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Over the past decade central banks have taken on new and expanded roles in an attempt to manage the global financial crisis. The European Central Bank (ECB) has been no exception. If anything, because of the incomplete architecture of the euro, the ECB has faced more serious challenges than either the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve. With the onset of the euro crisis, the ECB was forced to take on powers that went well beyond the conventions of standard monetary policy to prevent European Monetary Union from unravelling. Panicos Demetriades, former Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus during the country's bailout in 2013, examines the role of the ECB and its adoption of these new powers, which have led to legal and political challenges, high level resignations and the controversial removal of central bankers from their posts without due process. Demetriades argues that at a time when stability and action are needed to secure the future of the euro, the very foundations of the Euro-system are being eroded, namely its ability to act independently. The book provides a lively and insightful account of the processes that can make or break the euro.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Vingt ans après
• La crise grecque bouscule l'euro
• L'erreur des "doctor doom"
• Le "choc fédéral" n'a pas eu lieu
• Un euro fantasmé
• Un euro à la légitimité politique fragile
• L'euro, enfant de mai 68 ?
• Un projet d'union monétaire prématuré
• Un couple de choc
• François Mitterrand fait le choix de l'Europe
• L'Europe relancée
• La tactique du petit poucet
• Une Dame de fer flouée
• Balladur relance le projet de monnaie unique
• Le don du mark à l'Europe
• Delors convainc Kohl
• Kohl prêt à sacrifier le mark
• Jacques dans la fosse aux lions
• Le champagne des gouverneurs
• Beuverie bavaroise
• La chute du Mur
• Les hésitations de Kohl
• Kohl fait un geste
• L'union politique est lancée
• Maastricht : les tables de la loi
• Les muses du président
• Le couperet de 1999
• Une horloge dans la construction européenne
• Un traité "précuit"
• Réunions secrètes franco-allemandes
• "L'abominable problème italien"
• Des critères, mais lesquels ?
• Le combat des Belges
• "Drei komma null"
• Faut-il aider les pays en crise ?
• Londres quitte le navire
• Doutes d'après-sommet
• Les marchés à l'assaut du projet de monnaie unique
• La superbe indifférence de la Bundesbank
• Le choc danois
• L'humiliation de Washington
• Un faucon sous pression
• Trichet préfère le téléphone
• Un gaffeur humilié
• Les anti-maastrichtiens donnent de la voix
• Incident et mésentente
• Le triomphe des faucons
• La bière du chancelier
• Le compromis de Bruxelles
• Un Britannique à la rescousse
• Le coup de fil de Matignon
• Vers l'euro
• La laborieuse relance
• Stark se fâche
• L'UEM en panne
• Balladur sauve les meubles
• Un scepticisme tenace
• Un chancelier en cardigan
• Une ambiance délétère
• Un bulldozer dans un magasin de porcelaine
• Deux cathos à Versailles
• Un président qui inquiète
• Un premier rendez-vous annulé
• L'optimisme revient
• Chirac se convertit
• "Euro, tu es euro"
• L'euro aura l'accent allemand
• Stark dans ses oeuvres
• La Buba en première ligne
• Waigel sous pression de ses "faucons"
• La France, dès l'origine, veut des sanctions contre les "mauvais élèves"
• Les difficultés commencent
• Le voyage d'Arthuis
• Bonn négocie
• Crispation allemande
• Vers l'affrontement
• Une négociation surréaliste
• "Ich bin ein Politiker"
• Chirac aux toilettes
• L'euro a l'accent allemand
• La France renonce au gouvernement économique
• Une demande française qui remonte à 1990
• Résistances allemandes
• Qui est responsable de la politique de change ?
• Concilier des désirs contradictoires
• Le gouvernement économique en mode mineur
• Oppositions philosophiques
• Le refus français du fédéralisme
• Le retour des socialistes
• Le PS tient ses promesses
• L'épreuve du feu
• Un habillage plus politique et plus social
• La glace est rompue
• Le chemin de Damas de Waigel
• Blair part en guerre
• "Les mouches ne méritent pas cela !"
• La ruée vers l'euro
• Miracle à l'italienne

• La fin de l'illusion d'une mini-union monétaire
• L'Espagne poignarde la "solidarité méditerranéenne"
• Le retour de la lire
• Les marchés parient sur l'euro
• Ultimes manoeuvres allemandes pour torpiller l'Italie
• L'Italie disqualifiée ?
• Chirac dissout
• Les astuces de comptables
• L'Allemagne tentée par les astuces comptables
• La Commission tance l'Espagne
• Les dés sont, jetés
• L'Italie in ou out ?
• Onze pays qualifiés
• L'Allemagne s'enthousiasme
• Les banquiers centraux font main basse sur la BCE
• Wim Duisenberg, le candidat des banquiers centraux
• Le pas de trop
• La colère de l'Élysée
• Trichet se prend les pieds dans le tapis
• La légende d'un accord Mitterrand-Kohl
• L'indépendance, quelle indépendance ?
