The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known t. (source: Nielsen Book Data)
Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Book — xvi, 216 p.
1. The value of knowledge is external to it--
2. The value of true belief--
3. The value of justification--
4. Reliabilism, normativity and the special promise of virtue--
5. The Gettier problem and the value of knowledge--
6. Knowledge as irreducibly valuable--
7. Epistemic attitudinalism: semantic and pragmatic approaches--
8. Knowledge and understanding--
9. Conclusion-- References-- Index.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology. (source: Nielsen Book Data)