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 LORI (Workshop) (7th : 2019 : Chongqing, China)
 Berlin, Germany : Springer, 2019.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource (xxi, 441 pages) : illustrations (some color).
 Summary

 Intro; Preface; Organization; Abstract of Invited Talks; The Dynamics of Group Knowledge and Belief; ArgumentBased Paraconsistent Logics; Realism, Simplicity, and Topology; Reasoning in Dynamic Games: From Rationality to Rationalization; Understanding Equilibrium Properties of Multiagent Systems; Beyond Knowing that: A New Generation of Epistemic Logics; Contents; On the Right Path: A Modal Logic for Supervised Learning; 1 Introduction; 2 Modal Logic of Supervised Learning (SLL); 2.1 Language and Semantics; 2.2 Application: Winning Strategies in SLG; 2.3 Preliminary Observations
 3 Expressive Power of SLL3.1 FirstOrder Translation; 3.2 Bisimulation and Characterization for SLL; 4 Model Checking and Satisfiability for SLL; 5 Conclusion and Future Work; References; Elementary Iterated Revision and the Levi Identity; 1 Introduction; 2 Preliminaries; 2.1 SingleStep Change; 2.2 Iterated Change; 3 Elementary Revision Operators; 4 Extending the Levi Identity; 4.1 A Proposal Involving Rational Closure; 4.2 Nayak et al.'s `New Levi Identity'; 4.3 Rational Closure and the New Levi Identity; 5 Is Iterated Revision Reducible to Iterated Contraction?
 6 Conclusions and Further WorkReferences; Undefinability in Inquisitive Logic with Tensor; 1 Introduction; 2 Definability and Eliminability; 3 Inquisitive Logic with Tensor Disjunction; 4 Eliminability; 5 Independence of the Connectives; 5.1 Undefinability of; 5.2 Undefinability of; 6 Conclusion; References; MinimalChange Counterfactuals in Intuitionistic Logic; 1 Introduction; 2 Counterfactuals in Intuitionistic Kripke Semantics; 3 Minimal Change Conditions; 4 Axiomatization; 5 Canonical Model Construction; 6 Conclusion and Outlook; References
 Consolidation of Belief in Two Logics of Evidence1 Introduction; 2 A Multiagent Logic of Evidence; 3 A Consolidation Operation; 3.1 Definitions; 3.2 Examples; 3.3 Properties; 3.4 A Unified Language for Evidence and Beliefs; 4 Equivalence Between Evidence Models; 4.1 From B&P to FVEL Models; 4.2 From FVEL to B&P Models; 4.3 Evaluating the Conversions; 5 Comparing Consolidations; 6 Conclusion; References; From Classical to Nonmonotonic Deontic Logic Using ASPIC+; 1 Using ASPIC+ to Design Nonmonotonic Deontic Logics; 2 Running Example: FreeChoice Permission
 3 Step
 1: Arguments Based on Two Monotonic Logics4 Step
 2: Preferences Among Arguments; 5 Step
 3: Designing Nonmonotonic Logics; 6 Related Work; 7 Summary and Concluding Remarks; References; A Discrete Representation of Lattice Frames; 1 Introduction; 2 Notation and First Definitions; 3 Urquhart's Lattice Representation; 4 Modal Definability of Doubly Ordered Frames; 5 Representability of Lattice Frames; 6 Summary and Outlook; References; Group Announcement Logic with Distributed Knowledge; 1 Introduction; 2 Background; 2.1 Languages; 2.2 Models and Bisimulation; 2.3 Semantics of GALD
 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2018]
 Description
 Book — vi, 322 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.
 Summary