• La France rétive à l'indépendance de la Banque centrale
• Le silence de l'Élysée
• Duisenberg s'isole
• Le second "putsch" des banquiers centraux
• Les banquiers centraux hors la bulle
• Trichet versus Duisenberg
• Le "come-back" de Trichet
• Les premières tentatives de compromis
• Un fauteuil pour deux
• "La fin de la démocratie"
• Des ministres des Finances émus
• Un déjeuner qui s'éternise
• Blair dépassé
• Kohl en difficulté
• Le dénouement
• Chirac qui rit, Kohl qui pleure
• Gueule de bois d'après-sommet
• Le pied de nez de Duisenberg
• L'euro ne sera pas "de gauche"
• Fin de partie pour Helmut Kohl
• De la République de Bonn à la République de Berlin
• Oskar Lafontaine vs Banques centrales
• Réguler les marchés financiers ?
• L'esprit de Pôrtschach
• La France socialiste lâche Lafontaine
• Le leurre de l'esprit de Pôrtschach
• Duisenberg fait un geste
• Les budgets sous haute surveillance
• Qui contrôle la BCE ?
• Des gouvernements schizophrènes
• Le jour de l'euro
• L'euro, "un enfant prématuré et chétif"
• L'euro attaqué
• La BCE prend la défense de l'euro
• L'euro atteint son plus bas historique à 0,82 dollar
• Le passage à l'euro fiduciaire, un coup de maître
• L'euro cher
• Le sentiment inflationniste
• "La Grèce, c'est notre club Med, on se la paiera"
• Le premier mensonge grec
• L'Allemagne et la France minent le Pacte de stabilité
• "Le Pacte n'a pas été conçu pour s'appliquer à l'Allemagne"
• L'euro de douze à dix-neuf membres
• Le "conseil de sécurité" de la BCE
• L'euro flambe
• La crise des subprimes
• La crise touche le vieux continent
• L'euro atteint son sommet historique
• Et ce fut Lehman Brother
• L'euro bouclier
• L'impotence de l'Union et des États
• Merkel, la dame de plomb
• Vous n'avez pas voulu le fédéralisme ? vous aurez la crise ! (2009- ))
• Les États punis par là où ils ont péché
• Berlin murmure à l'oreille des marchés
• Le nouveau mensonge grec
• "Frau nein" à la manoeuvre
• Goldman Sachs et les fonds spéculatifs attaquent la Grèce
• De l'anxiété à la panique
• La Grèce, un pays sans État
• L'inconscience des Européens
• La troisième faillite de la Grèce
• Un premier plan d'aide à 110 milliards d'euros
• 860 milliards d'euros pour sauver l'euro
• Fallait-il sauver la Grèce ?

• Berlin relance la crise
• L'erreur des États
• Qui sont les marchés ?
• Les banques allemandes jouent les boulefeux
• Vers la renationalisation du marché de la dette ?
• Vers la restructuration de la dette grecque
• Le Portugal tombe à son tour
• Nationalisme bancaire
• Le Pacte de stabilité retrouve son accent allemand
• La "règle d'or" européenne coulée dans de l'acier trempé
• La dette grecque restructurée
• L'Europe rattrapée par ses banques
• La BCE, L'indispensable pompier de la zone
• De la tôle à l'accident industriel
• Bunga Bunga à Rome
• La démocratie mise à l'épreuve
• Un échec européen
• La Grèce, l'éternel retour
• La zone euro prête à éjecter la Grèce
• Berlin se réconcilie avec Athènes
• Eureka
• L'union bancaire, un saut fédéral
• L'Allemagne limite l'Union bancaire
• Berlin accepte à reculons un "filet de sécurité"
• "To do whatever it takes to preserve the euro"
• "L'euro reste, il reste, il reste"
• Tournant
• La BCE fait tourner la planche à billets
• L'euro au bord de la crise de nerfs (2013- ?)
• Une économie casino
• Nicosie refuse la restructuration de ses banques
• Le parlement chypriote rejette le plan de l'Eurogroupe
• La crise de la zone euro est devenue politique
• Grèce, l'éternel retour
• Antônis Samards, , le boutefeu
• L'Allemagne paiera
• La bourrasque Varoufdkis
• Varoufdkis au pays des ministres des Finances
• Humour grec contre rigidité allemande
• La Grèce isolée
• Varoufdkis démonétisé
• Pugilat à l'Eurogroupe
• Aléxis Tsipras, secrétaire général d'un bureau politique
• Coup de poker
• La Grèce doit être punie
• Tsipras se débarrasse de son aile gauche
• Un scandale démocratique
• La mafia des droites européennes
• L'Italie défit la zone euro
• La Commission menace
• L'Allemagne, le problème de la zone euro
• La zone euro, un pouvoir autocratique
• Que faire ?
• L'euro, un succès technique
• Imperium germanique
• Une Allemagne européenne dans une Europe allemande
• La zone euro plus fragile que jamais
• Faillites françaises
• Emmanuel Macron tente de reprendre la main
• L'Allemagne reste l'Allemagne
• Hubris allemande.

