concert radio receiver in the home of Brigadier General Zahedi
• Document 3: 23 August 1953, 3.1. Confidential advice to Zahedi from "Hirad" in regard to Hossein Makki's note to the shah
• Document 4: 9 September 1953, 4.1-4.2. Letter from Hassan Taqizadeh to General Zahedi
• Document 5: 15 September 1953, 5.1. Letter to General Zahedi from a professor at the university
• Document 6: 6 October 1953, 6.1-6.5. Correspondence from Great Britain seeking to resume diplomatic relations with Iran following the overthrow of Mossadegh government
• Document 7: 16 January 1954, 7.1. Report of Anoushiravan Sepahbodi to A. Zahedi
• Document 8: 17 February 1954, 8.1. Letter of Nasser Ghashghaei to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 9: 13 December 1954, 9.1. Memorandum from Prime Minister to Mr. Abtin in re orders of Dr. Mofakham.
• Document 10: 3 December 1955, 10.1-10.2. Letter of Ali Asghar Hekmat to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 11: 1953-1955, 11.1. Detailed account of gifts
• Document 12: 1954-1955, 12.1-12.8. Outline of General Zahedi's career prepared in anticipation of his personal memoirs
• Document 13: 1953-1955, 13.1-13.11. More of the outline General Zahedi prepared in anticipation of his personal memoirs
• Document 14: 1 April 1956, 14.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from a cleric who had worked to overthrow Mossadegh
• Document 15: 19 August 1955, 15.1. Letter from Shaban Jafari to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 16: 12 October 1955, 16.1. Letter from Hassan Ma'assar
• Document 17: Around 1957-1958, 17.1-17.2. Letter from Princess Ashraf to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 18: 17 February 1959, 18.1-18.2. Ali Asghar Hekmat to General Zahedi
• Document 19: 13 June 1959, 19.1. Letter of General Teymour Bakhtiar to General Zahedi
• Document 20: 30 January 1967, 20.1-20.2. Letter from Ardeshir Zahedi as foreign minister to the shah reporting on foreign policy
• Document 21: 3 February 1967, 21.1-21.4. Correspondence between Ardeshir Zahedi and the shah
• Document 22: Approximately March 1967, 22.1. Letter of Ardeshir Zahedi to shah of matters revolving around influence of Kermit Roosevelt
• Document 23: 11 June 1967, 23.1-23.6. Digest of the shah's meeting with the Soviet ambassador regarding Soviet breech of bilateral agreement to use of Iranian air space
• Document 24: Around 1967, 24.1-24.6. Correspondence between Ardeshir Zahedi as foreign minister and Armin Meyer, US ambassasor to Iran.

• Document 25: 13 November 1968, 25.1-25.14. Minutes of a meeting betwen the shah of Iran and the Saudi monarch, King Faisal
• Document 26: 25 January 1969, 26.1-26.4. Zahedi reporting in minute detail his conversations with the Soviet ambassador
• Document 27: 10 February 1969, 27.1-27.5. Letter from Ardeshir Zahedi, then foreign minister, to the shah of Iran
• Document 28: 28 July 1969, 28.1. Letter in English from King Huyssein of Jordan to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, shah of Iran
• Document 29: 10 February 1970, 29.1-29.5. Ardeshir Zahedi report to the shah of Iran
• Document 30: 2 March 1970, 30.1̀-30.8. Ardeshir Zahedi report to the shah of Iran
• Document 31: 19 February 1974, 31.1-31.2. Telegram to US Ambassador in Tehran requesting prevention of broadcasting 60 Minutes interview
• Document 32: 9 July 1974, 32.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from US Senator Edward Wm. Brooke
• Document 33: 6 May 1976, 33.1-33.2. Letters of Assadollah Alam (former prime minister of Iran) to the shah
• Document 34: 20 December 1976, 34.1-34.2. Documentation of gifts of caviar
• Document 35: 11 January 1977, 35.1. Letter of thanks from US Representative James Wright to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 36: 22 January 1977, 36.1. Letter of thanks from Kirk Douglas; 36.2. Letter of thanks from Washington Post columnist Art Buchwald
• Document 37: 26 January 1977, 37.1-37.2. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi, ambassador of Iran to US, from Sylvan M. Marshall, giving a legal opinion; 37.3-37.7. Letter from Ardeshir Zahedi to David Susskind, US television producer, objecting to allegations made by Reza Baraheni; 37.8. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from David Rockefeller
• Document 38: 27 January 1977, 38.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from Rose Mary Woods, secretary to President Richard Nixon
• Document 39: 16 March 1977, 39.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from US Senator Barry Goldwater
• Document 40: 16 March 1977, 40.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from Mrs. Arthur Hays Sulzberger; 40.2. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from Katharine Graham of the Washington Post
• Document 41: 18 March 1977, 41.1. Letter of gratitude to Ardeshir Zahedi from John R. Silver, president of Boston University
• Document 42: 7 November 1977, 42.1. Letter of gratitude to Ardeshir Zahedi from US Senator Hubert Humphrey
• Document 43: 5 January 1978: 43.1. Letter of gratitude to Ardeshir Zahedi from Claudia A. "Lady Bird" Johnson; 43.2. Telegram to Ardeshir Zahedi from Mrs. Ronand Reagan (Nancy); 43.3. Telegram to Ardeshir Zahedi from Mrs. Ronald Reagan; 43.4. Handwritten note of thanks to Ardeshir Zahedi from Mrs. Ronald Wilson Reagan
• Document 44: 30 January 1978, 44.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahidi [sic] from Lord Hartley William Shawcross
• Document 45: 25 September 1978, 45.1. Letter to Ardeshir Zahedi from Douglas Fairbanks in regard to Tabas earthquake; 45.2. Response to Douglas Fairbanks
• Document 46: 9 January 1979, 46.1. Letter of concern from Nelson A. Rockefeller
• Document 47: 22 January 1979, 47.1. Letter from Ronald Reagan to Ardeshir Zahedi
• Document 48: January 1979, 48.1. Telegram from William Rogers.

The inner workings of Iranian politics, as experienced by two key figures at their center, are revealed as never before through the meticulously preserved documents and photographs in the Ardeshir Zahedi Papers at the Hoover Institution Library and Archives. These materials are essential for understanding modern Iranian history and its global context.These archives were preserved over the course of two illustrious careers: those of Ardeshir Zahedi, Iran's ambassador to the United States and United Kingdom and minister of foreign affairs; and his father, Fazlollah Zahedi, military general and prime minister of Iran after the 1953 overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh. Abbas Milani, American-Iranian historian and an expert in US-Iran relations, has sifted through these archives to select resources of unparalleled value and fascination for understanding Iran's politics, culture, and history-both before and after the 1979 Revolution that toppled the shah and sent him and the younger Zahedi into exile.Published for the very first time, the papers and photos included here are connected with many of the key events and figures of the twentieth century. They are indispensable primary sources for scholarship on modern Iranian history as well as intriguing studies on the mechanisms of international diplomacy.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)