 Chapter 1. Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency (Walter Carnielli).
 Chapter 2. The price of true contradictions about the world (Jonas R. Becker Arenhart).
 Chapter 3. The possibility and fruitfulness of a debate on the Principle of NonContradiction (Luis EstradaGonzalez).
 Chapter 4. Keeping Globally Inconsistent Scientific Theories Locally Consistent (Michele Friend).
 Chapter 5. Title Not Available (Eduardo Barrio).
 Chapter 6. Provided you're not trivial: Adding defaults and paraconsistency to a formal model of explanation (David Gaytan).
 Chapter 7. ParaDisagreement Logics and their Implementation through Embedding in Coq and SMT (Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo).
 Chapter 8. Asymptotic quasicompleteness and ZFC (Marco Panza).
 Chapter 9. Interpretation and Truth in Set Theory (Rodrigo A. Freire).
 Chapter 10. Coherence of the product law for independent continuous events (Daniele Mundici).
 Chapter 11. A localglobal principle for the real continuum (Jose Carlos Magossi).
 Chapter 12. Quantitative Logic Reasoning (Marcelo Finger).
 Chapter 13. Reconciling firstorder logic to algebra (Walter Carnielli).
 Chapter 14. Plug and play negations (Sergio Marcelino).
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
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4. Fallibilism : evidence and knowledge [2018]
 Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne), author.
 First edition.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Summary

What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not guarantee that there is a crow (it might be a rook, or one might be dreaming). As a result, those wanting to avoid philosophical scepticism have standardly embraced "fallibilism": one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Despite this, there's been a persistent temptation to endorse "infallibilism", according to which knowledge requires evidence that guarantees truth. For doesn't it sound contradictory to simultaneously claim to know and admit the possibility of error? Infallibilism is undergoing a contemporary renaissance. Furthermore, recent infallibilists make the surprising claim that they can avoid scepticism. Jessica Brown presents a fresh examination of the debate between these two positions. She argues that infallibilists can avoid scepticism only at the cost of problematic commitments concerning evidence and evidential support. Further, she argues that alleged objections to fallibilism are not compelling. She concludes that we should be fallibilists. In doing so, she discusses the nature of evidence, evidential support, justification, blamelessness, closure for knowledge, defeat, epistemic akrasia, practical reasoning, concessive knowledge attributions, and the threshold problem.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
5. Fallibilism : evidence and knowledge [2018]
 Brown, Jessica (Jessica Anne), author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — xii, 197 pages ; 23 cm
 Summary

What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not guarantee that there is a crow (it might be a rook, or one might be dreaming). As a result, those wanting to avoid philosophical scepticism have standardly embraced "fallibilism": one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Despite this, there's been a persistent temptation to endorse "infallibilism", according to which knowledge requires evidence that guarantees truth. For doesn't it sound contradictory to simultaneously claim to know and admit the possibility of error? Infallibilism is undergoing a contemporary renaissance. Furthermore, recent infallibilists make the surprising claim that they can avoid scepticism. Jessica Brown presents a fresh examination of the debate between these two positions. She argues that infallibilists can avoid scepticism only at the cost of problematic commitments concerning evidence and evidential support. Further, she argues that alleged objections to fallibilism are not compelling. She concludes that we should be fallibilists. In doing so, she discusses the nature of evidence, evidential support, justification, blamelessness, closure for knowledge, defeat, epistemic akrasia, practical reasoning, concessive knowledge attributions, and the threshold problem.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
6. The limitations of the open mind [2018]
 Fantl, Jeremy.
 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Summary