"Si les gouvernements n'ont pas le courage d'achever la construction de l'euro, cette monnaie sans État, qui fête ses vingt ans le 1er janvier 2019, disparaîtra. Le choc sera d'une rare violence pour nos économies, comme l'a montré la faillite en 2008 d'une simple banque d'affaires américaine, Lehman Brothers, qui a entraîné la plus grave récession depuis 1929. Alors imaginez ce que donnerait l'effondrement de la seconde monnaie de réserve du monde... Entre 2010 et 2012, nous en avons eu un avant-goût. La crise de la zone euro n'était pourtant pas une surprise : les "pères fondateurs" de la monnaie unique avaient pris la précaution d'avertir que leur travail était imparfait. Ils comptaient sur leurs successeurs pour l'achever. Or, tels les rois fainéants, non seulement ceux-ci n'ont rien fait, se contentant de capitaliser sur les premiers pas réussis de l'euro, mais, au contraire, ils ont détricoté le peu de fédéralisme qui existait. Pour comprendre et juger, ce livre propose une plongée dans la grande histoire et les petites anecdotes de la construction monétaire européenne, nourrie des témoignages de ses principaux acteurs. Il raconte les faux pas, les réconciliations, les réunions secrètes, les engueulades homériques et les décisions prises aux petites heures du matin. Une histoire qui permet de mesurer le chemin qui reste à parcourir. À l'heure où l'Union est plus que jamais remise en question par le Brexit et la résistible vague démagogique, Jean Quatremer lance un avertissement : ce qui se joue, c'est l'avenir de notre argent."--Page 4 of cover.

• Part One: Costs and Benefits of Monetary Union
• 1: The costs of common currency
• 2: The theory of optimum currency areas: a critique
• 3: The benefits of a common currency
• 4: Costs and benefits compared Part Two: Monetary Union
• 5: The fragility of incomplete monetary union
• 6: Transition to a monetary union
• 7: How to complete a monetary union?
• 8: Leaving a monetary union
• 9: The European central bank
• 10: Monetary policy in the Eurozone
• 11: Fiscal policies in monetary unions
• 12: The euro and financial markets.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The twelfth edition of Economics of Monetary Union provides a concise analysis of the theories and policies relating to monetary union. The author addresses current issues surrounding the Eurozone, including; a critical discussion of the costs and benefits of possible exits by its member countries, an analysis of the role of the ECB as new single supervisor and detail on the sovereign debt crisis. In Part One the author examines the implications of adopting a common currency, assessing the benefit to each country from being a member of the Eurozone, whilst also questioning whether other parts of the world would gain from monetary unification. Part Two of the book looks at the problems of running a monetary union by analysing Europe's experience and the issues faced by the European Central Bank. The book is accompanied by online resources that feature: For students: r s1- Links to data sources - Essay questions - Web links - Paul De Grauwe on Twitter For Lecturers: - PowerPoint slides - Instructor's manual.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Chapter 1. Introduction.-
• Chapter 2. Law & Economics of Macroprudential Banking Supervision.-
• Chapter 3. A Legal Approach to Monetary Policy.-
• Chapter 4. Policy Interactions and Conflicts.-
• Chapter 5. The Legal Interaction in The EU Institutional Framework.-
• Chapter 6. Some Concluding Remarks .
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The European experience suggests that the efforts made to achieve an efficient trade-off between monetary policy and prudential supervision ultimately failed. The severity of the global crisis have pushed central banks to explore innovative tools-within or beyond their statutory constraints-capable of restoring the smooth functioning of the financial cycle, including setting macroprudential policy instruments in the regulatory toolkit. But macroprudential and monetary policies, by sharing multiple transmission channels, may interact-and conflict-with each other. Such conflicts may represent not only an economic challenge in the pursuit of price and financial stability, but also a legal uncertainty characterizing the regulatory developments of the EU macroprudential and monetary frameworks. In analyzing the "legal interaction" between the two frameworks in the EU, this book seeks to provide evidence of the inconsistencies associated with the structural separation of macroprudential and monetary frameworks, shedding light upon the legal instruments that could reconcile any potential policy inconsistency.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Introduction
• Why is the current model of EMU not working?
• Single currency or common currency?
• Monetary policy in the Keynesian EMU
• Rediscovering fiscal policy
• Breathing life into the European social model
• Conclusion.

In the wake of the Greek crisis, the future of the EU is the subject of a great deal of debate. This book critically evaluates the current new monetarist model of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, presenting an alternative post-Keynesian (progressive) model, aimed at addressing the current problems of trade imbalance and asymmetric macroeconomic policy infrastructure that are augmenting tensions within the Eurozone. The book's approach is based upon the development of a common, rather than a single, currency approach, and utilises post-Keynesian policy solutions in order to create a form of EMU which will promote full employment rather than austerity.-- Provided by Publisher.

• Table of Contents
• Introduction Part I - Theoretical Foundations
• Chapter 1. Substance and purposes of economic activity Part II - Money and Credit
• Chapter 2. Debts and balance sheets
• Chapter 3. The creation of bank deposits (deposits)
• Chapter 4. The creation of central bank deposits
• Chapter 5. The instruments of a central bank (monetary policy)
• Chapter 6. The creation of sovereign securities (fiscal policy)
• Chapter 7. The sustainability of the financial system
• Chapter 8. Inflation and deflation Part III - Analysis
• Chapter 9. A macroeconomic model
• Chapter 10. Europe before the euro
• Chapter 11. The situation with the euro Part IV - Reform
• Chapter 12. How do we restore demand?
