The Weight of Things explores the hard questions of our daily lives, examining both classic and contemporary accounts of what it means to lead 'the good life'. Looks at the views of philosophers such as Aristotle, the Stoics, Mill, Nietzsche, and Sartre as well as contributions from other traditions, such as Buddhism Incorporates key arguments from contemporary philosophers including Peter Singer, Martha Nussbaum, Robert Nozick, John Finnis, and Susan Wolf Uses examples from biography, literature, history, movies and media, and the news Gives a fresh perspective on the hard questions of our daily lives An engaging read; an excellent book for both students and general readers. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Book — xvi, 216 p.
1. The value of knowledge is external to it--
2. The value of true belief--
3. The value of justification--
4. Reliabilism, normativity and the special promise of virtue--
5. The Gettier problem and the value of knowledge--
6. Knowledge as irreducibly valuable--
7. Epistemic attitudinalism: semantic and pragmatic approaches--
8. Knowledge and understanding--
9. Conclusion-- References-- Index.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Book — xiii, 314 p. : ill.
1. Formalization-- Part I. Values:
2. Exclusionary preferences--
3. Preference states--
4. Changes in exclusionary preferences--
5. Constructing combinative preferences--
6. Pairwise combinative preferences--
7. Decision-guiding combinative preferences--
8. Monadic value predicates-- Part II. Norms:
9. A starting point for deontic logic--
10. Situationist deontic logic--
11. Conflicts and counterfactuals--
12. Rules and normative systems--
13. Legal relations-- Epilogue:
14. Afterthought-- Proofs-- References-- Index of symbols-- General index.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Formal representations of values and norms are employed in several academic disciplines and specialties, such as economics, jurisprudence, decision theory and social choice theory. Sven Ove Hansson closely examines such foundational issues as the values of wholes and the values of their parts, the connections between values and norms, how values can be decision-guiding and the structure of normative codes with formal precision. Models of change in both preferences and norms are offered, as well as a method to base the logic of norms on that of preferences. Hansson has developed a unified formal representation of values and norms that reflects both their static and their dynamic properties. This formalized treatment, carried out in terms of both informal value theory and precise logical detail, will contribute to the clarification of certain issues in the basic philosophical theory of values and norms. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
How can we know what is worth seeking or avoiding in life? Is there anything to know? If so, is it in some sense personal? This fresh and engaging work by noted philosopher Joel Kupperman addresses these questions as it examines the epistemology of value. Kupperman looks first at how judgments of values manifest themselves, whether there can be evidence for them, and whether a realistic account is appropriate. Focusing on emotional states, he rejects the notion that there is one primary value, arguing instead for a pluralistic understanding of value. He contends that value is strongly contextual; the value of a particular set of experiences in one's life can depend heavily on how they fit in with or provide contrast to other elements. Kupperman argues both for a realistic account of value-some things really do have a value about which we can have reasonable confidence-and for skepticism about how much we can actually know about value. The study moves on to explore the relations between judgments of value, and moral or social policy decisions of how we should behave. Acknowledging strong objections to the attempt by any group to impose its vision of a good life in a pluralistic society, Kupperman nevertheless argues that proper attention to value leads to perfectionism in social policy. Emphasizing the importance of detail in ethics, he focuses on variations among cases, and examines the weight cultural values can have in the social policy of a liberal society. Going further than previous works in determining what counts as evidence for a judgment of value, this book fills a substantial gap in the literature of ethical philosophy. Tackling difficult issues in an accessible manner, it will interest philosophers and students of ethics, epistemology, and social theory. (source: Nielsen Book Data)