 PART I: The Epistemology of OpenMindedness;
 1: OpenMindedness; 1.1 OpenMindedness Toward Arguments; 1.2 Conceptions of OpenMindedness; 1.3 OpenMindedness and Outright Belief; 1.4 Conclusion;
 2: A Defense of (a Different Kind of) Dogmatism; 2.1 Knowledge and ClosedMindedness; 2.2 ForwardLooking Dogmatism; 2.3 The Case for Dogmatism FL; 2.4 Conclusion;
 3: The Epistemic Efficacy of Amateurism; 3.1 Coins and Counterarguments; 3.2 HigherOrder Evidence; 3.3 The Epistemic Efficacy of Amateurism
 3.4 The Novice Knowledge Principle and the Case for the Other Side; 3.5 Conclusion;
 4: Psychic Phenomena and the Existence of God; 4.1 Sources of Knowledge; 4.2 Felt Obviousness; 4.3 Prima Facie Goat and Atheistic Knowledge; 4.4 Goat and Atheistic Knowledge, Undefeated; 4.4.1 The finetuning argument; 4.4.2 Statistical arguments for psi; 4.5 Conclusion: The Position of the Expert; PART II: The Ethics of Participation in Argumentation;
 5: The Obligation to Engage; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Is the Obligation a Role Ought?; 5.3 The Duty to Maximize Good Epistemic Consequences
 5.4 The Rights of Disputants 5.5 Conclusion;
 6: Against OpenMinded Engagement (for Some People); 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The Case Against OpenMindedness; 6.3 From Knowledge to ClosedMindedness; 6.3.1 Worries about the linking premise; 6.3.2 The argument for the linking premise; 6.4 Dealing with the Arguments for OpenMinded Engagement;
 7: Against ClosedMinded Engagement (in Some Situations); 7.1 The Pitfalls of ClosedMinded Engagement; 7.2 The Pitfalls of Insincerity; 7.3 The Pitfalls of Sincerity;
 8: On Inviting Problematic Speakers to Campus; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Learning from Problematic Speakers 8.3 The Case Against Inviting (Some) Problematic Speakers; 8.3.1 Problematic speakers and psychological harm; 8.3.2 Problematic speakers and intrinsic harm; 8.3.3 Problematic speakers and the respect for truth; 8.4 Conclusion.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
 Dancy, Jonathan, author.
 First edition.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Summary

Everyone allows that we can reason to a new belief from beliefs that we already have. Aristotle thought that we could also reason from beliefs to action. Practical Shape: A Theory of Practical Reasoning establishes this possibility of reasoning to action, in a way that allows also for reasoning to intention, hope, fear, and doubt. While many philosophers have found little sense in Aristotle's claim, Dancy offers a general theory of reasoning that is sensitive to current debates but still Aristotelian in spirit. The text clearly sets out the similarities between reasoning to action and reasoning to belief, which are far more striking than any dissimilarities. Its detailed account of practical reasoning, a topic inadequately covered in current literature, is presented in such a way as to be intelligible to a variety of readers, making it an ideal resource for students of philosophy but also of interest to academics in related disciplines.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
 Robles, Gemma, author.
 London, United Kingdom ; San Diego, CA : Academic Press, an imprint of Elsevier, [2018]
 Description
 Book — xxi, 136 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
 Summary

 PART I. Models with Set of Designated Points
 1. The basic logic Bc and its semantics
 2. Completeness of Bc
 3. Extensions of Bc PART II. Models without a Set of Designated Points
 4. The logic BK
 5. Extensions of BK PART III. Formulations by Means of a Falsity Constant
 6. The logics B+, F and BK+, F
 7. Definitional equivalence PART IV. Relevance and IntuitionisticType Negations
 8. The logic RBc and its extensions
 9. The logic RB+, t, F and its extensions.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
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 Simmons, Keith, author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Summary