• Chapter 13. The future - with or without the euro? Conclusion Further readings Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This book provides a new methodological approach to money and macroeconomics. Realizing that the abstract equilibrium models lacked descriptions of fundamental issues of a modern monetary economy, the focus of this book lies on the (stylized) balance sheets of the main actors. Money, after all, is born on the balance sheets of the central bank or commercial bank. While households and firms hold accounts at banks with deposits, banks hold an account at the central bank where deposits are called reserves. The book aims to explain how the two monetary circuits - central bank deposits and bank deposits - are intertwined. It is also shown how government spending injects money into the economy. Modern Monetary Theory and European Macroeconomics covers both the general case and then the Eurozone specifically. A very simple macroeconomic model follows which explains the major accounting identities of macroeconomics. Using this new methodology, the Eurozone crisis is examined from a fresh perspective. It turns out that not government debt but the stagnation of private sector debt was the major economic problem and that cuts in government spending worsened the economic situation. The concluding chapters discuss what a solution to the current problems of the Eurozone must look like, with scenarios that examine a future with and without a euro. This book provides a detailed balance sheet view of monetary and fiscal operations, with a focus on the Eurozone economy. Students, policy-makers and financial market actors will learn to assess the institutional processes that underpin a modern monetary economy, in times of boom and in times of bust.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• PART I: BUILDING BLOCKS-- PART II: EVOLVING MONETARY UNIONS OF LIMITED RISK-SHARING-- PART III: SOLIDARITY IN ACTION.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Creating the European monetary union between diverse and unequal nation states is arguably one of the biggest social experiments in history. This book offers an explanation of how the euro experiment came about and was sustained despite a severe crisis, and provides a comparison with the monetary-financial history of the US. The euro experiment can be understood as risk-sharing through a currency that is issued by a supranational central bank. A single currency shares liquidity risks by creating larger markets for all financial assets. A single monetary policy responds to business cycles in the currency area as a whole rather than managing the path of one dominant economy. Mechanisms of risk-sharing become institutions of monetary solidarity if they are consciously maintained, but they will periodically face opposition in member states. This book argues that diversity of membership is not an economic obstacle to the success of the euro, as diversity increases the potential gains from risk sharing. But political cooperation is needed to realize this potential, and such cooperation is up against collective action problems which become more intractable as the parties become more diverse. Hence, risk-sharing usually comes about as a collective by-product of national incentives. This political-economic tension can explain why the gains from risk-sharing are not more fully exploited, both in the euro area and in the US dollar area. This approach to monetary integration is based on the theory of collective action when hierarchy is not available as a solution to inter-state cooperation. The theory originates with Keohane and Ostrom (1995) and it is applied in this book, taking into account the latest research on the inherent instability of financial market integration.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1 Introduction 1 PART I: POWER SHIFTS AND GERMAN-FRENCH DIFFERENCES
• 2 Power Shifts 17 Lethargy of European Institutions 18 The First Power Shift: From Brussels to National Capitals 20 The Second Power Shift: To Berlin-Paris and Ultimately to Berlin 27 After the Power Shift 33
• 3 Historical Roots of German-French Differences 40 Cultural Differences 41 Federalism versus Centralism 43 Mittelstand versus National Champions 48 Collaborative versus Confrontational Labor Unions 51 Historical Inflation Experiences 54
• 4 German-French Differences in Economic Philosophies 56 Fluid Traditions: Switch to Opposites 56 German Economic Tradition 59 French Economic Tradition 67 International Economics 74 PART II: MONETARY AND FISCAL STABILITY: THE GHOST OF MAASTRICHT
• 5 Rules, Flexibility, Credibility, and Commitment 85 Time-Inconsistency: Ex Ante versus Ex Post 86 External Commitments: Currency Pegs, Unions, and the Gold Standard 89 Internal Commitments: Reputation and Institutional Design 91 Managing Current versus Avoiding Future Crisis 94
• 6 Liability versus Solidarity: No-Bailout Clause and Fiscal Union 97 The No-Bailout Clause 98 Fiscal Unions 100 Eurobonds 111 Policy Recommendations 115
• 7 Solvency versus Liquidity 116 Buildup of Imbalances and the Naked Swimmer 117 Solvency 118 Liquidity 119 Crossing the Rubicon via Default 125 Sovereign-Debt Restructuring and Insolvency Mechanism 126 Fiscal Push: Increasing Scale and Scope of EFSF and ESM 127 Monetary Push 131 Policy Recommendations 133
• 8 Austerity versus Stimulus 135 The Fiscal Multiplier Debate 137 The Output Gap versus Unsustainable Booms Debate 143 Politics Connects Structural Reforms and Austerity 145 The European Policy Debate on Austerity versus Stimulus 148 Lessons and Policy Recommendations 153 PART III: FINANCIAL STABILITY: MAASTRICHT'S STEPCHILD
• 9 The Role of the Financial Sector 157 Traditional Banking 159 Modern Banking and Capital Markets 162 Cross-Border Capital Flows and the Interbank Market 166
• 10 Financial Crises: Mechanisms and Management 173 Financial Crisis Mechanisms 175 Crisis Management: Monetary Policy 185 Crisis Management: Fiscal Policy and Regulatory Measures 194 Ex Ante Policy: Preventing a Crisis 206
• 11 Banking Union, European Safe Bonds, and Exit Risk 210 Banking in a Currency Union 211 Safe Assets: Flight-to-Safety Cross-Border Capital Flows 222 Redenomination and Exit Risks 226 Policy Recommendations 233 PART IV: OTHERS' PERSPECTIVES
• 12 Italy 237 Battling Economic Philosophies within Italy 237 Mezzogiorno: Convergence or Divergence within a Transfer Union 239 Italy's Economic Challenges 242 Politics and Decline 245
