Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004.
Book — 92 p. : map ; 24 cm.
1. Reassessing Protracted State Collapse in Somalia-- The collapse of central government-- Protracted armed conflict-- Lawlessness and criminality--
2. Interests and Risks in a Collapsed State-- Interests in protracted conflict-- Interests promoting lawlessness-- Interests promoting state collapse--
3. Somalia, Global Security and the War on Terrorism-- Security concerns prior to
11 September-- Terrorism and political Islamic movements in the 1990s-- Terrorism and radical Islam in Somalia today-- The misdiagnosis of collapsed states as safe havens-- Conclusion: Policy Implications-- Notes.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
Close analysis of how non-state actors adapt to state collapse is critical for effective strategies of peace building, development, and counter-terrorism in those crises. In Somalia, the nature of state collapse has changed significantly since 1995. Armed conflict is more localized; lawlessness is better contained by local authorities; and warlords have been weakened by an emerging commercial elite whose interests lie in stability, not plunder. Risk-aversion drives political behaviour and partially explains the reluctance of local elites to support a revived central government. Somalia has to date not been particularly attractive as a safe haven for terrorists due to the risk of betrayal and extortion foreigners face there. Instead, terrorist networks have used Somalia principally as a short-term transshipment site into Kenya. Efforts to revive a central state in Somalia risk creating a "paper state" - one which lacks a capacity to govern and is prone to police corruption, providing an environment in which terrorist networks thrive. (source: Nielsen Book Data)