 Cover; Semantic Singularities: Paradoxes of Reference, Predication, and Truth; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents;
 1: Semantic Paradox; 1.1 Three Paradoxes; 1.2 Ramsey's Division; 1.3 Universality; 1.4 The Plan of This Book;
 2: Paradox and Context; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Repetition, Rehabilitation, Iteration; 2.3 Contextchange and Discourse Analysis; 2.4 Contextchange and Repetition; 2.5 The Action of Context on Content; 2.6 Reflective Status as a Contextual Coordinate; 2.7 Four Tests for Contextsensitivity; 2.8 A Simple Russell; 2.9 A Simple Liar;
 3: Singularities
 3.1 Minimality and Singularities3.2 Reflective Status; 3.3 More on Singularities;
 4: Identifying Singularities; 4.1 Primary Trees; 4.2 Singularities and Semantic Universality; 4.3 Comparisons;
 5: Paradoxes of Definability, Russell's Paradox, the Liar; 5.1 Paradoxes of Definability; 5.1.1 Richard's Paradox; 5.1.2 Berry and König; 5.2 Russell's Paradox; 5.2.1 Sets and Classes; 5.2.2 Extensions; 5.2.3 Extensions and Paradox; 5.3 The Liar Paradox; 5.3.1 The Strengthened Liar; 5.3.2 More Liars;
 6: A General Theory of Singularities; 6.1 Preliminaries; 6.1.1 Explicitly Reflective Contexts
 6.1.2 Determination Sets and Values6.2 Basic Notions; 6.3 The 0expressions; 6.4 The Reflective Hierarchy; 6.5 Reflectionfree Expressions and Singularities; 6.6 Higher Levels of the Reflective Hierarchy; 6.7 Summary;
 7: The Theory at Work; 7.1 A Transfinite Paradox of Denotation; 7.2 The TruthTeller, a Curry Sentence, Loops; 7.2.1 The TruthTeller and the Curry Paradox; 7.2.2 Loops; 7.3 New Paradoxes without Circularity; 7.3.1 A Definability Paradox without Circularity; 7.3.2 A Russell without Circularity; 7.3.3 Truth Paradoxes without Circularity;
 8: Revenge, I; 8.1 Forms of Revenge
 8.2 Kripke's Theory of Truth8.3 Field's Theory of Truth; 8.3.1 Kripke and Nonclassical Logic; 8.3.2 Field's Theory of Truth; 8.3.3 Field's Conditional; 8.3.4 Determinate Truth; 8.3.5 Field's Theory and Natural Language; 8.4 Dialetheism and Revenge;
 9: Revenge, II; 9.1 Contextual Theories and Direct Revenge; 9.2 Contextual Theories and Secondorder Revenge; 9.3 The Singularity Theory and Revenge; 9.4 Summary;
 10: Consequences for Deflationism; 10.1 Deflationary Truth; 10.2 Deflationism Extended; 10.3 Deflationism and Semantic Paradox; 10.4 Three Deflationist Responses
 10.4.1 Pathology as Meaningless?10.4.2 An Unrestricted Truth Schema?; 10.4.3 A Restricted Truth Schema?; 10.5 The Expressive Role of Truth; 10.6 The Prosentential Theory and Horwich's Minimalism; 10.6.1 The Prosentential Theory; 10.6.2 Horwich's Minimalism; 10.7 Concluding Remarks; Bibliography; Index
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
 Sullivan, Meghan, author.
 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource.
 Summary

Should you care less about your distant future? What about events in your life that have already happened? How should the passage of time affect your planning and assessment of your life? Most of us think it is irrational to ignore the future but completely harmless to dismiss the past. But this book argues that rationality requires temporal neutrality: if you are rational you don't engage in any kind of temporal discounting. The book draws on puzzles about reallife planning to build the case for temporal neutrality. How much should you save for retirement? Does it make sense to cryogenically freeze your brain after death? How much should you ask to be compensated for a past injury? Will climate change make your life meaningless? Meghan Sullivan considers what it is for you to be a person extended over time, how time affects our ability to care about ourselves, and all of the ways that our emotions might bias our rational planning. Drawing substantially from work in social psychology, economics and the history of philosophy, the book offers a systematic new theory of rational planning.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — viii, 302 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
 Summary

