Risk, ambiguity, and decision
- "Further readings on choice under uncertainty, beliefs and the Ellsberg paradox / compiled by Mark J. Machina"--p. xxxix-xlviii.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 271-281).
- Acknowledgments-- Note to Reader-- Foreword, Isaac Levi -- 1. Ambiguity and Risk-- Vagueness, Confidence, and the Weight of Arguments-- The Nature and Uses of Normative Theory-- The Validation of Normative Propositions-- The Utility Axioms as Norms-- Normative Theory and Empirical Research-- 2. The Bernoulli Proposition-- A Possible Counterexample: Are there Uncertainties that are Not Risks?-- Vulgar Evaluations of Risk-- 3. The Measurement of Definite Opinions-- von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities-- Probability as Price-- "Coherence" and "Definiteness" of Probability-Prices-- Appendix to Chapter Three-- On Making a Fool of Oneself: The Requirement of Coherence-- Acceptable Odds: Definite, Coherent, and Otherwise-- 4. Opinions and Actions: Which Come First?-- The Logic of Degrees of Belief-- Opinions that Make Horse Races-- Postulate 2: the "Sure-Thing Principle"-- Intuitive Probabilities and "Vagueness"-- Appendix to Chapter Four-- The Savage Postulates-- The Koopman Axioms-- 5. Uncertainties that are Not Risks-- The "Three-Color Urn" Example-- Vulgar Evaluations of Ambiguity-- Appendix to Chapter Five-- 6. Why Are Some Uncertainties Not Risks?-- Decision Criteria for "Complete Ignorance"-- Decision Criteria for "Partial Ignorance"-- 7. The "Restricted Hurwicz Criterion"-- The "Restricted Bayes/Hurwicz Criterion"-- Boldness and Prudence: the "n-Color Urn" Example-- Ignorance, Probability, and Varieties of Gamblers-- 8. Ambiguity and the Utility Axioms-- The Pratt/Raiffa Criticisms and the Value of Randomization-- Rubin's Axiom-- Allais and the Sure-Thing Principle-- Winning at Russian Roulette-- Bibliography.
- (source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Publisher's Summary
- Risk, Ambiguity and Decision , is a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the position originally presented in Ellsberg's much-discussed, ground breaking article, 'Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms'. In this cogently argued book, Ellsberg mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision, and opens new fruitful lines of investigation whose lessons still have not been fully assimilated.
(source: Nielsen Book Data)
- Publication date
- Daniel Ellsberg ; [with an introduction by Isaac Levi].
- Studies in philosophy
- Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Harvard University, 1962.