Epistemic game theory : reasoning and choice
- Perea, Andrés.
- Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2012, ©2012.
- Physical description
- xviii, 561 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm
QA269 .P446 2012
- Unknown QA269 .P446 2012
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 552-558) and index.
- Acknowledgements-- 1. Introduction-- Part I. Standard Beliefs in Static Games: 2. Belief in the opponents' rationality-- 3. Common belief in rationality-- 4. Simple belief hierarchies-- Part II. Lexicographic Beliefs in Static Games: 5. Primary belief in the opponent's rationality-- 6. Respecting the opponent's preferences-- 7. Assuming the opponent's rationality-- Part III. Conditional Beliefs in Dynamic Games: 8. Belief in the opponents' future rationality-- 9. Strong belief in the opponents' rationality-- Bibliography-- Index.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Publisher's Summary
- In everyday life we must often reach decisions while knowing that the outcome will not only depend on our own choice, but also on the choices of others. These situations are the focus of epistemic game theory. Unlike classical game theory, it explores how people may reason about their opponents before they make their final choice in a game. Packed with examples and practical problems based on stories from everyday life, this is the first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory. Each chapter is dedicated to one particular, natural way of reasoning. The book then shows how each of these ways of reasoning will affect the final choices that can rationally be made and how these choices can be found by iterative procedures. Moreover, it does so in a way that uses elementary mathematics and does not presuppose any previous knowledge of game theory.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Publication date
- Copyright date
- Andrés Perea.