Explanatory reasoning is ubiquitous. Not only are rigorous inferences to the best explanation used pervasively in the sciences, this kind of reasoning is common in everyday life. Despite its widespread use, inference to the best explanation is still in need of precise formulation, and it remains controversial. On the one hand, supporters of explanationism take inference to the best explanation to be a justifying form of inference; some even take all justification to be a matter of explanatory reasoning. On the other hand, critics object that inference to the best explanation is not a fundamental form of inference, and some argue that we should be skeptical of inference to the best explanation in general. This volume brings together twenty philosophers to explore various aspects of inference to the best explanation and the debates surrounding it. These specially commissioned essays constitute the cutting edge of research on the role explanatory considerations play in epistemology and philosophy of science.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
12. Categories for the working philosopher [2017]
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — xiv, 471 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
 Summary

Often people have wondered why there is no introductory text on category theory aimed at philosophers working in related areas. The answer is simple: what makes categories interesting and significant is their specific use for specific purposes. These uses and purposes, however, vary over many areas, both "pure", e.g., mathematical, foundational and logical, and "applied", e.g., applied to physics, biology and the nature and structure of mathematical models. Borrowing from the title of Saunders Mac Lane's seminal work "Categories for the Working Mathematician", this book aims to bring the concepts of category theory to philosophers working in areas ranging from mathematics to proof theory to computer science to ontology, from to physics to biology to cognition, from mathematical modeling to the structure of scientific theories to the structure of the world. Moreover, it aims to do this in a way that is accessible to nonspecialists. Each chapter is written by either a categorytheorist or a philosopher working in one of the represented areas, and in a way that builds on the concepts that are already familiar to philosophers working in these areas.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
13. Core logic [2017]
 Tennant, Neil, 1950 author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — xvii, 357 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm
 Summary

Neil Tennant presents an original logical system with unusual philosophical, prooftheoretic, metalogical, computational, and revisiontheoretic virtues. Core Logic, which lies deep inside Classical Logic, best formalizes rigorous mathematical reasoning. It captures constructive relevant reasoning. And the classical extension of Core Logic handles nonconstructive reasoning. These core systems fix all the mistakes that make standard systems harbor counterintuitive irrelevancies. Conclusions reached by means of core proof are relevant to the premises used. These are the first systems that ensure both relevance and adequacy for the formalization of all mathematical and scientific reasoning. They are also the first systems to ensure that one can make deductive progress with potential logical strengthening by chaining proofs together: one will prove, if not the conclusion sought, then (even better!) the inconsistency of one's accumulated premises. So Core Logic provides transitivity of deduction with potential epistemic gain. Because of its clarity about the true internal structure of proofs, Core Logic affords advantages also for the automation of deduction and our appreciation of the paradoxes.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
14. Counterfactuals and probability [2017]
 Schulz, Moritz, author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — x, 236 pages ; 22 cm
 Summary

Moritz Schulz explores counterfactual thought and language: what would have happened if things had gone a different way. Counterfactual questions may concern large scale derivations (what would have happened if Nixon had launched a nuclear attack) or small scale evaluations of minor derivations (what would have happened if I had decided to join a different profession). A common impression, which receives a thorough defence in the book, is that oftentimes we find it impossible to know what would have happened. However, this does not mean that we are completely at a loss: we are typically capable of evaluating counterfactual questions probabilistically: we can say what would have been likely or unlikely to happen. Schulz describes these probabilistic ways of evaluating counterfactual questions and turns the data into a novel account of the workings of counterfactual thought.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
15. Introduction to logic [2017]
 Genesereth, Michael R., 1948, author.
 Third edition.  San Rafael, California (1537 Fourth Street, San Rafael, CA 94901 USA) : Morgan & Claypool, 2017.
 Description
 Book — 1 PDF (xiii, 163 pages).
 Summary

 * Preface* Introduction* Propositional Logic* Logical Properties and Relationships* Propositional Proofs* Propositional Resolution* Relational Logic* Relational Analysis* Relational Proofs* Herbrand Logic* Herbrand Proofs* Induction* Resolution* Bibliography* Authors' Biographies.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
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16. Lectures on inductive logic [2017]
 Williamson, Jon, author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — xiii, 201 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
 Summary