• 13 Anglo-American Economics and Global Perspectives 249 Diverging Traditions 251 The Politics of Looking for Recovery: The United States 261 The Politics of Thinking Outside Europe: The United Kingdom 267 The Global Perspectives: China and Russia 279 Conclusion 286
• 14 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 287 The IMF's Philosophy and Crisis Management 289 The IMF's Initial Involvement in the Euro Crisis 295 The IMF and the Troika 300 A Change in the IMF's Leadership 304 Loss of Credibility: Muddling Through, Delayed Greek PSI 306
• 15 European Central Bank (ECB) 313 The ECB before the Crisis: Institutional Design and Philosophy 315 The ECB's Early Successes and Defeats 325 The ECB and Conditionality 331 Lending and Asset Purchase Programs 343 Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for European Banks 368 Taking Stock: Where Does the ECB Stand? 372
• 16 Conclusion: Black and White or Twenty-Eight Shades of Gray? 375 Acknowledgments 391 Notes 393 Index 427.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Why is Europe's great monetary endeavor, the Euro, in trouble? A string of economic difficulties in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and other Eurozone nations has left observers wondering whether the currency union can survive. In this book, Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau argue that the core problem with the Euro lies in the philosophical differences between the founding countries of the Eurozone, particularly Germany and France. But the authors also show how these seemingly incompatible differences can be reconciled to ensure Europe's survival. As the authors demonstrate, Germany, a federal state with strong regional governments, saw the Maastricht Treaty, the framework for the Euro, as a set of rules. France, on the other hand, with a more centralized system of government, saw the framework as flexible, to be overseen by governments. The authors discuss how the troubles faced by the Euro have led its member states to focus on national, as opposed to collective, responses, a reaction explained by the resurgence of the battle of economic ideas: rules vs. discretion, liability vs. solidarity, solvency vs. liquidity, austerity vs. stimulus. Weaving together economic analysis and historical reflection, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas provides a forensic investigation and a road map for Europe's future.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Part I. Europe in crisis. The euro crisis ; The euro: the hope and the reality ; Europe's dismal performance
• Part II. Flawed from the start. When can a single currency ever work? ; The euro: a divergent system ; Monetary policy and the European Central Bank
• Part III. Misconceived policies. Crises policies: how Troika policies compounded the flawed Eurozone structure, ensuring depression ; Structural reforms that further compounded failure
• Part IV. A way forward? Creating a Eurozone that works ; Can there be an amicable divorce? ; Toward a flexible euro ; The way forward.

In 2010, the 2008 global financial crisis morphed into the "eurocrisis." It has not abated. The 19 countries of Europe that share the euro currency-the eurozone-have been rocked by economic stagnation and debt crises. Some countries have been in depression for years while the governing powers of the eurozone have careened from emergency to emergency, most notably in Greece. In The Euro, Nobel Prize-winning economist and best-selling author Joseph E. Stiglitz dismantles the prevailing consensus around what ails Europe, demolishing the champions of austerity while offering a series of plans that can rescue the continent-and the world-from further devastation. Hailed by its architects as a lever that would bring Europe together and promote prosperity, the euro has done the opposite. As Stiglitz persuasively argues, the crises revealed the shortcomings of the euro. Europe's stagnation and bleak outlook are a direct result of the fundamental challenges in having a diverse group of countries share a common currency-the euro was flawed at birth, with economic integration outpacing political integration. Stiglitz shows how the current structure promotes divergence rather than convergence. The question then is: Can the euro be saved? After laying bare the European Central Bank's misguided inflation-only mandate and explaining how eurozone policies, especially toward the crisis countries, have further exposed the zone's flawed design, Stiglitz outlines three possible ways forward: fundamental reforms in the structure of the eurozone and the policies imposed on the member countries; a well-managed end to the single-currency euro experiment; or a bold, new system dubbed the "flexible euro." With its lessons for globalization in a world economy ever more deeply connected, The Euro is urgent and essential reading.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Incomplete Monetary Union and Europe's Current Crisis
• 2. From Order to Disorder: How Monetary Union Changed National Labor Markets
• 3. Monetary Regimes, Wage Bargaining, and the Current Account Crisis in the EMU South: Empirical Evidence
• 4. National Central Banks and Inflation Convergence: Danish and Dutch Corporatism Inside and Outside of Monetary Union
• 5. Strength in Rigidity: Public Sector Employment Reform and Wage Suppression in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy
• 6. Sheltered Sector Dominance under a Common Currency: Irrational Exuberance in Ireland and Fragmentation in Spain
• 7. EMU, the Politics of Wage Inflation, and Crisis: Implications for Current Debates and Policy.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