Logic is a field studied mainly by researchers and students of philosophy, mathematics and computing. Inductive logic seeks to determine the extent to which the premisses of an argument entail its conclusion, aiming to provide a theory of how one should reason in the face of uncertainty. It has applications to decision making and artificial intelligence, as well as how scientists should reason when not in possession of the full facts. In this book, Jon Williamson embarks on a quest to find a general, reasonable, applicable inductive logic (GRAIL), all the while examining why pioneers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap did not entirely succeed in this task. Along the way he presents a general framework for the field, and reaches a new inductive logic, which builds upon recent developments in Bayesian epistemology (a theory about how strongly one should believe the various propositions that one can express). The book explores this logic in detail, discusses some key criticisms, and considers how it might be justified. Is this truly the GRAIL? Although the book presents new research, this material is well suited to being delivered as a series of lectures to students of philosophy, mathematics, or computing and doubles as an introduction to the field of inductive logic.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
17. Modal logics and philosophy [2009]
 Girle, Rod, author.
 Second edition.  Montreal ; Ithaca, NY : McGillQueen's University Press : Acumen, 2017.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource (viii, 248 pages) : illustrations
 Summary

 Preface Acknowledgements
 1. Argument and modality Part I Formal systems
 2. A simple modal logic
 3. The normal modal logics
 4. The nonnormal modal logics
 5. Natural deduction and axiomatics
 6. Conditional logic
 7. Modal predicate logics
 8. Quantifiers and existence Part II Applications
 9. Alethic modality
 10. Temporal logic
 11. Dynamic logic
 12. Epistemic logic
 13. Deontic logic
 14. Conditionals and reliability
 15. Synthesis and worlds Answers Index.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
18. The normativity of rationality [2017]
 Kiesewetter, Benjamin, author.
 First edition.  Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — xii, 314 pages ; 24 cm
 Summary

Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. The Normativity of Rationality is concerned with the question of whether we ought to avoid such irrationality. Benjamin Kiesewetter defends the normativity of rationality by presenting a new solution to the problems that arise from the common assumption that we ought to be rational. The argument touches upon many other topics in the theory of normativity, such as the form and the content of rational requirements, the preconditions of criticism, and the function of reasons in deliberation and advice. Drawing on an extensive and careful assessment of the problems discussed in the literature, Kiesewetter provides a detailed defence of a reasonresponse conception of rationality, a novel, evidencerelative account of reasons, and an explanation of structural irrationality in terms of these accounts.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
19. Plural logic [2016]
 Oliver, Alex, author.
 Second edition.  Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
 Description
 Book — 1 online resource
 Summary

 1. The project
 2. History
 3. Changing the subject
 4. Predicative analyses
 5. Termssingular and plural
 6. The indeterminacy of plural denotation
 7. Some basic ideas of plural logic
 8. Plural descriptions
 9. Multivalued functions
 10. Lists
 11. Singular logic
 12. Midplural logic
 13. Full plural logic
 14. Cantorian set theory
 Postscript: unfinished business
 Principal symbols
 Glossary
 References
 Index.
 (source: Nielsen Book Data)
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
20. Reflections on the liar [2017]
 New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, [2017]
 Description
 Book — ix, 383 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
 Summary

In recent years there have been a number of booksboth anthologies and monographsthat have focused on the Liar Paradox and, more generally, on the semantic paradoxes, either offering proposed treatments to those paradoxes or critically evaluating ones that occupy logical space. At the same time, there are a number of people who do great work in philosophy, who have various semantic, logical, metaphysical and/or epistemological commitments that suggest that they should say something about the Liar Paradox, yet who have said very little, if anything, about that paradox or about the extant projects involving it. The purpose of this volume is to afford those philosophers the opportunity to address what might be described as reflections on the Liar.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)