What explains Eurozone member-states' divergent exposure to Europe's sovereign debt crisis? Deviating from current fiscal and financial views, From Convergence to Crisis focuses on labor markets in a narrative that distinguishes the winners from the losers in the euro crisis. Alison Johnston argues that Europe's monetary union was structured in a way that advantaged the corporatist labor markets of its northern economies in external trade and financial lending. Northern Europe's distinct economic advantage lay not with its fiscal capabilities, which were not that different from those of southern Eurozone countries, but with its wage-setting institutions. Through highly coordinated collective bargaining, the euro North persistently undercut the inflation performance of southern trading partners, destining them to a perpetual cycle of competitive decline and external borrowing. While northern Europe's corporatist labor markets were always low inflation performers, monetary union ultimately made their wage-setting institutions toxic for the South.The euro's institutional predecessor, the European Monetary System, included economic and institutional mechanisms that facilitated macroeconomic adjustment and convergence between the common currency's corporatist and noncorporatist economies. Combining cross-national statistical analysis with detailed qualitative case studies of Denmark, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain, Johnston reveals that monetary union's removal of these mechanisms allowed external imbalances between these two blocs to grow unchecked, underpinning the crisis in which Europe currently finds itself. Rather than achieving the EU's goal of an ever-closer union, the common currency produced a monetary environment that destabilized the economic integration of its diverse labor markets.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• 1. Introduction: The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis
• 2. 'States Choose but not Under Circumstances of Their Own Making': A New Interpretation of the Integration Debate in Light of the European Financial Crisis
• 3. The Euro's Twin Challenges: Experience and Lessons
• 4. Competitiveness and the European Financial Crisis
• 5. 'United We Fall': The Euro Area's Silent Balance of Payment Crisis in Comparison with Previous Ones
• 6. Searching Under the Lamp-Post: The Evolution of Fiscal Surveillance
• 7. Fiscal Governance and Fiscal Outcomes under EMU before and after the Crisis
• 8. The ECB as a Strategic Actor: Central Banking in a Politically Fragmented Monetary Union
• 9. International in Life, National in Death? Banking Nationalism on the Road to Banking Union
• 10. Free Sailing or Tied to the Mast? The Political Costs of Monetary Adjustment in Iceland, Latvia and Ireland
• 11. New Institutional Dynamics in the European Union.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

This is the first book to provide a full and dispassionate account of the politics and economics of the Eurozone crisis, focusing on the interlinked origins and impacts of the Euro-Zone crisis and the policy responses to it. The book is distinguished from existing research by its avoidance (and rejection) of the too-often simplistic analysis that has characterized political, media and regrettably some academic coverage, and by its attempt to escape from the tyranny of day-to-day events and short-term developments. Each of the contributors identifies an important question and undertakes a careful empirical, theoretically-informed analysis that produces novel perspectives. Together they seek to balance many of the existing accounts that have rushed to sometimes unwarranted conclusions, concerning, for example, the locus of institutional power in European crisis-management; the power and centrality of particular member states, notably Germany which has been attributed with 'hegemonic' status; the supposed entrapment of EU policy makers by an 'austerity ideology'; and the deep flaws that apparently afflict the solutions to the crisis put painstakingly in place, such as Banking Union. While it will be some time before the EU can put the crisis behind it, and the dust finally settles on the revised institutional system that emerges, The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis marks an important step towards a considered, reflective analysis of the tumultuous events and developments of the crisis period.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• List of Figures List of Tables
• 1. Introduction PART I: THE 'PARTY PERIOD' BEFORE THE CRISIS
• 2. The costs and benefits for joining a common currency with emphasis on weaker member-states 2.1. Potential Sources of conflicts/costs: De-synchronization of business cycles 2.2. Demand disturbances and trade 2.3. Responses to labor market rigidities 2.4. Shortage of money stocks for the peripheral countries 2.5. External Imbalances 2.6. The effect of a monetary union on trade between member-states 2.7. Ten years of EMU (2000-2009). Convergence or divergence prevailed?
• 3. Greece before the crisis. The critical years in domestic Politics 3.1. The discussion in the Greek Parliament ahead of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 3.2. Various other debates and key speeches in the Greek Parliament during the term of the government that brought the Maastricht treaty for ratification by the Greek Parliament
• 4. What the IMF and EU bodies were reporting for Greece during the accession period ('90s) and the 2000-2009 golden years, as well during the implementation of the conditionality program, in particular with respect to the fiscal consolidation policy mix 4.1. IMF reports during the accession period ('90s) and the 2000-2009 'golden years'. 4.2. The implementation of the conditionality program: Fiscal consolidation and the issue of spending cuts vs. revenue increases 4.2.1. Research with regard to the policy mix of fiscal adjustments 4.2.2. IMF progress reports on the Greek Conditionality Program 4.3 European Union bodies' reports and decisions. 4.3.1. Annual country specific recommendations by the Council and European Commission recommendations to the Council. 4.3.2. The decision to admit Greece to the euro area. PART II: GREECE'S FREE FALL 2010-2013
• 5. The Troika period reconsidered 5.1. The Greek public finances and debt. A Brief overview 5.2. The run up to the memorandum 5.3. What the Memorandum initially provided 5.4. Implementing the Memorandum as of September 2011 and the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy 5.5. Incentives and unraveling the impasse Appendix to
• 5: OECD structural indicators in key network industries
• 6. Assessing the intentions of the government(s) since the ratification of the Maastricht treaty 6.1. The 1990-93 program, design and implementation 6.2. The 2010 program. Design, implementation and comparison with the 1990-93 approach. 6.3. The 'internal devaluation' fallacy of 2010-2012 6.4. The other side of the internal devaluation fallacy - the approach to the labor market deregulation during 2010-12. 6.5. The lack of a strategy to enhance growth - in Greece and in Europe 6.6. The private sector death - trap: Undermining the financial sector, jeopardizing macroeconomic stability and questioning the European future of the country 6.6.1. The PSI 6.6.2. Euro area exit PART III: LOOKING AHEAD
• 7. Greece: Why did the forceful internal devaluation fail to kick-start an export led growth? 7.1. Introduction 7.2. Employment 7.3. Wages and earnings 7.4. Labour cost indexes and exports 7.5. Conclusions and further remarks
• 8. Giving Greece a chance to succeed
• 9. Structural differences ensure permanent shock-trends that play into the above. A closer and more democratic union to heal economic asymmetries helping southern member-states 9.1. The compromise of the euro area: Common monetary, national fiscal and structural policies 9.2. Evaluating the current structure of powers and democratic mandates 9.3. How changes in the structure of the democratic mandates can secure a 'closer and more democratic' Union 9.4. The role of European parties
• 10. Conclusions Index.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Greece's economy symbolizes in many ways the Eurozone's economic problems and divergent interests as it amasses most of the economic disadvantages characterizing the Eurozone's economy itself. This book presents the economic and political challenges to Greece and the EU member states.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• I. Transatlantic Linkages
• 1. Ken Ash, The Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade Policy and Trade Agreement
• 2. Ivan Belyacz and Erzsebet Szasz, The Deeper Roots of the Financial System's Propensity to Crisis
• 3. Bruno Dallago, The Financial and Real Crisis in the Eurozone and Vulnerable Economies II. The Crisis and Policies: A Transatlantic Perspective
• 4. Steven Rosefielde, Secular Crisis: The Mundell-Fleming Trilemma and EU De-Legitimization
• 5. Quinn Mills, Assessment of the EU's management of the EZ crisis
• 6. Nicola Acocella, A Tale of two cities: Exit Policies in Washington and Frankfurt III. Institutions, Rivalry and the Consequences for Democracy
• 7. Simona Piattoni, Institutional Innovations and EU Legitimacy after the Crisis
• 8. Paul Blokker, The European Crisis as a Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
• 9. Layna Mosley, (De)Fault Lines? The EU, National Governments and Private Capital Markets in the Post-Crisis Era IV. The European Currency and Transatlantic Relations
• 10. Domenico Mario Nuti, Euroarea: Premature, Diminished, Divergent
• 11. Paolo Guerrieri, The Euro Crisis and its Impact upon Transatlantic Relations
• 12. Alfred Steinherr, Why Germany should leave the Euro
• 13. Roberto Tamborini, EMU 2.0 and the German Problem.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The adoption and management of the common currency has led the Eurozone to a critical point. This book analyzes in an interdisciplinary way the fundamental causes of distress, making sure to relate economic issues to the social and political aspects of the problem. The book explores the reasons why the Eurozone has fallen into a policy trap, as well as what Europe did and should do to exit the crisis, and why this is proving to be so difficult. The book also considers what role the United States has played, and could play to help foster a solution for the Eurozone. The main topics explored are the complex nature of the crisis, the short circuit between policies and the given institutional architecture, the controversial role of Germany, and the importance of an active role of the US. The book brings together a transatlantic group of scholars in order to offer an interdisciplinary analysis of the deep causes of the Eurozone distress. The authors recognize that the Eurozone countries have contrasting situations and interests and face different problems with complex consequences for the vexed question of national sovereignty within the EU; and pay attention to the social and political consequences of the economic and financial distress and of the perceived strain of the common currency.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Opening remarks and keynote speech
• Keynote Speech to the XXVII General Congress of the UAE
• Economic and financial crisis: the response of the european union Reflections on the Euro Crisis and on the Role of Germany
• The Eurozone Crisis: the Way Forward
• Eu state aid control in the banking sector Introductory Remarks by the Moderator
• Overview of State Aid for Banks since the Beginning of the Financial Crisis
• The Economic and Financial Crisis in Europe: State Aid and Banks in the European Union - Selected Examples
• State aid control in the banking sector: the recapitalisation of Portuguese Banks
• The Spanish Financial Sector Restructuring from a State Aid Law Perspective
• The Irish Banking Crisis - a Special Case
• The reform of the banking sector in europe the future banking union
• Deposit Guarantee Schemes in the Banking Union
• Macro-Prudential Policy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism
• The Reform of the Banking Sector in Europe the Future Banking Union
• The Role of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism
• Legal and economic perspectives of the eu support policies for growth and economic recovery The European Union Institutional and Budgetary Framework for Growth and Recovery
• Le rôle de l'innovation et de la recherche dans la reprise économique de l'UE.

"2010, année noire pour l'Union Européenne, confrontée à la plus grave crise économique et financière depuis sa constitution il y a 50 ans déjà. L'Union des Avocats Européens (UAE), à l'occasion de son 27e Congrès, tenu à Lisbonne, a voulu se livrer à une réflexion sur la crise et les remèdes mis en place par l'Union Européenne. Après avoir entendu l'ancien Président du Portugal, M. Jorge Sampaio, appeler à un "New Deal" européen, les orateurs ont livré aux participants une étude exhaustive des dispositions adoptées par l'Union pour répondre à la crise, notamment la mise en place d'une vraie Union Bancaire, le renforcement du contrôle de l'euro, l'organisation d'une synergie entre le budget de l'Union et des Etats membres, et la mise en place d'un contrôle renforcé des aides d'Etat au secteur financier. Cet ouvrage riche et documenté, porteur d'espoir, s'adresse aux professionnels du droit et de la finance, mais encore à tous ceux qui sont intéressés par le développement de l'Union Européenne."--P. [4] of cover.

• Introduction
• 1. An Asymmetric Economic and Monetary Union
• 2. The Euro Area Crisis
• 3. The Responses to the Crisis
• 4. The Evolution of EMU: Challenges and Underlying Principles
• 5. The Mechanics of EMU Integration and Questions of Competence
• 6. Intergovernmentalism
• 7. The Shapes and Problems of Multi-speed integration
• 8. The Courts and the Crisis
• 9. Constitutional Obstacles to Further Integration
• 10. The Future of EMU: Models of Integration
• Conclusion.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

The euro area sovereign debt crisis has been the greatest threat to the euro since its inception, but the consequences of the crisis go well beyond the realm of macroeconomics: the crisis has cast doubt on the viability of a mechanism of integration such as the one envisaged in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and on the future of the European Union as a political project in the face of citizens' growing disaffection. The various responses to the crisis have not only altered the principles underlying EMU; they have also had a profound impact on the constitutional orders of the EU and its Member States. This book focuses on the euro area crisis and its aftermath from a constitutional perspective. It provides a critical analysis of the workings and evolution of Economic and Monetary Union, the changes brought by the crisis and their broader effects, and the constitutional obstacles to integration in this area. Looking forward, it tackles the uncertain future of economic and fiscal integration and the challenges posed. This is a compelling and incisive account of some of the most significant developments and dilemmas facing the European Union since its creation.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• *Frontmatter, pg. i*Contents, pg. vii*Preface, pg. xi*ONE. A Giant Historic Mistake?, pg. 1*TWO. Before the Fall, pg. 25*THREE. Greece and the Idolatry of Debt, pg. 48*FOUR. Ireland: The Private Is Political, pg. 80*FIVE. Europe Digs Deeper, pg. 106*SIX. Righting the Course: From Bail-Out to Bail-In, pg. 139*SEVEN. If Europe Dared to Write Down Debt, pg. 165*EIGHT. Europe's Real Economic Challenges, pg. 189*NINE. The Politics That the Euro Needs, pg. 217*TEN. Great Britain or Little England?, pg. 242*ELEVEN. Remembering What the Euro Is For, pg. 265*Notes, pg. 273*Index, pg. 303.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Originally conceived as part of a unifying vision for Europe, the euro is now viewed as a millstone around the neck of a continent crippled by vast debts, sluggish economies, and growing populist dissent. In Europe's Orphan, leading economic commentator Martin Sandbu presents a compelling defense of the euro. He argues that rather than blaming the euro for the political and economic failures in Europe since the global financial crisis, the responsibility lies firmly on the authorities of the eurozone and its member countries. The eurozone's self-inflicted financial calamities and economic decline resulted from a toxic cocktail of unforced policy errors by bankers, politicians, and bureaucrats; the unhealthy coziness between finance and governments; and, above all, an extreme unwillingness to restructure debt. Sandbu traces the origins of monetary union back to the desire for greater European unity after the Second World War. But the euro's creation coincided with a credit bubble that governments chose not to rein in. Once the crisis hit, a battle of both ideas and interests led to the failure to aggressively restructure sovereign and bank debt. Ideologically informed choices set in motion dynamics that encouraged more economic mistakes and heightened political tensions within the eurozone. Sandbu concludes that the prevailing view that monetary union can only work with fiscal and political union is wrong and dangerous--and risks sending the continent into further political paralysis and economic stagnation. Contending that the euro has been wrongfully scapegoated for the eurozone's troubles, Europe's Orphan charts what actually must be done for the continent to achieve an economic and political recovery.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)

• Preface PART I: 1970-1991 Engaging Germany, Modernising France The Drive For A European Treaty On Economic And Monetary Union (EMU)
• 1. Introduction: Why did France want EMU?
• 2. 1984-88: How the EMU Treaty Project Took Shape
• 3. 1988-90: German Unity and European Union
• 4.
• 1991: The Maastricht Negotiations
• 5. The EMU Deal: French Ambition-- German Design? PART II: 1992-2014 Putting The Treaty Deal Into Practice French Political Management Of Emu
• 6. 1992-96: The Years of Turmoil and Disarray
• 7. 1996 -
• 99: Recovery and Launch of a Wide Eurozone
• 8. 1999-2007: French Competitiveness and European Reform
• 9. 2007-12: The Crisis Years
• 10. Conclusions and Future Policy Challenges Acronyms and Abbreviations Select Bibliography and Further Reading.
• (source: Nielsen Book Data)

Why did France, with its strong sense of national identity, want to give up the Franc for the Euro? Drawing on the author's experience as a British diplomat in Paris and on new archive evidence, this book explores how France's drive for European Economic and Monetary Union arose from the challenges posed by unstable global financial markets, the political demands of a rising urban middle class and the restoration of Germany's economic strength. It traces the unresolved Franco-German tensions over the design and political governance of European economic co-operation which led to crisis, and asks whether this ambitious European project can still become the force for modernisation and growth, and the shield against the extremes of globalisation and nationalism, that France's leaders hoped it would be.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)